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Do we treat 1990s as a gap, a rupture between the Soviet past and the post-Soviet 
present? Post-Soviet film and fiction certainly stage the break up of the Soviet Union and the end 
of Soviet rule in this way. Post-Soviet culture has left behind a certain set of Soviet cultural 
myths: the conquest of space, the normal functioning of Soviet life with clear sources of 
symbolic authority, the Soviet notion of heroism, etc. These myths have not been replaced with 
anything new. One can sense a real pause in films and texts from the late 80s and early 90s – as 
ideology, already exhausted by late socialism, takes a break. Eliot Borenstein speaks of the 
1990s as a moment of a loss of national identity, of emasculation of Russian culture. Mikhail 
Epstein argues that the end of socialism created a loop in the time of national history, whereupon 
the Soviet future (communism) became the post-Soviet past. Aleksei Yurchak has shown that the 
utopian stability of the Soviet “forever” was lost in late socialism, staging a seemingly 
cataclysmic break up of the Soviet Union and its ideological constructs. My project seeks to 
uncover the sites that post-Soviet texts create in order to reflect on the Soviet narratives that 
came to an end, and on those that can be put in their place. What kinds of myths do post-Soviet 
texts rely on to construct a notion of continuity that overcomes what was previously discarded or 
destroyed? What myths are persistent enough to survive the historical gap? 
I show that the texts from the 1990s already seek a path to re-mythologize the myths of 
the past. Their goal is to bridge the gap between the where Russia is now with where it had been. 
The project surveys the major players of the post-Soviet Russian cultural landscape, its most 
influential writers and filmmakers, to show that those same texts from the late 80s and 90s that 
seemingly spoke of the rupture, were always speaking about continuity. Svetlana Boym 
discusses the ways in which post-Communist nostalgia solidifies and stabilizes the mythological 
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space of Soviet culture, providing contemporary Russian culture with a workable past. With the 
imaginary worlds of Socialism gone upon the system’s downfall, the Soviet past solidifies into 
the retroactively-produced Žižekian mythical object, the object produced by the loss itself. In this 
imaginary and imagined past, the two meanings of myth merge: it is a “myth” in a sense that it 
never existed, its illusory nature exposed by the collapse of Communist ideology and its post-
Soviet deconstruction. Yet, it is also a “myth” in the Barthian sense, in a sense that the post-
Soviet imagination inflects and expands the meanings attached to the signifiers of the Soviet 
state. The signs and symbols of the (Soviet) past are invested with other, new meanings, 
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Situating Post-Soviet Culture 
Mожно было подумать, что это не живой человек, что он уже умер, или и не жил 
никогда, и ничего не видит в живом мире и не слышит ничего, кроме звенящих мертво 
слов. 
Федор Сологуб, Мелкий Бес 
 
You might conclude that he was not a living person, that he was already dead or had never lived, 
and that he saw nothing in the living world and heard nothing but dead-sounding words. 
Fyodor Sologub, The Petty Demon 
 
I. 
The first chapter is omitted for the time being. 
II. 
The alarm clock rattled like a tin of bonbons. The alarm clock was cheap, painted, brown, 
of Soviet manufacture… The clock was accurate, but Margulies did not depend on it… 
Margulies could not really have faith in so simple a mechanism as a timepiece; could not 
entrust to it so precious a thing as time1. 
In Valentin Kataev’s 1932 novel, Time, Forward! (Vremia, vpered!), the Socialist 
industrial achievement defies time itself: the novel hurries past its first chapter, but its three 
hundred pages of highly metaphorical narration, clipped sentences and immense narrative time 
compression deal with just one day in the life of the builders of “Magnitka”, The Magnitogorsk 
Iron and Steel Works in the Chelyabinsk region of the Soviet Union, an important event in the 
                                                
1 Valentine Kataev, Time, Forward!, trans. Charles Malamuth (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1995), 3. 
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history of Soviet industrialization. The plot develops around the motif of waiting: will the 
foremen allow the enthusiastic workers to beat the production record of the rival Kharkov 
concrete mixers? Will a pregnant woman be able to join the father of her baby on the production 
site? Will she be able to clean up his bachelor’s pad by nightfall? Will the engineer’s sister 
manage to get the notes from the engineer’s former professor before noon? Will the production 
deadline be met? 
The measured, structured time of the clock is a nuisance - a timepiece does not reflect the 
time of Socialism, hurriedly launching forward, towards its teleological goal. The sooner 
Communism comes, the better. Herein lies the paradox of Socialist Realist art: it exists, 
theoretically, in an ever-narrowing gap between the dark past and the bright Communist future 
that possesses an indelible sense of finality; yet the industrial novel, like Kataev’s, records the 
gap itself by narrating the building of Communism, and continuously postponing the arrival of 
the future. 
One is tempted, then, to read high Socialist Realist novel through Freud via Peter Brooks. 
Brooks, in his application of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death drive to narrative dynamics, 
argues that the narrative desire, “[t]he desire of the text… is…. desire for the end, … reached 
only through the at least minimally complicated detour, the intentional deviance, in tension, 
which is the plot of narrative.”2 In the larger scheme of Soviet cultural production, the Socialist 
Realist novel delays the coming of Communism by the very fact of its existence, its desire for the 
end of history in the form of the arrival of Communism counteracted by the circuitous narrative 
path it takes to bring Communism closer, taking its characters on sometimes extensively long 
journeys towards the heights of the Communist spirit. 
                                                
2 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Vintage, 1984), 104. 
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The temptation is even stronger in retrospect: the tension of delaying the end of the 
narrative is metaphorized as sexual tension in Vladimir Sorokin’s 1982 short novel, Marina’s 
Thirtieth Love. The distinctly apolitical, neurotic and shrewd female protagonist spends the 
whole novel exploring her sexuality, a taboo subject for Soviet prose, only to disappear in the 
stylistically faithful recreation of a high Socialist Realist novel after a particularly powerful 
orgasm (complete with a chorus singing the Soviet national anthem). After the narrative break, 
the sophisticated protagonist is no more; having lost her name (she now goes by her surname, in 
a nod to the Socialist novel’s stylistic preference), she goes to work in a factory and spends the 
last pages of the novel struggling to increase productivity amidst her roommates’ discussions on 
the most effective ways to contribute personally to the building of Communism. The novel 
closes with the complete dissolution of the subjective narrative perspective, as the suddenly 
emergent omniscient narrator proclaims that the “fruits of [the characters’] creativity” would 
serve the “further increase in the economic and defensive power of the Socialist Fatherland, as 
well as the rise in the prosperity of the Soviet people,”3 in the exact same language as the Soviet 
newspaper formula would have it. 
Intuitively, we may read Sorokin’s take on Socialist Realist literature as a purely parodic 
one. The power seems to have gone from Soviet textuality as it becomes meaningless, formulaic, 
agency-erasing in the closing pages of Marina. The beginning of the end was the year 1956, the 
year of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, which exposed Stalin’s 
personality cult, signifying a large symbolic shift at work in subsequent Soviet cultural 
production. The figure of Stalin that seemed to hold Soviet narratives together, always their 
                                                
3 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. “Пусть же плоды их дерзаний и творчества лучше служат 
дальнейшему повышению экономического и оборонного могущества социалистического Отечества, росту 
благосостояния советских людей” (Vladimir Sorokin, Tridsataia Lyubov’ Mariny (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo R. 
Elinina, 1995), 277) 
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implicit referent and addressee, “the master who… by being presented as standing outside 
ideological discourse and possessing an external knowledge of the objective truth, temporarily 
conceals the contradiction by allowing it to ‘appear through himself’”4, no longer legitimized the 
production of Soviet textuality. In Lacanian terms, Stalin is the Soviet version of the Name-of-
the-Father; for Jacques Lacan, the Name-of-the-Father is the fundamental signifier that launches 
the process of signification and thus identification: 
The function of symbolic identification… [the paternal function] concentrates in itself 
both imaginary and real relations that always more or less fail to correspond to the 
symbolic relation that essentially constitutes it. It is in the name of the father that we must 
recognize the basis of the symbolic function which, since the dawn of historical time, has 
identified his person with the figure of law5. 
Especially in view of Russian culture’s propensity for “upholding the leader as the father 
of the nation,”6 the revelations of the 20th Party Congress may be read as having launched the 
definitive disintegration of the Soviet Name-of-the-Father, facilitating the creation of a glaring 
absence in the symbolic structure underlying the way in which the Soviet state imagined itself. 
The role of Stalin as the master signifier of Soviet culture becomes evident in retrospect, after his 
personality cult is exposed; there is little doubt that, for post-Stalinist Soviet culture, Stalin 
becomes more than just a major historical figure. The figure of Stalin acquires a paradoxical 
duplicity in the later Soviet culture: on the one hand, post-Stalinist narratives forever lose their 
universal referent, no longer legitimized by the paternal metaphor; on the other, scholarship on 
                                                
4 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2006), 10. 
5 Jacques Lacan. “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, in Écrits: The First 
Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 230. 
6Yana Hashamova, Pride and Panic: Russian Imagination of the West in Post-Soviet Film (Bristol/Chicago, 
Intellect, 2007), 116. 
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late-Soviet culture notes that this metaphor expands7 to become the signifier of the Soviet era 
across a range of cultural texts. Even as the Soviet state continued to exist after the end of 
Stalinism, Stalin’s ghost continued to appear on screen and on page as the symbol of the cultural 
legacy of Socialism in the 1980s, still as important a staple of cinematic narratives as it used to 
be in Stalinist cinema8. In this way, the Soviet state itself emerges in post-Stalinist Soviet culture 
as a retrospective construction, as a structure of cultural memory solidified by the figure of 
Stalin. 
Lacan posits that the lack of the Name-of-the-Father opens up a hole in the signified, 
“set[ting] off a cascade of reworkings of the signifier from which the growing disaster of the 
imaginary proceeds, until the level is reached at which signifier and signified stabilize in a 
delusional metaphor.”9 Indeed, this may be an interpretative lens through which to read Vladimir 
Sorokin’s take on Soviet textuality: no longer sustained by the cult of Stalin, by one single 
legitimizing metaphor, the slogans and clichés of Soviet discourse become a parodic cascade of 
empty signs in the final pages of Marina’s Thirtieth Love. 
The post-Stalin history of Soviet Union has been read in precisely this way, as a gradual 
crumbling of the Soviet narratives. Alexei Yurchak proposes a linguistic reason for the collapse 
of the grand narrative of the Soviet state, as he explores the paradoxical situation in which Soviet 
culture of the 1970s-1980s found itself. The paradox, according to Yurchak, was that the 
seeming eternity of the Soviet system was very quickly replaced by the feeling of the 
inevitability of its collapse. Yurchak sees the reasons for this paradox in the production and 
                                                
7 See Derek Spring, “Stalinism: The Historical Debate”, in Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (NY: Routledge, 1993), 1-
14. 
8 Julian Graffy, “Unshelving Stalin: after the period of stagnation”, in Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (NY: Routledge, 
1993), 212-227;Svetlana Boym, “Stalin is with us: Soviet documentary mythologies of the 1980s”, in Stalinism and 
Soviet Cinema (NY: Routledge, 1993), 201-212; and Anna Lawton, “The Ghost That Does Return: Exorcising 
Stalin”, in Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (NY: Routledge, 1993), 186-200. 
9 Jacques Lacan, “On a Question Prior to Any Treatment of Psychosis”, in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in 
English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 445-489, 481. 
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reproduction of authoritative discourse that eliminated the constative element of the language—
in other words, the ability of signifiers to be unquestionably and “naturally” attached to their 
signifieds. The radical break between the signifier and the signified, according to Yurchak, 
stemmed from the endless repetition of authoritative discourse that had little to no relation to the 
current social reality. This had drastic consequences for the production of subjectivity, as the 
subjects of the state were bound to view state-controlled discourse as a “pure performance.” The 
fall of the Soviet system, then, can be ascribed to the loss of its master signifier10. 
Was, then, the power of Socialist textuality definitively exhausted by the late 1980s? At 
the first glance, this indeed seems to be the case if we look at conceptualist art and sots-art in the 
late 1970s and 80s; sots-art, in particular, asks for an intuitive reading as a straightforward 
cultural reaction to the clichés of Soviet textuality and visuality, as it faithfully recreates these 
only to rearrange them in order to create unorthodox meanings. When sots-art creators Vitaly 
Komar and Aleksander Melamid were expelled from the Youth Division of the Artists' Union for 
“distortion of Soviet reality,” this reality was crumbling on its own: in the 1966 painting Flowers 
for the Teacher, an eerie green glow envelops the standard subject of Socialist Realist painting, 
its formulaic composition lovingly preserved. The faceless girl giving a bouquet to the equally 
faceless teacher in the painting may indeed be read as the distortion of Soviet reality. However, it 
is precisely the faithful recreation of the Socialist Realist formula that brings scholars like Boris 
Groys to read what looks to be a symptom of the system’s exhaustion to mean a paradoxical re-
launching of the mythologies of Socialist Realism. In his Total Art of Stalinism, Groys notes 
Socialist Realism’s exceptional conduciveness for mythologizing not just the objects of art, but 
aesthetic practices themselves. He argues that, through reproduction of Soviet images, sots-art 
                                                
10 See Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2006), 21-26. 
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returns to the utopian meanings attached to the Soviet symbolic system and especially to the 
symbols of Stalinist culture. It does so in order to deconstruct Soviet utopianism while 
simultaneously inscribing it into a universal paradigm of cultural mythologies. “The devices of 
Stalinist indoctrination”, Groys argues, “were [used to demonstrate] the similarity of this myth to 
those of both the present and the past to reconstruct the single mythological network in which the 
modern consciousness functions.”11 
It is this restorative aspect inherent in what looks to be an irreverent parody of Soviet 
authoritative textuality that makes possible another reading of the ending of Sorokin’s Marina’s 
Thirtieth Love: while the protagonists of Socialist Realist novels spend their respective narratives 
waiting for the Socialist future to come, Marina’s own narrative path, however unorthodox, leads 
her exactly to where the Socialist novel would want her to be - towards a narrative future that is 
an endless celebration of the Socialist state as the individual disappears in the endless repetition 
of the state’s discourse. 
Wherein lies the appeal of Soviet textuality for the later Soviet and post-Soviet cultures? 
After all, the fall of the Soviet Union, an outcome of the gradual crumbling of Soviet narratives, 
has been popularly read as the radical break with the Soviet past. Communist ideology seemingly 
completely discredited and outright negated by the emergent post-Soviet state, the 1990s looked 
like a time of radical transition; the end of the Soviet state produced a range of anxieties about 
national identity and national history as post-Soviet Russian culture attempted to craft a new 
identity for itself12. 
                                                
11 Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond (Princeton University 
Press, 1992), 95. 
12 See, e.g., Horton, Andrew, Michael Brashinsky, eds. The Zero Hour : Glasnost and Soviet Cinema in Transition. 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992); Birgit Beumers, “To Moscow! To Moscow? The Russian Hero and the Loss of the 
Centre”, in Russia on Reels: The Russian Idea in Post-Soviet Cinema, ed. Birgit Beumers (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1999), 76-91; Susan Larsen, “National Identity, Cultural Authority and the Post-Soviet Blockbuster: Nikita 
Mikhalkov and Aleksei Balabanov”, in Slavic Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), 491-511; Nina Tsyrkun, 
8 
 
Do we then treat the 1990s as a gap, a rupture between the Soviet past and the post-Soviet 
present?  In Yurchak’s argument, the utopian stability of the Soviet “forever” was lost in late 
socialism, setting the stage for a seemingly cataclysmic breakup of the Soviet Union and its 
ideological constructs. Films like Karen Shakhnazarov's City Zero, as well as texts like Viktor 
Pelevin's Omon Ra, certainly stage the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet rule in 
this way. Both texts end on an ambivalent note; the protagonists of each are traveling (in City 
Zero, in a small boat with no oars; in Omon Ra, on the Red Line of the Moscow metro) but their 
destination is unknown. They have left behind a certain set of Soviet cultural myths: the conquest 
of outer space, the normal functioning of Soviet life with clear sources of symbolic authority, the 
Soviet notion of heroism. These myths have not been replaced with new myths. One can sense a 
pause in films and texts from the late 1980s and early 1990s as ideology, already exhausted by 
late socialism, takes a break. 
On the textual level, this break is staged as the manipulation of the peculiar narrative 
temporality characteristic of Socialist Realist texts. As we have seen, this temporality is not 
measured by the time of the clock. Katerina Clark, reading the Soviet novel’s peculiar 
temporality through the Bakhtinian notion of the chronotope13, suggests that the futuristic 
modality of the Soviet novel creates a tension between the mimetic “what is” and the completed, 
immutable perfect world of “what should be.”14 Clark traces the parallels between this perfect, 
“incontrovertible” reality that the Soviet novel constructs, and the time-value system of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Tinkling Symbols: Fragmented Society – Fragmented Cinema?”, in Russia on Reels: The Russian Idea in Post-
Soviet Cinema. Ed. Birgit Beumers ( London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 57-66; Adele Barker, ed. Consuming Russia: 
Popular Culture, Sex, and Society Since Gorbachev (Durham: Duke UP, 1999); Berdahl, Daphne et. al., eds. 
Altering States: Ethnographies of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
13 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Towards a Historical Poetics”, in 
Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson & Michael 
Holquist (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1981), 84-258, 84. 
14 Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (U of Chicago Press, 1981), 40. 
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Bakhtinian notion of the epic which, Bakhtin says, tells of a mythic time separated from the 
present by the unbridgeable gap of the “absolute epic past”. Clark argues that the Soviet novel 
picks up on the sacred, closed time of the epic, making it into the mythic Great Time of the 
Soviet novel, set to “annul time, to write off … the unbridgeable distance between… [the 
Bakhtinian] absolute epic past and the present”15, “subordinat[ing] [the] historical reality to the 
preexisting patterns of legend… [and] bridg[ing] the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought to be.’”16 
The paradox of the Socialist Realist novel, then, is that it creates the temporal gap that it 
is meant to cover over, behaving as if it is simultaneously set in the present and in the future, 
going forward and not going anywhere. Without the authority of the paternal metaphor that could 
legitimize the temporal paradox, in late-Soviet prose, the absolute time of Socialist Realism is 
either “accelerate[d]”, or “slow[ed] down”, whereby “the retardation of absolute time” is 
performed by creating “the absolute pause, silence, and the void (i.e., anti-time) [which for these 
texts] are the ideal states.”17 
It is this pause that the late-Soviet and early post-Soviet texts stage as they deconstruct 
and reflect upon Soviet ideology, crafting de-ideologized textual sites where the time of national 
history is suspended. The time of national history becomes, in the texts like Tatyana Tolstaya’s 
novel The Slynx, or Aleksandr Sokurov’s film Russian Arc, an unmoving, floating, suspended 
temporality. Trauma theory provides an avenue through which to read this temporal suspension: 
a traumatic event creates a breach in the conventional temporal structure as accessible to the 
subject. The subject is therefore stripped of that temporal frame of reference which ensures 
                                                
15 Clark 40. 
16 Clark 41. 
17 As discussed in Marina Balina, “Playing Absolute Time: Chronotypes of Sots-Art”, in Endquote: Sots-Art 
Literature and Soviet Grand Style (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 2000), 58-76, 60. 
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integrity of identity, making the subject functional18. On a national scale, a rupture in time occurs 
when major historical changes affect the state institutions and thus challenge the linear nature of 
their shared national narratives. 
In this way, texts from the late 1980s and early 1990s that feature temporal suspension, 
such as City Zero, Omon Ra, The Slynx19 and others, suggest that late-Soviet Russia becomes a 
site of trauma. After the fall of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet culture exhibits more traumatic 
symptoms: scholars like Birgit Beumers, Yana Hashamova, Susan Larsen, and others20 have 
delineated the ways in which national space becomes fragmented, unstable, and unmappable in 
post-Soviet texts. One reason for this fragmentation is found in social and cultural processes 
characteristic of the transitional period of contemporary Russian history, which presents a set of 
challenges not just to the imaginary integrity of national identity, but also to the aesthetic 
principles informing cultural production, as the aesthetic framework of Socialist Realism and its 
mythmaking potential is challenged and exposed in the post-Soviet context. Anglo-American 
cultural studies and literary criticism, informed by neo-Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
trauma theory, treat the cultural processes in post-Soviet Russia as a reaction to a symbolic 
collapse. Andrew Horton and Michael Brashinsky, Beumers, Nancy Condee, and others21 cite the 
“symptomatic” disintegration of the grand narratives of the nation, nostalgia for the Communist 
past, fragmentation of space, and displacement as primary trends of the post-Soviet cultural 
production.  
                                                
18 For the discussion of traumatic breach of temporality, see Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). Jenny Edkins (see Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. xiii, xiv, also 13-14), extrapolates the theory into the social sphere.  
19 Though The Slynx was published in 1999, Tolstaia began to write it in the late 1980s. 
20 See: Beumers 1999; Yana Hashamova 2007; Larsen 2003. 
21 See Horton and Brashinsky, 1992; Nancy Condee, ed., Soviet Hieroglyphics: Visual Culture in Late Twentieth-
century Russia (London/Bloomington: BFI/Indiana University Press, 1995); Tsyrkun 1999, 57-66; Aleksandr 
Ageev, “Conspectus of the crisis: Sociocultural Conditions and the Literary Process”, in Re-Entering the Sign: 
Articulating New Russian Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 170-189. 
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For domestic criticism and Russian émigré scholars, on the other hand, the fragmentation 
of grand narratives and the disintegration of national space are not precisely the symptoms of the 
collapse of national identity; instead, for scholars like Mikhail Epstein, Sergei Dobrotvorsky and 
Mikhail Iampolsky22, they signal the advent of postmodernism as a dominant aesthetic principle 
of post-Soviet art. Indeed, if one faced the task of characterizing post-Soviet textuality 
succinctly, one of its most salient features would be the experimentation with language, narrative 
and genre conventions, which Andrew Wachtel ascribes to the cultural necessity of finding a 
new language with which to articulate the rapidly changing social reality23.  
The search for this protean post-Soviet language is complemented by the manifest 
reliance of post-Soviet textuality on other textualities: diachronically, the phenomenon is 
evidenced by the staggering amount of intertextual references to the Russian/Soviet continuum 
of literary tradition, as scholars like Lyudmila Parts24 show; synchronically, post-Soviet 
referentiality manifests in borrowing textual and cinematic tropes from global popular culture, 
most importantly from Hollywood entertainment cinema, with writers like Viktor Pelevin 
making global cultural icons like Arnold Schwarzenegger into characters of his novels. This set 
of phenomena contributes to the leveling of the divide between “high” and “low” culture, the 
                                                
22 Mikhail Epstein, After the Future: The Paradoxes of Postmodernism and Contemporary Russian Culture (Critical 
Perspectives on Modern Culture), trans. Anesa Miller-Pogacar (University of Massachusets Press, 1995); Sergei 
Dobrotvorsky, “Cinema Myths and the Future of Culture”, in Re-Entering the Sign: Articulating New Russian 
Culture. Ed. Ellen E. Berry and Anesa Miller-Pogacar  (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan Press, 1995), 311-324. Mikhail 
Iampolsky, “Death in Cinema” in Re-Entering the Sign: Articulating New Russian Culture. Ed. Ellen E. Berry and 
Anesa Miller-Pogacar  (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan Press, 1995), 270-289. 
23 Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Remaining Relevant After Communism: The Role of the Writer in Eastern Europe 
(Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2006), esp. 217. 




divide that, in the Russian cultural tradition, used to be sharply pronounced, thus strengthening 
the Jamesonian arguments in favor of a postmodern(ist) nature of post-Soviet culture25. 
These features of the post-Soviet Russian cultural landscape prompted theorizations of 
post-Soviet culture as a hybrid culture26 as it clings to the Soviet legacy while infusing it with the 
now-available Western cultural paradigms. 
Yet, post-Soviet intertextuality is far from being unproblematically postmodernist – 
Linda Hutcheon’s playfulness of postmodernist referentiality27 is often lost, subsumed by the 
sheer amount of referentiality that films like the Aleinikov brothers’ 1992 Tractor Drivers II, or 
novels like Viktor Pelevin’s Chapaiev i pustota (Clay Machine-Gun, alternatively Chapayev and 
the Void) exhibit, referencing Hollywood and Stalinist cinema, Eastern philosophy and the 
Russian modernist novel with equal, and overwhelming, sophistication. More than simply the 
postmodern notion of all signifiers being equal in value and thus carrying no value at all, the 
sheer violence of appropriative tactics of some of these post-Soviet texts brings me to argue that 
the post-Soviet referentiality is actually – paradoxically - a quest for meaning. These texts poach 
(to borrow language from Michel De Certeau28) other textualities for meaningful language. 
After the breakup of Soviet Union, the fantasy of clear cultural meanings no longer 
sustains the now-post-Soviet textuality; cultural meanings reveal their constructedness, their 
                                                
25Fredric Jameson stresses the leveling of the divide between the “high” and “low” culture in postmodernity, citing 
postmodern art’s fascination with “this whole ‘degraded” landscape of schlock and kitsch, of TV series and Reader's 
Digest culture, of advertising and motels… materials they no long simply “quote”, … but incorporate into their very 
substance”: Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke UP, 1991), 
3-4. 
26 Stephen Lovell and Birgit Menzel, eds. Reading for Entertainment in Contemporary Russia: Post-Soviet Popular 
Literature in Historical Perspective  (Arbeiten and Texte zur Slavistik 78. Munich: Sagner. 2005), 32; Liliia 
Shevtsova, trans. Mark Eckert, “Russia’s Hybrid Regime”,  in Journal of Democracy (Vol. 12, Number 4, October 
2001), 65-70 . 
27 Hutcheon cites the works of Joseph Heller, Robert Coover and Kurt Vonnegut as examples of postmodernist 
playfulness. See Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory and Fiction (NY: Routledge, 1988), 
esp. 141-157. 
28 Michel De Certeau, “Reading as poaching”, in The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 165-176, esp. 171,174. 
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dependence on cultural and textual codes illuminated by the breakdown of these codes. Julia 
Kristeva, building on Bakhtin’s discussion of literary dialogism and heteroglossia, speaks of a 
critical interpretative moment when the “notion of intertextuality replaces the notion of 
intersubjectivity.”29 In a perverse reading, the swarm of linguistic and cultural codes that are 
used (and abused) by early post-Soviet films like Tractor Drivers II, in an endless stream of 
references meant to articulate post-Soviet identity, comes to stand in for the post-Soviet subject, 
masking a lack in post-Soviet subjectivity. In Tractor Drivers II, an avant-garde remake of Ivan 
Pyr’iev’s 1939 classic, Tractor Drivers, the protagonist attempts to use the language staged for 
him by high Stalinist culture in the early post-Soviet milieu; yet, he is compelled to drop the 
Stalinist formulae and resort to screaming and bizarre behavior, thus signifying the failure of this 
language to articulate the post-Soviet reality. 
It is this impossibility of grasping and articulating the meaning of signifiers that brings 
scholars like Serguei Oushakine to deem post-Soviet culture aphasic. Oushakine argues that, in 
the post-Soviet context, the economic and cultural uncertainties, accompanied by a loss of the 
frame of reference that allows the subject to discuss current sociopolitical reality, the loss of a 
“metalanguage,” lead to a loss of the ability to understand what the very metaphor of “post-
Soviet” stands for30. 
How does one read post-Soviet culture, then? Is it hybrid, aphasic, postmodern, 
traumatic? Where does it “transition?” Was the Communist future simply replaced in Russian 
teleology by the not-less-utopian capitalist dream of the market economy shaped by Western 
cultural values? Why is it that in the same late-Soviet City Zero, as well as in early post-Soviet 
                                                
29Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980), 66. 
30 Serguei Oushakine, “In the State of Post-Soviet Aphasia: Symbolic Development in Contemporary Russia,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 6 (2000): 991-1016. 
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films like Ivan Dykhovichnyi’s 1992 Moscow Parade, Soviet myths persist despite the 
deconstruction of Soviet ideology? In the late 1980s, City Zero makes use of the artistic 
freedoms associated with the era of glasnost’ to stage the still-existing Soviet state as a place 
with no sense of temporal progression. The film’s suspended temporality satirizes and exposes 
the textual “eternal present,” a temporality characteristic of Socialist Realist art where the 
passage of time does not bring about change. Yet, by satirizing this temporality the film 
magnifies the time of the Socialist Realist text, preserving it in its own cinematic space. The film 
already looks at Soviet history from a critical interpretative distance, thus contributing to the 
staging of a historical break between Soviet and what is yet-to-become post-Soviet history. 
History becomes, in the film, a museum, in which the events of Soviet, Russian, and world 
history are grotesquely distorted and at times plainly invented; yet, Soviet history is preserved in 
the underground memory vault, and the film’s appeal to the aesthetics of high Stalinism creates a 
perverse continuity between the Soviet and the post-Soviet representations of history. 
Moscow Parade, in its turn, exemplifies a distinctly uneasy treatment of the totalitarian 
legacy in the post-Soviet context: while on the surface critical of Stalinism’s inhumanity, its 
stifling of creativity and of freedom of expression, the film nonetheless dwells on the celebratory 
aesthetics of Stalinism and lovingly constructs a fantasy of festive everyday life in a manner very 
similar to totalitarian art. Problematizing the direction of post-Soviet cultural “transition,” post-
Soviet films look back not just to the events of Russian/Soviet history. Other films, like Aleksei 
Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon and Nikita Mikhalkov’s The Barber of Siberia, demonstrate 




In particular, First on the Moon, a mockumentary, crafts a practice of writing Soviet 
history that implicitly dwells on the Soviet model. “Mockumentary”, a genre defined as “a partial 
and concerted effort to appropriate documentary codes and conventions in order to represent a 
fictional subject,”31 uses representational techniques conventionally associated with “telling the 
truth” for dealing with fictional subjects. As Aleksandr Prokhorov argues, late-Soviet and post-
Soviet cinema “dealt with the gap between Soviet reality and its representations in Soviet 
culture”32. Mockumentary, then, becomes a productive genre for a culture in which “the 
association between factual discourse and factual means of representation is increasingly 
tenuous”33. In the post-Soviet cultural context, permeated with the remnants of Soviet signifiers 
that have proved to be empty, mockumentary’s representational mode, paradoxically, can 
potentially become a functional model of working through the past, because it ironically yet 
compulsively uses the same techniques of fictionalizing social reality that were used in creating 
the Soviet master narrative in the first place. In other words, the mockumentary’s mode of 
treating the “reality” of the event is very similar to the mode in which the Soviet official 
discourse is perceived, in the post-Soviet context, to have treated Soviet social reality. Mourning 
this lost modality of representation, First on the Moon, on one level, examines the creation of the 
Soviet myth of the conquest of space. On another level, through the very fact of this 
examination, it conceptually solidifies it, by consciously narrating it as a myth. This enables the 
film to find a “proper place” for this important part of the Soviet grand narrative in the post-
Soviet context. 
                                                
31 Jane Roscoe and Craig Hight. Faking it. Mock-documentary and the subversion of factuality. Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 2001, 2, quoted in Aleksandr Prokhorov, “The Redemption of Lunar Reality: Aleksei 
Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon (Pervye na lune)”, 2005. Kino-Kultura 2006, no 
11.<http://www.kinokultura.com/2006/11r-firstmoon2.shtml>, accessed May 29, 2009. 
32 Prokhorov 2006. 
33 Roscoe and Hight 3, quoted in Prokhorov 2006. 
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By the end of the 1990s, it becomes even more evident that the traumatic historical gap of 
the end of Socialism is countered by the desire for historical continuity. Mikhalkov’s The Barber 
of Siberia, a late 1990s film, tries to re-assimilate (if not fully rehabilitate) the Russian past, 
conceived now in the broadest possible terms that include Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. 
The film’s goal is to bridge the gap between where Russia is now with where it had been. In the 
film, for the duration of the cinematic illusion at least, the overconstructed space of Tsarist 
Russia becomes a site where the emergent nationalist ideological fantasies can be played out. I 
examine the emergence of the utopianized cinematic version of the Russian national past in the 
course of the 1990s in Chapter 2. Reading three films from the late 1980s through the late 1990s, 
I argue that Russian film resurrects the national past from its status as an uncertain category of 
memory (which it became in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse) and assigns it another 
status, that of the imaginary repository of cultural mythologies. In these films, the national past 
becomes a cache of symbols that sustain the fantasy of a unified Russian national identity, 
however problematic some of these symbols may have become. Post-1991 Russian culture, then, 
at least partly “transitions” towards the past. Does the “reverse” direction of this transition 
signify a cultural compulsion to repeat history? 
Soviet culture constantly postponed the arrival of the future, and, as Mikhail Epstein 
explains, as this postponement came to an abrupt end in 1991, the future and the past exchanged 
places in the schema of Russian national history. In After the Future, Epstein argues that the fall 
of the Soviet Union signified a major shift in the ways Russian culture conceived of national 
history and historical temporality in general. He describes a “loop” that the time of Russian 
national history makes in the aftermath of 1991, whereupon the Communist future, one of the 
organizing temporal categories of the Soviet grand narrative, suddenly becomes the post-Soviet 
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past34. “For the Russian consciousness”, Epstein suggests, “the collapse of communism was not 
simply the end, but rather an inversion of the beginning and the end, an almost impossible 
anomaly of time. […] The historical perspective, once so confidently described by Marxism, has 
been turned inside out.”35 For Epstein, the dissolution of the Communist teleological model of 
history that coexists with nostalgic memories of a time when this model was functional, becomes 
one of the definitive conceptual mechanisms at work in post-Soviet cultural production. The 
memory of a relatively stable past, coinciding with an impossibility of a comparably stable 
future, launches cultural mechanisms meant to restore the relative stability of the temporal 
structure of history. 
The post-Soviet take on the communist teleology, simultaneously deconstructive and 
nostalgic, finds expression in the post-Soviet dystopian novel that I examine in Chapter 3. There, 
I argue that the post-apocalyptic and/or totalitarian landscapes of the future that emerge in these 
texts are simultaneously in opposition to and in dialogue with Soviet literature’s cheerful 
utopianism. The post-apocalyptic landscape becomes a site where the national past is questioned 
by way of displacement and traumatic repetition. Tolstaya’s novel, The Slynx, re-imagines a 
future that fully repeats the mechanisms of the past, paving the way for another such repetition, 
staged in Vladimir Sorokin’s A Day of Oprichnik. Yet, I show that a utopian dimension opens up 
in these dystopian milieus, as, in an unusual move for the genre, the protagonists feel “at home” 
in these dystopias. The novels project this feeling of “belonging” to a dystopian society onto the 
reader. This enables post-Soviet dystopias to metaphorize the tension between the parts of the 
Soviet legacy, creating a textual space where Soviet totalitarianism can coexist with the nostalgic 
reconstruction of the Soviet utopian fantasies. 
                                                
34See Epstein 1995. 
35 See Mikhail Epstein, “Postmodernism, Communism and Sots-Art”, in Endquote: Sots-Art Literature and Soviet 
Grand Style, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 3-31,20. 
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Post-Communist nostalgia, as theorized by Svetlana Boym36, manifests itself in the 
appeal that Soviet myths, seemingly completely discredited after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
carry in the post-Soviet context. As much as the removal of Feliks Dzerzhinskii’s statue from the 
Lubyanskaia Square in Moscow in 1991 might suggest a radical break with the Soviet past, the 
ghost of Vladimir Lenin continues to resist exorcising as Lenin’s body, enshrined in the 
Mausoleum, continues to define the landscape of the new Russian statehood. 
Boym argues that sharing the memories of the past, on which principle communities are 
united, requires representation of the past as a continuous narrative37. In the post-Soviet case, the 
Soviet narrative of the eventual triumph of Communism (or at least the myth that the Soviet 
experience was nobler, more superior and beneficial for humankind than its Western counterpart) 
served as this uniting narrative. Boym conceptualizes nostalgia as primarily a longing for the 
imaginary, idealized place that contains memories of the past38. The past itself, by extension, is 
reconceptualized as a place, as something akin to a treasured memory vault. However, neither 
the past as it is presented in nostalgic narratives, nor the actual places to which the memories are 
relegated, ever "really" existed39. They exist, instead, on screen and on page, where the nostalgic 
fantasy materializes as a textual and/or cinematic illusion. 
According to Boym, nostalgia comes to be mediated through a kind of cultural fetishism, 
that is, the remnants of the past (artifacts, images, and condensed symbols of the nation) serve at 
                                                
36 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001). 
37 See Introduction, Boym 2001, esp. xiii. 
38 See Svetlana Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 
1994), 4, also 283-287. 
39 To illustrate the point, one can think back to a very well-known post-Communist nostalgic text, Wolfgang 
Becker’s 2003 film, Good-Bye Lenin, where the East German cultural milieu that the protagonist attempts to restore 
for his sick mother is hyperreal and highly stylized, not only because of the memory’s faultiness but also precisely 
because of the amount of restorative work that goes into recreating it. 
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the same time as triggers of and the ways to cope with nostalgia40.  “I had a mirrored buffet. And 
a colored TV with an Italian tube... My brother-in-law managed to get a hold of a Yugoslav 
cabinet set, I had a separate bathroom and toilet, Golden Autumn wallpaper”41, says one of the 
characters of Tolstaia’s post-apocalyptic The Slynx, in which a nuclear blast serves as a metaphor 
for the fall of the Soviet Union. The past condenses, for this character, into artifacts associated 
with well-to-do Soviet urban living. 
Why is post-Soviet nostalgia so pervasive? Why do events of Soviet history and Soviet 
symbols continue to hold the post-Soviet imagination of the 1990s? Susan Buck-Morss’s reading 
of Soviet utopian ideology proposes a reason for the post-Soviet nostalgia for the past. The fall 
of the Soviet Union, Buck-Morss elaborates, constituted a loss of the ideological illusion. Buck-
Morss makes use of Walter Benjamin’s analytical concept of “the dreamworld,” central to his 
theory of modernity as the reenchantment of the world, in her analysis of the cultures of both 
capitalism and socialism as utopian dreams of industrial modernity’s capability to provide 
happiness for the masses42. In Buck-Morss’s argument, the fall of the Soviet Union marked a 
definitive breakdown of this dream, the breakdown of the Soviet mythological imagination43, 
which used to be sustained by networks of ideologically charged psychosocial fantasies through 
which the subjects organize their experiences, by the networks of utopian cultural myths. 
                                                
40 I am borrowing the lucky term of cultural fetishism from the discussion of nostalgia manifested in post-Soviet 
Russian culture of advertising by Jeremy Morris (Jeremy Morris, “The Empire Strikes Back: Projections of National 
Identity in Contemporary Russian Advertising”, in The Russian Review, Vol. 64, Issue 4, 642-660). 
41 Tatyana Tolstaya, The Slynx, trans. Jamey Gambrell. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2003),148.  
42 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge-
London, MIT Press, 2002), 205. 
43 See, e.g., Carol Barner-Barry and Cynthia Hody, “Soviet Marxism-Leninism as Mythology”, in Political 
Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), 609-630.  
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Concealing their origins in ideology (to borrow the phrase from Louis Althusser)44, these myths 
were staged as concrete mythical narratives in the texts of Socialist Realism. 
Socialist Realism, the Soviet aesthetic doctrine, Evgeny Dobrenko shows45, was 
predicated on the transformational nature of aesthetic activity; the famous goal of depicting life 
not as it is, but as it should be, proclaimed at the All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers of 1934, 
aporetically wedded the mimetic principles of realist representation to the Marxist 
mythopoesis46. 
A brief look at the textual strategies of the Soviet novel elucidates the reasons why this 
particular type of textuality is especially conducive for covering gaps in meaning and for 
mediating mythic content. Here is a passage from Aleksandr Fadeev’s The Young Guard 
(Molodaia Gvardiia, 1943-1951): 
In those early years he had distinguished himself as a staunch and able soldier. But he 
was promoted not only for that: staunchness and ability are not rare qualities. 
Unassumingly, little by little, even slowly as it appeared, he had assimilated everything a 
Red Army soldier could learn from the company political instructors and the battalion 
and regimental political commissars – that countless, nameless army of workers from 
political departments and Red Army Party groups, and may the memory of these people 
live on down the ages. He did not simply learn their science; he chewed it over and made 
                                                
44 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays. 
(Monthly Review Press, 1971),121-176:153. 
45 See Evgeny Dobrenko, The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet 
Literature. 1st ed. (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1997), 17 
46 Boris Groys proposes in his The Total Art of Stalinism that the “Stalin era satisfied the fundamental avant-garde 
demand that art cease representing life and begin transforming it by the means of a total aesthetico-political project” 
(see Groys 1992, 36); Also see: Régine Robin, Socialist Realism: An Impossible Aesthetic. Trans. Catherine Porter 
(Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992). 
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it an integral part of himself. Then all at once he stood out among his fellows as a man 
with exceptional political gifts47. 
The otherwise brilliant translation does not do justice to the strategy of epic retardation 
that this classic Soviet novel continuously employs.  Alluding to one of Stalin’s favorite 
rhetorical strategies, pleonastic restatement48, the original passage repeats “he rose from the 
ranks” (on vydvinulsia) four times as it narrates the story of a Party official who would play an 
important role coordinating the Donbass anti-Fascist resistance during the Great Patriotic War. 
The passage is illustrative of the Soviet novel’s epic strategies, even featuring a concealed 
invocation of the Party, the muse of the Soviet epic. Such literary environment was, as Katerina 
Clark has shown, especially conducive for the Soviet novel’s major function, which “since at 
least 1932-34… has been to serve as the official repository of state myths”49. 
Regine Robin calls Socialist Realism an “impossible aesthetic”50, and indeed, larger-than-
life epic heroes of high Stalinism merged within this aesthetic with stock characters representing 
“social types”, like the sublime, yet nameless army of the political workers in Fadeev’s novel. 
Soviet formulaic mythical narratives and their origin in the foundational myths of Russian 
culture have been extensively outlined by scholars like Robin, Clark, Groys, Mark Lipovetsky51 
and others. Yet, this study aims to show that this aesthetic continues to hold a mythopoetic 
                                                
47 Aleksandr Fadeev, The Young Guard, trans. Violet Dutt (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959?), 
39.“В те юные годы он выдвинулся как стойкий боец. Он выдвинулся как умный боец. Но он выдвинулся не 
только поэтому: стойкие и умные люди не редкость в народе. Исподволь, незаметно, казалось бы даже 
медленно, усваивал он все то, чему учили бойцов-красноармейцев ротные политруки, батальонные и 
полковые комиссары - вся бесчисленная, безыменная армия работников политотделов и воинских 
партийных ячеек, да живет во веки веков память об этих людях! И он не просто усваивал их науку - он 
перерабатывал и прочно укладывал ее в своей душе. И вдруг выдвинулся среди боевых товарищей своих как 
человек незаурядного политического дарования” (Aleksandr Fadeiev, Molodaia Gvardiia (Moskva: 
Gosudarstvennoie Pedagogicheskoie izdatel’stvo ministerstva prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1959), 39). 
48 See, e.g., Iosif Stalin, “Golovokruzheniie ot uspekhov”, in Pravda, no. 60 (2 March 1930), for a concise classic 
example of Stalin’s epic rhetorical strategies. 
49 Clark xii. 
50 See Robin 1992, esp. Part 1. 




temptation for the post-Soviet culture even after Soviet novel, clichéd and conventionally 
“unreadable,”52 was exposed as a cache of empty Party slogans and meanings. 
This mythopoetic potential is a function of the meta-literary implications of the Socialist 
Realist aesthetic and its inherent aporetic duplicity noted above. In Groys’s reading, Socialist 
Realism, with its transformational goals, is inherently an avant-garde aesthetic; yet, formally it 
is, first and foremost, a restorative project, a historical project to inscribe the history of 
proletarian art into the general teleological schema of Marxist history. Clark argues that “the 
only thing that was absolutely new about Socialist Realism was the term itself”53. Indeed, 
Lenin’s pronouncement about the “proletarian culture not [having] sprung out of nowhere… 
[being] a logical development of the store of knowledge that the mankind had accumulated under 
the yoke of the capitalist society”54 determined, on the level of state philosophy, the inherent 
reliance of Socialist Realism on cultural and aesthetic continuity. Formally, Socialist Realism 
was a return to the principles of realist representation that Russian modernist and post-
Revolutionary avant-garde seemingly had done away with. Indeed, the very foundational 
document of Socialist Realism, the Central Committee’s 1932 Decree that established Socialist 
Realism as an official state art, is called “On the Reconstruction of Literary and Art 
Organizations.” In the original Russian, the Decree uses the word “perestroika”. It is too 
tempting to pass on an opportunity for an analogy: the Socialist Realist “return” to the principles 
of realist representation was meant to undo the harms of uncontrolled and uncontrollable, 
runaway avant-garde textuality as much as Mikhail Gorbachev’s (failed) late-Soviet policy of 
                                                
52 Clark ix. 
53 Ibid., 29. 
54 Vladimir Lenin, “Zadachi Soiuzov Molodezhi: Rech na III Vserossiiskom s’ezde RKSM 20 oktyabria 1920 
goda”, in Vladimir Lenin. Polnoie Sobraniie Sochinenii, Vol 41, (Moskva: Politizdat, 1967-81), 304-305, 304. 
“Пролетарская культура должна явиться закономерным развитием тех запасов знания, которые человечество 
выработало под гнетом капиталистического общества”. 
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perestroika.  That policy, with its appeal to bring Soviet official discourse close to social reality, 
was meant to restore meaning to the official discourse—meaning that, by the 1980s, was slipping 
through the cracks, no longer held together by the organizing metaphors of the Soviet state. 
We can draw a parallel between the post-Soviet treatment of Socialist Realism and the 
Socialist Realist treatment of the classic Russian literature of the 19th century, conventionally 
labeled the Golden Age of Russian literature. Beginning with the creation of modern Russian 
literary language, the history of Russian literature in the 19th century can be read as a story of 
molding and tempering the principles of realist representation, as social and psychological 
realism of the great 19th century Russian novelists becomes, in the course of the century, so 
sophisticated that it eventually crumbles under its own weight, signaling the end of an era. 
However, this history can also be read as a story of solidifying the myth of the power of literary 
textuality. The Romantic notion of the “poet-prophet” explored by the first two major poets of 
modern Russian literature, Aleksandr Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov, carries over to the early 
Russian literary criticism that perversely interpreted the realist mimesis as the quest for truth. 
Literary critic Vissarion Belinskii was instrumental in installing [national] literature as a source 
of profound cultural meanings, assigning it a nearly magical power to influence the reader. It is 
this power that Socialist Realism appropriated, covering the gap of modernist semantic 
uncertainty created by the revolutionary art. 
Of course, the smooth, seamless, authoritative Russian textuality of the Golden Age, just 
as the Golden Age itself, is a retroactive construct, a cultural myth largely solidified by the 
prescriptive Soviet literary criticism, as Dobrenko shows. Socialist Realism’s construction of the 
Golden Age elucidates the mechanism by which Soviet culture appropriated and made use of an 
authoritative textuality to create a cultural continuity where none was to be had. Socialist Realist 
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fascination with the power of artistic teleological transformations of reality relies, then, on the 
concealed fascination with the (imagined, re- and over-constructed) past. This “epic past”, to 
borrow from Bakhtin via Clark again, becomes the imaginary source of stable cultural meanings 
and foundational myths. In other words, Socialist Realism had its own historical gap to cover – a 
gap in the magical belief in the power of the written word to carry the “truth”, the gap created by 
the modernist disillusionment in the semantic capacity of the linguistic sign. One can draw an 
analogy between this “gap” and the gap created as a result of the post-Stalin Soviet semantic 
incongruity. It is the myth of authoritative, unproblematic, legitimized and legitimizing 
textuality, then, that the post-Soviet culture lacks in its present and is all-too-eager to find in its 
past.  
Post-Soviet culture’s fascination with Socialist Realism is therefore a fascination with the 
last instance in its national history where such textuality was possible; its compulsive return to 
Socialist myths, tropes and clichés, however ideologically discredited they may have become in 
the post-Soviet context, manifests a nostalgic desire to relive this type of authoritative textuality. 
The post-Soviet poaching of past textualities for meaning, then, is, in a way, a repetition of the 
path Socialist Realism once took in its quest to create a (mythic) Marxist historical continuity. 
The post-Soviet texts that I examine in Chapter 3 stage a possibility of such historical 
continuity through their (re)turn to folklore, with its peculiar ways of meaning-production. This 
return parallels the Soviet revival of interest in Russian folklore55 coinciding with the beginnings 
of Socialist Realism. The language of folklore, with its perverse ability to solidify meanings, 
                                                
55 Reinterpreted by the Soviet folklorists of the 1930s as the “creativity of the masses”, as Frank J. Miller argues in 
his definitive study of the subject. See Frank J.Miller, Folklore for Stalin: Russian Folklore and Pseudofolklore of 
the Stalin Era. New York: M.E. Sharps, 1991, and Frank J. Miller, “The Image of Stalin in Soviet Russian 
Folklore”. The Russian Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), pp. 50-67, esp. 53. 
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used to sustain the paternal metaphor of “Joseph-Our-Light Vissarionovich,”56 and the post-
Soviet return to folkloric strategies to frame the mythic content is a search for the Russian textual 
past that it shares with Socialist Realism. 
In Chapter 4, I examine other attempts to relive and redeem Soviet mythologies by 
looking at post-Soviet rethinking of the legacy of the Space Race, and specifically, at the way in 
which the remnants of the Soviet heroic myth of the “conquerors of space” are used in post-
Soviet literature and film to create a set of heroic, escapist, meta-ideological fantasies. These 
fantasies take place in the sublime, eerie outer space, which is staged, in Viktor Pelevin’s novel 
Omon Ra and Aleksei Gherman’s film Paper Soldier, as a reverse side of a Soviet dreamscape57. 
The post-Soviet nostalgic optic thus stabilizes the mythological space of Soviet culture, 
providing contemporary Russian culture with a workable past. In her Common Places: 
Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia, Svetlana Boym examines the power that everyday 
Soviet mythologies held over the imagination of Soviet citizens; the very mode of Boym’s 
exploration also demonstrates that these mythologies are a retroactive, nostalgic construct58. In 
Yurchak’s words, “the imaginary worlds within the fabric of socialist society gradually changed 
the very cultural logic of the Soviet system, deterritorializing it and rendering it increasingly 
incongruous with the descriptions it made of itself.”59 With these imaginary worlds of Socialism 
gone upon the system’s downfall, the Soviet past solidified into the retroactively-produced 
Žižekian mythical object60, the object produced by the loss itself. In this imaginary and imagined 
                                                
56 The phrase from a Soviet pseudofolkloric novina quoted in Miller 1991, 56. 
57 For more on the Soviet dremscapes in Pelevin, see Rajendra A. Chitnis, “Learning to Live with Emptiness: Viktor 
Pelevin, Vaclav Kahuda, Vlado Balla”, in Rajendra A. Chitnis, Literature in Post-Communist Russian and Eastern 
Europe: The Russian, Czech and Slovak fiction of the Changes, 1988-1998 (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian 
and East European Studies, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 136-162. 
58 See Introduction to Boym 1994). 
59 Yurchak, 205. 
60 For Žižek’s discussion of the retroactive production of the mythical object see Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the 
Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 37. 
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past, the two meanings of myth merge: it is a “myth” in a sense that it never existed, its illusory 
nature exposed by the collapse of Communist ideology and its post-Soviet deconstruction. Yet, it 
is also a “myth” in the Barthian61 sense, in a sense that the post-Soviet imagination inflects and 
expands the meanings attached to the signifiers of the Soviet state. The signs and symbols of the 
(Soviet) past are invested with other, new meanings, (re)constructed and used to structure and 
explain the country’s present, becoming a source of stable cultural meanings as a part of the 
shared historical legacy incorporated into the emergent narrative of the new Russian state. 
How exactly do the cultural texts work “around” the rupture in the time of national 
history and in national mythology? How exactly is the cultural continuity created where the 
rupture seems to be so complete? 
Pierre Nora suggests that cultural memory and cultural memorialization work by creating 
lieux de mémoire, explaining that “a lieu de mémoire is any significant entity, whether material 
or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a 
symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community”62. These sites of memory are 
crystallization of [national] history into the mythic space of cultural memory63, sites where 
history is reworked and appropriated to create an imaginary cultural identity. In the post-Soviet 
context, signifiers of the Socialist state provide a link to the mythologies of the national past, 
serving as constant reminders of what was lost. However, post-Soviet sites of memory, I argue, 
spread beyond the numerous Lenin Streets still endemic to Russian cities, beyond the Lenin 
Mausoleum and beyond the still-glittering Friendship of the Nations Fountain in Moscow. 
                                                
61 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (London: Paladin, 1972), esp. 129. 
62 Pierre Nora, “From lieux de mémoire to realms of memory”, in Nora, Pierre and Lawrence D.Kritzman, eds., 
Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Vol. 1: conflicts and divisions. New York and Chichester: 
Columbia University Press. 1996,  xv-xxiv, xvii. 




Cultural texts, too, become sites of memory, rhetorical topoi of memorialization in the scheme of 
post-Soviet culture64, as they sift through the Lacanian cascade of signifiers and (re)organize 
them, preserving them in their own textual space. 
In the words of Nina Tsyrkun, post-Soviet culture builds a new mythology on the ruins of 
the old one.65 As the 1990s gave way to the rise of nationalist rhetoric in the Russian public 
discourse of the 2000s, it became evident that, as Kevin Platt puts it, 
one dominant historical metaphor—that of historical rupture and social rebirth—has been 
replaced by another—that of civilizational continuity—as the authoritative tool for the 
construction of social identity. Neither of these public discursive formations accounts 
well for the actualities of social experience and a political history that exceed both in 
their complexity66. 
This study traces the roots of the metaphor of civilizational continuity, seeking to show 
that those same texts from the late 1980s and the 1990s that seemingly spoke only of rupture, 
were also always speaking about continuity. I propose that, along with centripetal forces at work 
in post-Soviet Russian culture, there were also always the centrifugal ones, which focused the 
old mythologies to bring them together to preserve and shield them from destruction. This study 
seeks to uncover the sites of memory that post-Soviet texts create in order to reflect on the Soviet 
narratives that came to an end, and on those that can be put in their place. I ask, what kinds of 
myths do post-Soviet texts rely on to construct a notion of continuity that overcomes what was 
previously discarded or destroyed? What myths are persistent enough to survive the historical 
gap? 
                                                
64 I draw here on Derrida’s theory of “sites in language”. See Jacques Derrida, "Force and Signification", in Writing 
and Difference, trans. Allen Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 3-30, 28. 
65 Tsyrkun 1999, 62. 
66 Kevin M.F. Platt, “The Post-Soviet is Over: On Reading the Ruins”, in Republics of Letters: A Journal for the 
Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts 1, no. 1 (May 1, 2009): http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/41. 
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The possibility of a historical continuity in literary and cinematic texts of the 1990s 
paradoxically emerges out of the features of these texts that, at first glance, seem to signify the 
symbolic collapse. The weak connections between events, the decontextualized signifiers, the 
disorganized space and the purposeless movements break the narrative and cinematic 
conventions, allowing for "temporary suspension of all hierarchic distinctions and barriers… of 
the prohibitions of usual life."67 Such temporary suspension, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, is 
characteristic of the specific modality of culture expressed in carnival that "offers the chance to 
have a new outlook on the world, to realize the relative nature of all that exists, and to enter a 
completely new order of things”68. The new outlook is possible precisely because of the 
estrangement of familiar social and (one can extrapolate) symbolic structures that the carnival 
provides for its duration. This estrangement is achieved, according to Bakhtin, through the 
creation of a new, liberated context for the carnival’s participants. 
For Bakhtin, the enjoyment of observing a beggar playing the king at the carnival stems 
from the collective memory of his status outside of the carnival, that is, from the memory of the 
“authentic” context. This consideration brought about several anthropological studies that take 
Bakhtinian notion of the carnivalesque and apply it to the functioning of collective memory that 
is reactualized and reactivated during the carnival. The constant interplay of the social and 
cultural contexts confined to memory and created anew (through defamiliarization) at the 
carnival, emotionally imprint themselves on the subject through the affective power of laughter 
that accompanies the carnival’s decontextualization. Joseph Roach formulates this cultural mode 
                                                
67 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984), 15. 
68 Ibid., 34. 
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of memorialization/establishing cultural continuities as “that mental space where imagination 
and memory converge … at once remembered and reinvented—the otherwise unthinkable”69.  
The Bakhtinian carnival, thus, is a cultural site where decontextualization can be a source 
of enjoyment and simultaneously serve as a form of memorialization, a paradoxical source of 
cultural continuity for a culture. Post-Soviet literature and film had done away with many of the 
conventions of representation; yet, the controlled transgression of the law for which the 
carnivalesque suspension of conventions allows, in the end sustains the law, its existence 
illuminated by its very absence. In this way, the very cultural texts that examine the Soviet 
legacy via its carnivalesque defamiliarization and attempt to map post-Soviet identity become 
sites of memorialization. Carnival, for Bakhtin, “is a place for working out [italics mine.- DK]... 
in half-real and half-acted form, a new mode of interrelationship between individuals.”70  An 
exciting possibility then emerges: a possibility to read the 1990s as a pause that Russian culture 
takes to reflect on what has been lost and what can be salvaged from the past, much like the 
interpretative moment that Tzvetan Todorov describes in his theory of the fantastic as the 
hesitation that the subject experiences when their frame of reference clashes with the unknown. 
This interpretative moment “occupies the duration of [the] uncertainty”71 as the subject 
repositions themselves in the relation to the event, the breakdown of the Soviet system. 
Post-Soviet culture suspends narrative and historical time in order to reflect on the past, 
to counter the ideological void of the late 1980s and 1990s. In Chapter 1, I examine post-Soviet 
reassessment of the myth of classic Russian literature as a source of profound, universal 
meanings, the myth of the Golden Age. As post-Soviet culture deconstructs the classic legacy in 
                                                
69 Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), 27. 
70 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 123. 
71Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Richard Howard, (Cleveland: 
Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973), 25. 
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the form of various cultural myths about literature and language, as it examines the Soviet 
mythological imagination, it does so by means of literary texts themselves. These new textual 
sites consolidate the myth of Russian literature, becoming Boym’s “common places”, sites and 
loci of cultural mythologies72 that are persistent enough to survive the historical and cultural gap. 
I use the term “imaginary places” to describe these textual sites; the “imaginary” here is 
the Lacanian imaginary73, a foundational illusion of coherence and wholeness that underlies the 
possibility of signification. The texts I examine structure their narrative spaces to recreate and 
relive the illusion of the uninterrupted flow of historical time and of the possibility of meaning-
production, even if on the surface they seem to be doing the complete opposite. 
In this study, I focus on the sites of memory that emerge as a result of the reworkings of 
“domestic” mythologies. I concentrate on the diachronic dimension of the post-Soviet cultural 
process, on the “diachronic Others” of post-Soviet culture because the generation of post-Soviet 
writers and filmmakers who defined the field of culture in the 1990s are the carriers of the 
cultural memory of the Soviet past, the driving force behind the reworkings of Soviet textuality. 
The definitive figures of the post-Soviet literary landscape of the 1990s, Tatiana Tolstaia, Viktor 
Pelevin and Vladimir Sorokin, along with the influential filmmakers like Nikita Mikhalkov, 
Karen Shakhnazarov, and Aleksei Gherman grappled not just with the legacy of the Soviet past, 
but more importantly, with the transformation they themselves had to undergo as former Soviet 
writers and filmmakers. As this older generation gradually leaves the field of cultural production 
in Russia, the younger generation’s relative lack of emotional investment in the cultural memory 
of the Soviet state will lead this new cohort of writers and filmmakers to explore subjects beyond 
                                                
72 Boym 1994, 4. 
73 For Lacan’s discussion of this foundational illusion of unity, see Jacques Lacan,  “The Mirror Stage as Formative 
of the I Function, as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton and Co, 2004), 3-10.  
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memory and history, a process already underway. As the 1990s gave way to the 2000s, my 
readings show, the construction of post-Soviet myths became more focused, leaving the younger 
writers and filmmakers with a set of new, reworked cultural mythologies on which to build their 
own. 
One might conclude, following the narrator of Fyodor Sologub’s 1907 novel, Petty 
Demon, in the epigraph to this Introduction, that the seemingly helplessly referential post-Soviet 
Russian culture of the 1990s was only that – a traumatic repetition of the dead words of dead 
discourses. However, it is possible to read “might” in Sologub as an expression of a possibility: 
the repetition proved to be therapeutic as the 1990s drew to a close, as the seemingly dead Soviet 





The Writer, the Reader, the Character: Re-mythologizing Post-Soviet Literary 
Space. 
Yet,… modern mind is so sophisticated that it often keeps on thinking  even after having 
realized that it does not exist. 
Viktor Pelevin, T 
Однако… современный ум изощрен настолько, что нередко продолжает думать, 
даже поняв, что его нет. 
Виктор Пелевин, Т 
The Unmaking of the State Reader. 
“I’m not one of those people who mourns the good old times when the USSR 
supposedly was the ‘most well-read country in the world’ [sam[aia] chitaiusch[iaia] 
stran[a] v mire]. If you listen to those people, you might get an idea that every Soviet 
citizen was an avid reader, and of only good books. But this was just another fiction of 
the Soviet propaganda”, claims Nina Litvinets, the Editor-in-Chief of Moscow’s famous 
Raduga Publishers. She continues: 
We, publishers, remember that… a hundred thousand copies of every book in the 
‘Masters of Contemporary Prose Series’ were published1, and the [Soviet] 
distribution channels [still] worked… [but] the bookstores in the province 
                                                
1 Mastera Sovremennoi Prozy Series (that included more than a hundred titles of 20th century fiction from 
all over the world translated into Russian) was a series of Progress Publishers, transferred over to Raduga 
Publishers in 1982. Litvinets’s assessment of readership in Russia, then, refers to the 1980s. 
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received maybe a couple of copies, and that was it… [Good contemporary prose] 
was read only by the intelligentsia who either used the library or paid an arm and 
a leg for those books on the black market… For the mass reader, all these 
“Masters” were just nonsense, its intellectual content was hidden [from the mass 
reader]. Now [in 1997] the mass reader actually reads what we publish. Women 
who used to only read “Woman Worker” [Rabontnitsa] magazine and wouldn’t 
touch a book, now read romance novels, are happy and think of it as great “me-
time”.  By the way, romance is appreciated not just by the female readers of a 
modest intellectual potential. It’s a great way to relax, an escape from all the 
ugliness that’s just outside your window, it’s a plunge into the other, much more 
pleasant world, into a world of dreams…2 
Litvinets’s comments on post-Soviet readership in this 1997 interview reveal an 
interesting ambiguity. On the one hand, Litvinets, at the helm of a publishing house in the 
six-year-old market economy3, is clearly excited about the expanding market for mass 
literature; this excitement may also stem from a certain leveling of the traditional divide 
between high and low culture that Russia experienced in the 1990s, a result of an influx 
                                                
2 Galina Shulga. “Luybov’ i “Raduga”(Beseda s direktorom izdatel’stva N.S. Litvinets)”, Inostrannaia 
Literatura 7 (1997) (online version available at http://magazines.russ.ru/inostran/1997/7/lov.html). “ Мы-
то, издатели, помним, что когда «Мастера современной прозы» выходили тиражом сто тысяч 
экземпляров … то в провинциальный магазин … все равно доходило в лучшем случае 2 экземпляра 
книги... Нас читала только интеллигенция, добывая книги либо в библиотеке, либо втридорога на 
черном рынке, но ни в коем случае не через торговую сеть. Для массового читателя все эти 
«Мастера» были полной мурой, интеллектуальный смысл их оставался скрытым. Сейчас нас читает 
именно массовый читатель, «человек с улицы». Женщины, которые раньше читали только журнал 
«Работница», а за книгу даже и не брались, теперь читают любовный роман, счастливы и считают 
это замечательным отдыхом. Кстати, дамские романы любят не только читательницы со скромным 
интеллектуальным потенциалом. Это прекрасное отдохновение, это уход от того неприглядного, 
что ты видишь за окном, погружение в иной, более приятный мир мечты”. 
3 Litvinets will later go on to be the Executive Vice-President of Russian Book Union [Rossiiskii Knizhnyi 
Soiuz], the national association of Russian publishers) 
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of Western consumer-oriented culture, the runaway creative freedoms and the adoption of 
a set of postmodern sensibilities.  
On the other hand, however, the “modest intellectual potential” of the mass reader 
who missed their chances to appreciate the “intellectual content” of Alejo Carpentier and 
Chinua Achebe in the 1970s and 1980s still seems to ring somewhat bitter, which 
Litvinets quickly covers up by stressing the social and psychological benefits of a mass 
literature that allows the post-Soviet reader to escape the harsh socioeconomic reality of a 
country in transition. 
Litvinets’s claim that the Soviet reader hardly ever read “good” prose points to an 
implicit assumption about the nature of Soviet readership operating in the discourse of 
post-Soviet intellectuals. This assumption is predicated on what the National Association 
of Book Publishers, the Russian Book Union, calls a myth4 - that the Soviet Union was 
indeed the “most well-read” and that the books being read were “good.”  Litvinets claims 
that no serious readership studies ever supported the myth, but this myth might not be in 
any need of support. In 2008, the nostalgic myth was alive and well in a major academic 
study of post-Soviet readership, which, summing up the effects of a transitional economy 
on readership in Russia, claimed that “Russian readers of nearly every gender, age and 
education level have transitioned [pereshli, italics mine. - DK] to mass fiction.”5 The 
starting point of this transition can be nothing else than the “good books” read by 
everyone in the “most well-read country in the world.” 
                                                
4 Among the stated goals of the Russian Book Union (Rossiiskii Knizhnyi Soiuz) is “to correct the myth of 
‘the most reading country in the world’”. See: Rossiiskii Knizhnyi Soiuz, “Deiatel’nost Rossiiskogo 
Knizhnogo Soiuza”, http://www.bookunion.ru/pages/mero.html.  
5 B. Dubin, N. Zorkaia, Chteniie v Rossii 2008: Tendentsii i Problemy (Moskva: Analiticheskii Tsentr Iuriia 
Levady, 2008), 25. “Коротко говоря, на массовую беллетристику более или менее перешли читатели, 




This study, “Readership in Russia, 2008: Trends and Problems” (Chtenie v Rossii 
2008: tendentsii i problemy) was conducted by the Levada Center (Analiticheskii tsentr 
Iuriia Levady) at the request of Federal Department of Print and Mass Communications6. 
The results of the 2008 readership study were perceived in the media as shocking: 
metaphors like “catastrophe of readership”7 abound in the press coverage of the study’s 
release.  
Indeed, the findings of the Levada Center (further referred to as the Levada 
report) are grim if read from within the model of a culture that maintains a sharp division 
between “good” and “bad” literature. “Even the most educated and progressive readers”, 
the Levada report muses, “are clearly oriented towards a passive-adaptive type of cultural 
behavior and consumption; [even these readers display] an absence of analytic interest in 
the surrounding reality with its controversies, an inclination towards entertainment and 
escapism, towards a leveling of [cultural] taste.”8 
At first glance, the attitude towards mass literature expressed by Litvinets 
(implicitly) and by the Levada report (explicitly) is predicated just on intellectual elitism, 
a familiar stance for the Russian intellectuals: literature should be good, otherwise it is no 
literature (significantly, the Levada report even argues that, in the Russian context, 
“reading” means reading fiction9). However, the report’s nearly prescriptive demand for 
                                                
6 The Levada Center’s nongovernmental status, its spotless reputation and its world-class staff analysts 
ensure that the results of its studies are nearly automatically given a vote of confidence in contemporary 
Russian public discourse (in a sharp contrast to those of RosStat, the Russian Federal Statistics Service) 
7 See, e.g., Federal Portal of State Program of Readership Support (Federal’naia Programma Podderzhki 
Chteniia). Ol’ga Frolova, “Katastrofa chteniia v Rossii”, http://www.chtenie-21.ru/p-19, accessed Jan 7, 
2010 
8 Dubin 2008: 29. “В чтении даже самых образованных и продвинутых читательских групп сегодня 
отчетливы ориентации на пассивно-адаптивный тип культурного поведения и потребления, 
отсутствие аналитического ин- тереса к окружающей современности во всех ее противоречивых 
чертах, склонность к развлечению и эскапизму, усреднение вкусов”. 
9 Dubin 2008: 27.“’Читать’ означает ‘читать художественную литературу’”. 
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“analytic interest in the surrounding reality,” magnified by formulating this interest in 
terms of absence, makes one suspect that the issue at stake is not precisely “good 
literature versus bad literature” (after all, the 1990s have somewhat leveled the divide, as 
is evident in Litvinets’s interview). Or, rather, the definitions of good and bad literature 
are hardly drawn along the lines of literary aesthetics proper. However different are the 
attitudes expressed in Litvinets’s interview and in the Levada report towards the escape 
provided by mass literature, they are nonetheless similar in their mode of assessing 
literature in terms of its goals: both Litvinets and the Levada report are very interested in 
what literature (and reading it) should do. Mass literature fulfilled its role of providing 
escape from “real life” just as well in the 2000s as it did in 1990s. Yet the reader’s escape 
into literary worlds was deemed “good” for the society in the tumultuous 1990s and 
turned out to be “bad” in the 2000s, when escapism could no longer serve the needs of 
Russia’s rediscovered statehood. The difference between Litvinets’s relatively favorable 
assessment of mass literature and the Levada report’s condemnation thereof is then best 
explained not by the sudden reversal of Russian intellectuals’ attitude towards mass 
fiction, but by how well the objective literary and publishing trends are aligned with the 
perceived social demands imposed on literature. What emerges from the comparative 
diachronic analysis of Russian intellectuals’ assessment of Russian readership is the 
obvious persistence of the intellectual model which assigns the task of moderating social 
trends, whichever they are, to literature. 
The Levada report reads as a work of mourning; the object of mourning is a 
peculiar kind of interaction of literature with the reader and the state. Peppered by 
phrases such as “no longer…” and “loss of…”, the Levada report traces a gradual decline 
37 
 
in the interest in reading back to (and at times outright blames it on) the disintegration of 
state institutions that used to promote and support readership in the Soviet era. What the 
report mourns is a particular sensibility, a mode of reception of literature that was shaped 
by these state institutions and, the report concludes, was perhaps too quickly thrown 
away together with other remnants of Soviet ideology. It is this sensibility that was at the 
core of the myth of the Soviet Union as the “most well-read country in the world.” 
In his seminal study of Soviet readership, Evgeny Dobrenko outlines the aesthetic 
and ideological factors in Soviet literary production and reception that shape the peculiar 
Soviet mode of reading. “In contrast to the “explanatory” passion of the Western 
aesthetics of reception”, Dobrenko suggests, “Soviet aesthetic doctrine started out from 
an assumption of the “transformational” nature of aesthetic activity (in accordance with 
Marx’s eleventh thesis about Feuerbach).”10 The framework of this doctrine, Dobrenko’s 
study convincingly shows, defines the representational principles of Socialist Realism 
and its implicitly modernist goal11 of transforming life through art. However, such an 
aesthetic doctrine also had implications for the reader of literary texts produced within it: 
as the transformational nature of Soviet aesthetics is imposed not just on literary 
production but also on literary reception, the Soviet reader, Dobrenko demonstrates, 
acquires a set of responsibilities, the first and most important of which is to become a 
reader. 
The process of becoming, Dobrenko continues, is facilitated by state-controlled 
institutions, the school and the library being the most significant of those. The term 
Dobrenko suggests for such “transformation of aesthetics into aesthetic education” is 
                                                
10 See Evgeny Dobrenko, The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception 
of Soviet Literature. 1st ed. (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1997), 17 
11 For more on the relationship between Socialist Realism and modernism, see Groys 1992, esp. 36. 
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“pedagogization of aesthetics.”12 Indeed, it is the post-Soviet lack of aesthetic education 
in the absence of Soviet primary facilitators of readership, the school and the library, that 
the Levada report concludes to be the reason for the post-Soviet “catastrophe of 
readership”. 
This particular post-Soviet catastrophe, the Levada report continues, is a symbolic 
one. Among the reasons why post-Soviet readers flat out refuse to fulfill their 
“obligation” to read (an unusually curt sentence in the otherwise elaborately phrased 
report stands out by flatly stating, “46 per cent of adult Russians do not read books”13), 
the report names “the external democratization, which largely resulted in a massive loss 
of trust in social institutions in general, including the school and the library.”14 These 
institutions “of literary culture lost not only their former symbolic value and authority, 
but also their former role in structuring the reading of the masses, in providing and 
disseminating influential models.”15 
The mention of symbolic authority in the report needs to be given some 
consideration. The Levada report concludes that the disintegration of Soviet 
intelligentsia’s “ideology of enlightenment”, completed by the mid-1990s, eliminated the 
role of intelligentsia as an important source of cultural authority. Before the fall of the 
Soviet Union, this source was sustained through transmitting the “ideology of 
enlightenment” through codified, legitimized, and stable channels of communication like 
                                                
12 Dobrenko 1997, 17. 
13 Dubin 2008, 21. “46 процентов взрослых россиян не читают книг”. 
14 Dubin 2008, 5. “…внешняя демократизация, которая во многом повлекла за собой массовую 
потерю доверия к социальным институтам вообще, включая, среди прочих, школу и библиотеку”. 
15 Dubin 2008, 39-40. “Прежние институты книжной культуры – библиотека, школа, вуз, 
литературная критика – утратили не только свое прежнее символическое значение, авторитетность, 
но и свою прежнюю роль в структурировании процессов массового чтения, представлении и 
распространении влиятельных образцов”. 
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“thick journals”16 and “literature-centric school education”17. The report deems 
unsuccessful post-Soviet attempts on the part of the state to fill the void of cultural 
authority with federal readership support programs18. 
The Levada report, then, not just subscribes to the rather conservative definition 
of culture as something promoted by the intellectuals. The report also mourns the lost 
pedagogical value of literature, promoting (as intellectuals should) the controlled 
pedagogization of aesthetics, which was characteristic, as Dobrenko shows, of the Soviet 
cultural paradigm. The intelligentsia’s authority now in shambles and the state authority 
over culture in general and readership in particular not living up to the expectations, the 
Levada report does outline the steps that need to be taken on the state level to restore the 
symbolic authority associated with literary culture. However, the report’s 
recommendations, having resulted in some policy declarations to promote readership in 
200919, are nowhere as interesting as the Levada report’s own unconscious search for the 
source of cultural authority to fill the perceived void. The report suggests, or, rather, 
wishes for, the void to be filled not by a social institution or a group. In the absence of 
both state and intellectuals’ tangible authority over readership, an unexpectedly 
mythological authority (“author-ity”) emerges from the report’s conclusions. 
                                                
16 “Thick journals” (tolstyie zhurnaly), publishing literary criticism along with literary texts, were an 
important channel of disseminating literary culture in Russia since late 18th century. The specific period in 
the history of literary journals to which the Levada report refers is perestroika, when “thick journals” 
become an arena for public debate not just about literature, but about Soviet political ideology. 
17 See Dubin 2008, 6. 
18 Like National Program of Readership Support and Development (Национальная программа поддержки 
и развития чтения), launched in 2006. 
19 Thus, a document titled “Declaration in Support of the Book” (“Deklaratsiia o podderzhke knigi”) was 
signed by the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, an umbrella organization for 
the certain former Soviet Republics, in February 2009. Interestingly, in an unexpected logocentric move, 
the text of the document uses the term “book” to encompass reading practices and cultural value of reading. 
For the text of the Declaration, see Federal’noie Agentstvo po Pechati i Massovym Kommunikatsiiam, 
“Deklaratsiia o podderzhke knigi”, http://www.fapmc.ru/files/download/696_file.pdf.  
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“In [Russia of the 2000s], compared to the late-Soviet period, to the years of 
perestroika and to the attempts of systemic transformation in the 1990s, there emerged, in 
a certain sense, a different society [literally, “other society” [drugoie obschestvo]. – 
DK]”, the Levada report claims; 
Characteristic for this society is the sharp deficit of figures of authority, with the 
exception of the state leaders. Thus [italics mine. - DK], the names of even the 
most influential Russian writers of the 20th and 21st century were recalled by only 
very few respondents [of the survey]. Among leaders here are [Sergei] Yesenin 
(14%), recently departed [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn20 (10%), plus three or four 
other authors – within the margin of statistical error. There are no recognized 
public elites, there are no independent channels of transmission of their ideas, 
examples and assessments, thus there are no symbols [shared by everyone]21. 
The nearly careless automaticity of conflating social, symbolic, and literary 
authority in this reflection speaks volumes about the model of culture that is often 
deemed to be characteristically Russian. While Yesenin and Solzhenitsyn’s appearance in 
the report is of course explained by the nature of the survey (which was, after all, focused 
on what people read), the report’s own wording, nonetheless, hardly leaves any room for 
conventional sources of symbolic authority other than the state and literature (like 
athletes, entertainers, or other types of influential social players). Putting the state and 
                                                
20 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn died in 2008. 
21 Dubin 2008, 69-70. “B стране по сравнению с позднесоветским периодом, с годами перестройки и 
периодом, попыток системной трансформации советского социума в 1990-е гг. сло жилось в 
определенном смысле другое общество. Оно другое по структуре коммуникаций, по их 
интенсивности (точнее, наоборот, их неинтенсивности), по содержанию этих коммуникаций. Для 
него характерен, резкий дефицит общих авторитетов, за исключением первых лиц государства. Так, 
имена даже самых влиятельных отечественных писателей ХХ–XXI вв. могут назвать лишь немногие 
опрошенные. Лидируют Есенин (14%), только что ушедший Солженицын (10%), плюс еще три-
четыре автора – в границах статистической достоверности.Нет признанных публичных элит, нет 
независимых каналов коммуникации их идей, образцов и оценок, поэтому нет и общих символов”.  
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literature in dangerously close textual proximity outlines the place of literature in the 
Russian intellectuals’ prescriptive and pedagogical model of culture. Petr Vail’ and 
Aleksandr Genis sum up this place in the following way: 
For Russia, literature is a [universal] reference point, a credo, an ideological and 
moral foundation… For such mutual understanding only classical literature would 
do. Classical literature is a universal language based on absolute values… [One 
can even speak] not about the unique nature of Russian literature, but about the 
unique nature of the Russian reader, who is inclined to see the sacred national 
property in their favorite books. Criticizing the classics is the same thing as 
criticizing motherland22. 
The reader Vail’ and Genis construct here is a nostalgically idealized reader: the 
quotation comes from a collection of essays meant to reintroduce the post-Soviet reader 
to Russian classical literature. In the 1990s, when the collection was put together, the 
readers flocked, as Nina Litvinets reminds us, to the foreign, and newly-available 
domestic23, mass literature, towards the escape that genre fiction provides. They may 
have fled the pedagogized Soviet aesthetics of reception. Vail’ and Genis explain, in the 
essay on the 19th-century Russian critic Vissarion Belinskii (a compulsory reading in the 
Soviet “literature-centric school education”), that 
                                                
22 Vail', Petr, and Aleksandr  Genis. "Rodnaia Rech’: Uroki iziaschnoi slovesnosti", in  Sobraniie 
sochinenii v dvukh tomakh. Tom 1 (Yekaterinburg: U-Faktoriia, 2003), 6-271: 7-8. The essays were 
originally published by “Nezavisimaia Gazeta” in 1991.“Для России литература -- точка отсчета, 
символ веры, идеологический и нравственный фундамент. … Классика - универсальный язык, 
основанный на абсолютных ценностях…Впрочем, с таким же -- если не большим - успехом можно 
было бы говорить не об уникальности русской литературы, а об уникальности русского читателя, 
склонного видеть в любимых книгах самую священную национальную собственность. Задеть 
классика - все равно что оскорбить родину”. 
23 On the emergence of domestic popular fiction, see Introduction to Eliot Borenstein, Overkill: Sex and 
Violence in Russian Popular Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
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[Belinskii’s] judgments [about literature] had… drastic consequences for Russian 
reader: they became a model for teaching literary criticism in schools. 
[Belinskii’s] idea that “literature is a textbook of life” turned the study of 
literature into a particular subject: “life-ology” [zhiznevedeniie]24. The characters 
became role models, their fate was a model for [real life] relationships… In 
essence, all of the [Russian] classic literature, as interpreted by the [Soviet] 
school, is a type of moral doctrine, a peculiar surrogate of religion25. 
While the mass reader seems to stop reading Russian classics and “serious” 
literature in general in the 1990s, Vail’ and Genis still conclude that the imaginary 
Russian reader treats (or at least should treat) the texts as an “encoded revelation”, which 
needs to be decoded on the basis of the particular reader’s “individual spiritual 
experience.”26 Such wishful, and nostalgic, thinking only attests to the fact that, for post-
Soviet intellectuals, there remains an unconscious attraction not just to Belinskiian “life-
ology” approach to reading literary texts, but also to the transformational and 
pedagogized Soviet aesthetics of reception, even as Socialist ideology underlying both is 
already discredited. By inviting the reader to look to the classics in their search for their 
own identity, Vail’ and Genis preserve the pedagogical value of literary text, appealing to 
the meta-ideological value of the Russian classics: “in order to read [the classics] there 
                                                
24 Vail’ and Genis continue that the reader is supposed to “outgrow” Belinskii’s ‘proto-Socialist Realist’ 
approach (establishing a pragmatic connection between, if not outright conflating, art and life, Belinskii’s 
literary criticism is undoubtedly an important source of the Soviet doctrine of transformational aesthetics 
discussed by Dobrenko). Nonetheless, Vail’ and Genis still seem to have a particular affinity to Belinskii’s 
“life-ology”. Thus, they continue to be Belinskian in spirit when, in another essay in the collection, they 
reason about which of two characters is “better” (read: which of the two can serve as the most beneficial 
role model). 
25 Vail’, Genis 2003, 96. “Но куда более грандиозные последствия суды Белинского имели для 
русского читателя… Идея ‘литература - учебник жизни’, к которой со временем свели творчество 
Белинского, превратила словесность в особый учебный предмет - жизневедение. Персонажи стали 
примерами, на судьбе которых разбирались модели взаимоотношений... По сути, вся наша классика 
в школьной интерпретации - вид нравственной доктрины, своеобразный суррогат религии”. 
26 Vail’, Genis 2003, 99. 
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was no need to wait for the next ‘thaw’27. We often forget that when schoolchildren in the 
Stalin era learned something by heart, it was not just [the state-approved] Demyan 
Bednyi’s poems, but Lermontov’s, too.”28 
Now that Stalin comes into the picture, a return to Dobrenko’s discussion of how 
the Soviet “state reader” was made might provide an insight into the reasons why 
transformational and pedagogized aesthetics of reception retain their attractiveness in the 
post-Soviet context. 
Boris Groys discusses, in his Total Art of Stalinism, Socialist Realism’s late-
Soviet legacy, and notes this aesthetic paradigm’s exceptional conduciveness for 
mythologizing not just the objects of art, but aesthetic practices themselves. Groys argues 
that, in the late-Soviet context, “the devices of Stalinist indoctrination were [used to 
demonstrate] the similarity of this myth to those of both the present and the past to 
reconstruct the single mythological network in which the modern consciousness 
functions.”29 The evident temptation of Stalinist mythology for late-Soviet art lies in the 
figure of Stalin, the “artist-tyrant” in Groys’s words, who for Stalinist art becomes a locus 
of symbolic, but also of aesthetic, authority. It is Stalin’s power to hold myths about the 
state (but also myths about art) together that late-Soviet art, not anymore overseen by a 
similar source of authority30, nostalgically seeks. 
Thus, Stalinist mythology becomes especially relevant in the late- and post-Soviet 
context; it is then not entirely surprising that part of it, the mythologized Soviet reader, is 
                                                
27 Vail' and Genis refer to the “Khrushchev Thaw,” a period of relative democratization in Soviet history 
(roughly 1956-64), associated with more creative freedoms; the name comes from the title of Il’ia 
Ehrenburg’s 1954 novel, Ottepel’ (The Thaw). 
28 Vail’, Genis 2003, 8.“А главное - чтобы читать Чехова и Толстого, не надо было ждать очередной 
"оттепели". Часто забывается, что школьники сталинской эпохи учили наизусть не только Демьяна 
Бедного, но и Лермонтова”. 
29 Groys 1992, 95. 
30 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of Stalin as the Soviet paternal metaphor. 
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a concept that has a potential to inform the post-Soviet reader. What exactly is this 
mythologized Soviet reader, then, and what happens to him31 in the post-Soviet context? 
As Dobrenko shows in his analysis of the Soviet reader’s politics of 
interpretation, this reader is a paradoxical creature: he actively searches literary texts for 
models of their own behavior, and actively negotiates, through a variety of state-
supported feedback channels, both the form and the content of literature. “Characteristic 
[for the Soviet reader]”, Dobrenko concludes, “is the effort to explain an image while 
overlooking its ‘literariness.’”32 In practice, however, this does not mean that the Soviet 
reader fails to see a difference between literary characters and “real” people, boundary 
between life and art thoroughly blurred by Socialist Realist method. Instead, the reader 
has to adopt a paradoxical mode of reading which simultaneously reinforces and ignores 
this boundary. To reformulate Dobrenko’s argument in the language of psychoanalysis, 
this reader knows very well that what he reads is not “life” but, in a classic fetishist 
move, very much wants it to be, to an extent that he sometimes forgets about ever 
knowing the difference. 
On the one hand, this reader is extremely pragmatic, trying to fit himself into the 
character’s shoes, or to compare the representations of social phenomena with his own 
experience of these phenomena. On the other hand, this reader still turns to the text as the 
authorized source of socially and politically relevant models, as the state legitimizes the 
controlled environment of the text to be a “better” source of such models than “real life”. 
This reader emerges as a result of intensive soul-searching, to which reading serves as an 
                                                
31 I intentionally use the pronoun ‘he’, following Dobrenko, as this reader is a variant of model Soviet 
heroic masculinity. 
32 Dobrenko 1997, 107. 
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occasion; he emerges a dutiful learner of channeled and sanctioned social meanings that 
the text itself, interestingly, may or may not possess. 
What happens to the author of the text, so promptly ignored by both the imaginary 
Soviet and the post-Soviet reader so far? Is there a place for the author in the 
mythological quest of the Soviet reader, beyond divining “what the author wanted to 
say?” 
“The [Soviet] reader does not want to read the author’s text”, Dobrenko argues, 
“since he is entirely carried away by the reading of his own, second meaning of the text, 
to which he gives birth in the process of reading.”33 By putting production and reception 
into dangerously close proximity, such mode of reading, then, blurs the line between the 
reader and the writer. Dobrenko illustrates the easiness with which a Soviet reader could 
become a Soviet writer with several case studies. In a way, this is a “natural” move; 
when, channeled through the prescriptive messages of the state institutions, literary 
characters insistently serve as real-life role models, the reverse relationship in which real-
life models become literary characters flows from the mode of reading as “writing 
oneself.” 
When the Levada report insists that the Russian reader of the 2000s is passive and 
dispassionate, it implicitly compares this reader to the Soviet model, to the reader who is 
“’different from all the other readers in the world, a Soviet reader, a reader-builder, and a 
reader-fighter’… This literary character is what the ideal Soviet reader is;”34 this reader is 
essentially a Socialist Realist character35. 
                                                
33 Dobrenko 1997, 111. 
34 Ibid., 301-302. 
35 Ibid., 258. 
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This mythological figure may seem just a nostalgic post-Soviet conjecture; 
however, Soviet literary production and reception were so deeply intertwined that a post-
Soviet return to the mythology of readership points to some of the processes in post-
Soviet literary production that aim to cover the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the 
reader and the text staged by post-Soviet intellectuals. 
The Unmaking of the State Writer: Literary Landscape in Ruins? 
The fate of the book would decide Pavel's own fate. If the manuscript was rejected 
that would be the end for him. If, on the other hand, it was found to be bad only in 
part, […] he would launch a new offensive. His mother took the parcel with the 
manuscript to the post office. Days of anxious waiting began. Never in his life had 
Pavel waited in such anguished suspense for a letter as he did now. He lived from the 
morning to the evening post. But no news came from Leningrad. The continued 
silence of the publishers began to look ominous. From day to day the presentiment of 
disaster mounted, and Pavel admitted to himself that total rejection of his book would 
finish him. That, he could not endure. There would be no longer any reason to live. 
[…] At last, when the agony of waiting had become well-nigh unbearable, his mother, 
who had been suffering from the suspense no less than her son, came running into the 
room with the cry: 
“News from Leningrad!” 
It was a telegram from the Regional Committee. A terse message on a telegraph form: 




His heart beat fast. His cherished dream was realised! The steel bonds have been 
burst, and now, armed with a new weapon, he had returned to the fighting ranks and 
to life36. 
Nikolai Ostrovskii’s narration becomes clipped; time shrinks in the closing pages 
of How the Steel Was Tempered (1930-32) as his protagonist, Pavel Korchagin, anxiously 
awaits the state’s permission to become a Soviet writer, thus staging an “aesthetic 
revolution from below.”37 
Disabled by his war wounds, paralyzed and blind, Korchagin searches for a way 
to rejoin the ranks of the builders of the new Soviet state; writing seems to be the only 
option left. Having missed on much of his formal education, Korchagin understands that 
his writing skills are lacking; he improves them by becoming a voracious reader and only 
then emerges as a writer, “heartily approved” by the Party Committee. 
This plot stages a model for the Soviet reader to become a Soviet writer, but it 
also goes beyond just that, establishing a mode of “complete identification with the hero, 
[…] a desire to replace a literary character, to turn life into literature.”38 The author of 
Korchagin, Nikolai Ostrovskii, the Russian Civil War veteran, turned his own life into 
literature, modelling the literary character on himself. Korchagin, in turn, became a 
personal favorite (and a role model) for the Great Patriotic War youth resistance group 
leader, Oleg Koshevoi; this diligent Soviet reader himself went on to become a literary 
character, in Aleksandr Fadeev’s Socialist Realist masterpiece, The Young Guard (1946; 
1951). The interaction between Nikolai Ostrovskii, Pavel Korchagin, and Oleg Koshevoi 
                                                
36 Nikolay Ostrovsky. How The Steel Was Tempered. Translated from the Russian by R. Prokofieva. 
Moscow: Progress Publishers (Progress Soviet Author Library), no year (1973). P.141-142. 
37 Evgeny Dobrenko, The Making of the State Writer: Social and Aesthetic Origins of Soviet Literary 
Culture. 1st ed. (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2002), xx. 
38 Dobrenko 1997, 289. 
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demonstrates that, as Soviet critics would put it, “before our very eyes, the hero crosses 
from the pages of the book into life… the full cycle of interaction of literature and reality 
is completed”39. 
This is a disturbing aesthetic of reception, and it may seem surprising that the 
ideal Soviet reader, packaged together with an unmistakably avant-garde call for total art, 
is indeed the nostalgic object mourned by post-Soviet intellectuals. After all, this 
aesthetic is defined by the “absence of the boundary between Konstantin Simonov40 and a 
Kaluga tractor driver”41 (as Dobrenko succinctly puts it), and thus is inherently counter-
elitist. Can the ideal Soviet reader become a post-Soviet nostalgic object? 
Stripped of Socialist ideology, however, the distilled myth of the adolescent42 
Soviet reader can become a nostalgic object for both intellectual paternalist elitism and 
for the post-Soviet writer. This reader does not resist, and even welcomes, the exceptional 
porosity of the boundary between the reader, the character and the writer, while retaining 
a deep respect for the work of art. This reader is everything the post-Soviet writer wishes 
for, for a number of reasons. 
In his Remaining Relevant After Communism, Andrew Wachtel examines the 
post-Communist shift in the social perception of the role of writer. Socialist ideology not 
informing aesthetic practices anymore, the change in the status of a writer in post-
Communist societies is intrinsically connected to the issue of Socialism eliminating the 
                                                
39 S. Tregub and I. Bashelis, “Schast’e Korchagina”, in “Znamia”, 4(1944), 127 (quoted in Dobrenko 1997: 
290). 
40 Dobrenko refers here to Konstantin Simonov (1915-1979), an eminent Soviet poet, six-time Stalin Award 
laureate and the functionary of the Union of Soviet Writers. 
41 Dobrenko 2002:279. 
42 “In principle, Ostrovskii’s novel [How the Steel Was Tempered] presupposes a child reader, either a child 
or an infantile adult who “for his entire life connects his ideal of man with an image of a hero idealized by 
him most often in his middle years of school. In his behavior he is guided by thoughts of how this hero 




possibility of choice, Wachtel suggests43. In post-Communist societies, the formerly 
monolithic audience segmented through the increase in the number of published titles and 
the decrease in the number of copies of each title, Wachtel shows (and several publishing 
industry surveys44, together with the Levada report’s findings, support this observation 
for the Russian case). 
The post-Communist writers, Wachtel continues, found themselves negotiating 
literary pluralism45: one single author could no longer capture the attention of every 
reader, and their readers no longer shared a single (or at least comparable) social 
experience46. In this light, Vail’ and Genis’s call in the 1990s for the return to the classics 
becomes a social imperative: the classics provide the readers with a universal language47 
just when, in Wachtel’s model of a post-Communist society, “great work[s] of literature 
[that can] recapitulate the general truths of people’s experience48” are seemingly no 
longer produced. 
In the 1990s, the suddenly-post-Soviet writer had found him- or herself in the 
situation where the universal language of Soviet ideology has revealed itself to be a 
universalizing language. Michael Gorham, speaking about the 1990s, notes that 
most of the major [literary] trends that have emerged in the past decade have done 
so if not as a kind of linguistic revolt against the clichéd and tightly controlled 
                                                
43 Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Remaining Relevant After Communism: The Role of the Writer in Eastern 
Europe (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2006), esp. 217). 
44 See, e.g., Irina Kabanova, “Sladostnyi Plen: Perevodnaia Massovaia Literatura v Rossii v 1997-1998 
godakh”, in “Volga”, 10 (1999), online version available at 
http://magazines.russ.ru/volga/1999/10/kaban.html. 
45 Wachtel 217. 
46 Wachtel 218. 
47 Vail’ and Genis 2003, 7. 
48 Wachtel 218. 
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language of the Soviet state, then at least as an alternative source of linguistic 
authority to fill the void created by that language’s wholesale de-legitimation49. 
In other words, post-Soviet disillusionment in the formerly universal language 
sanctioned by the Soviet ideology was negotiated on two levels. In terms of post-Soviet 
language, the amount of linguistic and genre experimentation, and verbal innovation 
readily observed across post-Communist literatures of the 1990s attests to Gorham’s 
observation that “periods of radical social change tend to share a basic dynamic in the 
evolution of language culture– one in which the rejection of old models of writing and 
speaking lead to verbal innovation and the articulation of a new order.”50 
On another level, the experimentation and innovation characteristic of the post-
Soviet literary landscape can be read as a paradoxical nostalgic mechanism. By searching 
for the ways to articulate the reality, by coming up with ways to fix it in language, these 
experimental texts seek to reestablish the authority of the written word over this reality, 
that is, to return to the mythological possibility of having a universal language in which 
to speak, to replace the dysfunctional language that Communist ideology formerly 
provided. The runaway post-Communist textuality was, after all, navigating a void whose 
boundaries were shaped by the Soviet institutions of literary production and reception. 
To see how the processes of linguistic experimentation and articulation of the 
renewed authority of language over social reality are intertwined, one is bound to turn to 
the case of the Viktor Pelevin, the major figure of the contemporary Russian literary 
                                                
49 Michael S. Gorham, "Language Culture and National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia", in Landslide of the 
Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet Russia, Ingunn Lunde, ed. (Bergen: Slavica Bergensia , 2006),18-
31, 19-20. 
50 Ibid., 19. 
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landscape. Aleksandr Genis speaks of the “Pelevin phenomenon,” formulating Pelevin’s 
contribution to the post-Soviet search for a new language in the following way: 
Pelevin was often (and unreasonably) criticized for his inability to write 
beautifully [pisat’ krasivo]. This is, of course, pure nonsense; Pelevin searches for 
– and usually finds – the new linguistic strata. When asked, “what do you think 
post-perestroika Russia is, linguistically,” he answers… : “The logos is tired of 
being ‘preserved,’ it is tired of rotting in the mouth of a powerless intelligent – 
and it has returned to life in the language of fighting demons. The speech of the 
thugs [iconically associated with the early 1990s and often featured in Pelevin’s 
prose. -DK] possesses an incredible power, because behind every turn of their 
bazar [thug slang for “discourse”- DK] there is a very real flicker of life and 
death. This is why it is very interesting to formulate the metaphysical truths [in 
the language of the thugs] – in their language, these truths become alive.”51 
Pelevin does not want to “write beautifully” because the notion of “harmonious,” 
smooth textuality belongs to, as the Levada report would have it, the “ideology of 
enlightenment” carried by the Soviet intelligentsia, who now ostensibly have their mouth 
stuffed with the rotting logos. Pelevin looks, instead, for the kind of language that bridges 
the gap between the signifier and the signified, the gap that was extensively widened by 
the Soviet clichéd rhetoric, and fixed, Pelevin suggests, by the Russian intellectual 
discourse which falls back on the “old” models of expression. 
                                                
51 Aleksandr Genis. “Fenomen Pelevina”, http://pelevin.nov.ru/stati/o-gen1/1.html.“Пелевина часто и 
несправедливо ругали за неумение писать красиво. Это, конечно, чепуха, Пелевин ищет — и 
обычно находит — новые языковые пласты. … на вопрос, что для вас ‘постперестроечная Россия в 
языковом плане’ Пелевин отвечает следующим образом: “Логос устал ‘храниться’, устал преть во 
рту бессильного интеллигента  — и возродился в языке сражающихся демонов. В речи братков есть 
невероятная сила, потому что за каждым поворотом их базара реально мерцает жизнь и смерть. 
Поэтому на их языке очень интересно формулировать метафизические истины — они оживают”. 
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While the colorful speech of post-Soviet thugs may indeed bring [Russian] 
language and the [social] reality it is supposed to reflect closer to each other, Pelevin’s 
relatively early post-Soviet linguistic experiment suggests that what covers the gap 
between the signifier and the signified created on the ruins of the Soviet language is the 
language of immense, if schizophrenic, potential of signification—indeed the language of 
power. 
In Pelevin’s 1992 novella, Ukhriab, an aging retiree, Ivan Maralov, gradually 
slips into insanity, slowly realizing that everything around him is ukhriab. The 
nonsensical noun appears in Maralov’s consciousness together with a morning-after 
headache, and he dismisses it as result of overindulging. However, he gradually starts 
seeing ukhriab in surrounding objects. It is noteworthy that Maralov does not precisely 
see ukhriab: a product of Soviet “readerly” culture, he reads it in the decaying urban 
landscape dominated by banners featuring clichéd Soviet pronouncements like “We wish 
success to the participants of the XI international festival for disarmament and nuclear 
security.” Maralov’s third-person subjective narration claims that he does not see any 
trace of ukhriab in the slogan, yet Pelevin’s newly post-Soviet reader, out of habit of 
abbreviating longer pieces of state-sanctioned rhetoric, would readily see ukhriab in 
“Uspekha uchastnikam XI mezhdunarodnogo festivalia za razoruzheniie i iadernuiu 
bezopasnost’.”52 Sometimes, the names of the objects surrounding Maralov appear to be 
in an onomatopoeic relationship with ukhriab, sharing a syllable or two; sometimes there 
are no traces of phonetic similarity. Grasping for the remnants of his sanity, Maralov 
theorizes that ukhriab is a blend (not precisely an acronym) of two Russian words, 
khrebet (“ridge”, or “spine”) and ukhab (“pothole”). The conceptual opposition of “high-
                                                
52 X is the letter of the Cyrillic alphabet that denotes the sound [h]. 
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low,”53 evident between the two “parts” of ukhriab, allows a reading of ukhriab as a kind 
of a linguistic condensation of a gap (Maralov theorizes, at one point, that ukhriab is a 
hole in his soul, but at the same time a symbol par excellence that is meant to cover this 
hole). 
Tracing ukhriab to its possible linguistic origin, however, does not help Maralov 
at all. Instead, ukhriab is represented as a rupture in the canvas of Maralov’s life – first a 
crack, then a canyon, then an abyss. He sinks deeper and deeper into his obsession with 
ukhriab, reads it in more and more objects around him, and then comes to realize that he 
was initially mistaken: it is not that the objects turn into ukhriab, but instead ukhriab 
reveals itself to Maralov, formerly disguised in the shape of these objects: 
[This something] … has become an ukhriab and was now shining over Maralov’s 
inner world as a dim red flickering light. Before the dream, Maralov saw air as 
air, and asphalt as asphalt, but it turned out that everything around was simply a 
shape in which ukhriab temporarily molded itself – just like bronze remains 
bronze whether it is molded into a toy soldier, or into a cross, or into a monument 
to Kirov. So, there it was – a huge, immeasurable ukhriab, shining right through 
Maralov… and Maralov knew that the most important thing for him now would 
be to delay realizing that he, essentially, is also an ukhriab54. 
                                                
53 See Vyacheslav Desyatov, “Viktor Pelevin mezhdu Ukhriabom i Uralom”, 
http://lik.altnet.ru/Kritika/pelevin.htm. 
54 Viktor Pelevin. “Ukhriab”, in Vse Rasskazy (Moskva: Eksmo, 2005), 176. “это что-то, мелькнув 
сначала неясной точкой где-то на периферии души, вдруг с ужасающей скоростью понеслось с 
самому центру личности и лопнуло там, превратившись в ухряб и осветив внутренний мир 
Маралова тусклым красным мерцанием,- до этого сна Маралов видел воздух как воздух, асфальт 
как асфальт и так далее, теперь же оказалось, что все вокруг – просто форма, в которой временно 
застыл ухряб,- так же, как бронза остается той же бронзой, отливаясь и в солдатика, и в крестик, и в 
памятник Кирову. Итак, огромный, безмерный ухряб, а в центре - просвеченный ухрябом Маралов, 




As a linguistic gap, ukhriab has a paradoxical potential to be an all-encompassing 
master signifier, as it possesses an uncanny ability to cover other linguistic gaps: when 
Maralov reads, ukhriab manifests itself in both the Russian classics, separated by space in 
phrases like “dvukh riabchikov” (“two grouses”), and in Soviet fiction, split into two by a 
period: “… vozdukh. Riabaia…” (“… air. Pockmarked…”)55. 
This ability of ukhriab also works on the intersection of the imaginary and the 
symbolic, and more importantly, emerges in the process of reading Pelevin’s text: in a 
movie theater, Maralov observes a mural depicting a mountain ash (riabina in Russian) 
with two sunflowers (podsolnukh) on its sides, and readily sees ukhriab. Of course, 
ukhriab emerges here not precisely for Maralov but for the reader who has no way of 
seeing what Maralov sees except by reading the words that describe the image. The 
reader of Pelevin’s text thus largely contributes to Maralov’s insanity by reading the 
image for him. 
No matter in which direction Maralov thus “reads” the mural, ukhriab effectively 
provides a perverse continuity to seemingly disjointed symbols. Pairing sunflowers with 
mountain ash was often favored by the Soviet genre of still life;56 it can be argued that 
ukhriab, seemingly only a source of Maralov’s anxiety and a symbol of the failure of 
language to account for the surrounding reality, nonetheless does create a perversely 
continuous national landscape out of the remnants of the Soviet imagery of the mural. 
Ukhriab finally removes any and all distinctions between the object and its name 
in the protagonist’s psyche. A taxi trip is described in the following way: “The street 
rushed towards him – that is, for the driver it was the street, but for Maralov… he knew 
                                                
55 Ibid., 174. 
56 Aleksandr Os’merkin’s 1952 painting, “Podsolnukhi i Riabina”, is a classic representative. 
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what it was; on its sides were separate gray vertical ukhriabs, on which other ukhriabs 
were glowing, square-shaped and yellow.”57 Maralov completes the trip to “uncover the 
symbol [ukhriab] with the help of the symbol itself,”58 hoping to understand ukhriab, so 
to say, on its own terms. What ukhriab conceals is something unbearable, yet Maralov is 
determined to see what it is, still hoping that there is, as Jacques Lacan would put it, a 
metalanguage to understand a symbol that fails to “symbolize” by perverting the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified. 
Expectedly, Maralov’s final journey ends in encountering ukhriab, in the form of 
a trench in the ground, into which Maralov promptly falls to his death, to become one 
with the signifier that subsumed his world. 
The intuitive reading of the short story would suggest that, as the symbols of 
decaying Soviet landscape become ukhriabs in Maralov’s mind, the story is a metaphor 
for the late- and post-Soviet linguistic failure manifested in the disconnect between the 
signifier and the signified. However, the closing passage of the story suggests that it may 
well be a very productive linguistic failure: the protagonist “determinedly… threw away 
the useless big word, ready to see what was beyond it.”59 In other words, the story 
explores the failure of language to account for reality, moves onto considering the 
possibility that there is no metalanguage, and dismisses it. This restores, for the 
protagonist at least, the ability of symbols to stand for something, even if this something 
is accessible only in death. The story is disillusioned in the linguistic sign, metaphorizing 
                                                
57 Pelevin. “Ukhriab”, (2005),180. “Улица понеслась навстречу - улица для водителя, а для Маралова 
– известно что: имевшее по бокам отдельные вертикальные ухрябы серого цвета, на которых горели 
другие - желтые и квадратные”. 
58 Ibid., 179.“И вскрыть его надо с помощью самого этого символа, то есть ухряба”. 
59 Ibid., 182 (“А затем решительно, с размаху, повалился в яму и, как сбрасывают покрывало с 
памятника, отбросил ненужное большое слово, приготовясь увидеть то, что за ним”. 
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its detachment from the signified, but not in the mechanism of signification itself. 
Ukhriab, having destroyed Maralov’s psyche, turns out to be a not an empty signifier but 
a signifier of some higher order: it denotes a transcendental meaning which, of course, 
“normal” language cannot hope to describe. The story ends there, seemingly 
deconstructing language but in fact reinforcing its magical power. 
It seems that logocentrism, traditionally associated with Russian culture, 
intrinsically shaping literary practices60 and predicated on the belief in the nearly magical 
power of language, determined the post-Soviet literary response to the collapse of both 
the institutional structures and aesthetic practices of Soviet literature. Post-Soviet writer, 
having glimpsed into the void where the signifiers lost their ability to be unquestionably 
matched with their signifieds, had no real means to counter this void of language but with 
language itself. The search for a language which will restore the chain of signification 
continued in post-Soviet literature even after the relationship between the signifier and 
the signified was shown to be irreparable (as the case of Ukhriab demonstrates). 
Post-Soviet literature, I would argue, has seen something in the post-Soviet 
symbolic void that it could not live with, as none of the Soviet cultural assumptions about 
the role of literature carried over into the post-Soviet literary landscape. While Wachtel 
suggests that a radical rethinking of the role of literature in the fabric of social life could 
and should occur as a post-Communist society transitions to new models of cultural 
production, I propose that this did not precisely happen in the Russian case. Russian 
literature wanted to remain Literature with a capital L. Though the range of ideologies 
supporting the myth of great national literature have revealed their mythological nature in 
post-Soviet context, the myth itself was largely sustained as a function of cultural 
                                                
60 For a discussion of Russian logocentrism, see Conclusion to Epstein 1995. 
57 
 
nostalgia for the institutional status of literature, and as a cultural defense mechanism 
against the linguistic void. 
As much as Pelevin would want one to believe that the old models of literature’s 
functioning in Russian society are dead, his own writing suggests that this is not precisely 
the case. Pelevin’s essay Zombifikatsiia (“Zombification”, 1990), mentions a banner that, 
anecdotally, used to decorate the building of the Kazan’ train station: “Communism”, the 
banner proclaims, “is pyzdyr maksymardysh pyzh!” In the essay, devoted to the Soviet 
Union’s “magical practices” that socialize the citizen into the ritualized magic of state 
ideology, Communism is defined as a string of nonsensical words with no grammatical 
relation to one another61. However, it is worth noting that the essay does provide a 
definition of Communism, even though the language responsible for the definition does 
not do its job. In other words, the stated goal of Soviet/Russian literary textuality, - 
production of profound, socially relevant meanings, - continues to be pursued, even if this 
production is now met with certain difficulties. 
In the same essay there appears an image of “lexical impact” [leksicheskii udar], a 
peculiar feeling experienced when one is faced with the swarm of empty Soviet 
signifiers: “All these… terms in the Martian language produce a sensation of some 
inflexible, inhuman power – nothing human can be called thus.”62 Yet, the incessant 
traumatic repetition of the empty, inhuman Soviet signifiers in Pelevin’s own prose is 
also a “lexical impact” in its own right. The repetition is what validates these signifiers 
                                                
61 The phonetics of the utterance are a conventionalized parody of the sounds of the Tatar language. 
62 Viktor Pelevin, “Zombifikatsiia”, online version available at http://pelevin.nov.ru/pov/pe-zombi/2.html. 
“Все эти... марсианские термины рождают ощущение какой-то непреклонной, нечеловеческой силы 
– ничто человеческое не может так называться”. 
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because they are again included into the productive field of the literary text, a field whose 
very existence is predicated on the functionality of linguistic expression. 
Nearly twenty years later, one of the characters of Pelevin’s 2009 novel, T, will 
say that “the modern mind… often keeps on thinking even after having realized that it 
does not exist,”63 effectively summing up the nature of the problem the post-Soviet writer 
faced as they formulated their responses to the linguistic and institutional void of post-
Soviet literary landscape. 
It has to be said that Wachtel’s post-Communist literary pluralism is undoubtedly 
a feature of this landscape. The explosion of domestic genre fiction towards the mid-
1990s, proliferated mainly by the younger generation of writers, attests to that. However, 
the heavily mythologized status of Russian national literature continued to define not just 
the nature of the literary innovation, but also the aesthetic and thematic inertia in the 
work of those newly post-Soviet writers who retained many cultural assumptions about 
literature formulated by generations of Russian intellectuals. As much as Pelevin 
(jokingly) claims to have a goal of liberating the rotting logos from the mouth of an 
intellectual, he, nonetheless, entrusts himself into its power. 
Pelevin hardly has any other option; the absolute linguistic void (into which we 
glimpsed together with the protagonist of Ukhriab and were relieved to dismiss) 
completely denies the writer any ability to produce meaning. In the context of nearly two 
hundred years of socially responsible, heavily pedagogized, high-status literature, the 
attempts to articulate the post-Soviet void, so to say, on its own terms, like the one in 
Ukhriab, find themselves in opposition to another kind of articulation. In these attempts, 
                                                
63 Viktor Pelevin. T (Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 2009), 364. “Однако…современный ум изощрен настолько, 
что нередко продолжает думать, даже поняв, что его нет”. 
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linguistic innovation is complemented by a compulsive repetition of the language that 
was. Just as the protagonist of Ukhriab attempts to cover the void produced by an empty 
signifier with the help of the signifier itself, the mythologized entity known as the 
Russian language is used in the post-Soviet literary context to mask its own apparent 
absence. This perverse operation aims to restore the stability of a national literary 
tradition by providing a self-consciously illusionary linguistic continuity. This allows the 
institution of national literature to face the paradigmatic shift that strips it of its former 
status. 
Pushkin pushkinski velik: Actualizing the Classics 
Russian logocentrism is largely predicated on the mythologized status of national 
language. Lara Ryazanova-Clarke sums it up: 
The Russian language is seen as a national treasure, an encapsulation of national 
history and culture… Usually, language cultivation falls back on the discourse of 
the Great Tradition, which supports the symbolic status of the language and which 
is based on a set of beliefs, often of a mythological nature, about the relation of 
language to the history of the people. Generally, in the narrative of the Great 
Tradition, the past is believed to be a realm of perfection, whereas innovation is 
suspected of being corrupt. Evoking the image of the Golden Age of Russian 
language, for instance, Lyudmila Graudina writes: “[In] the Russian language… 
both form and content of that perfect language which we call the language of 
Pushkin, Blok… Dostoievskii and Tolstoi, are distorted [narusheny].”64 
                                                
64 Quoted in Lara Ryazanova-Clarke, “‘The Crystallization of Structures’: Linguistic Culture in Putin’s 
Russia”, in Landslide of the Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet Russia, Ingunn Lunde, ed. (Bergen: 
Slavica Bergensia , 2006), 31-64, 49. ”Русская речь ведет свое существование [...] Но в ней давно 
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Graudina’s lament of the state of national language in this passage is something to be 
expected; Gorham posits the necessity of some form of linguistic purism as a reaction to 
the linguistic experimentation characteristic of the cultures in transition65. Linguistic 
purism per se aside, however, there is something else that is distorted in the post-Soviet 
treatment of the Great Tradition: its relationship with the classics themselves. This 
relationship is predicated on a distinctly Soviet mode of reading, not just in terms of 
normativity of interpretation but also in terms of the relationship between the author and 
their text. 
Dobrenko suggests that “[T]he notion of ‘the classics’… in Soviet times 
became… the model and value standard for judging literary quality, and… reached a 
‘maximal semantic purity, functionality, and inflexibility’.”66 The mechanism through 
which such inflexible normativity of interpretation was possible is, of course, reading 
literary texts from the premise of establishing authorial intent. It seems that the decades 
of this mode of reading have left a pleasantly tingling scar on Russian literary culture: the 
writers belonging to the classical Russian canon, as Vail’ and Genis so effectively 
demonstrate, become indispensable characters in their text. In the process of “proper” 
reading, the writers acquire the agency that consistently supersedes even that of the text’s 
“conventional” protagonists. We remember that the Soviet reader (in Dobrenko’s 
rendering) had an unmatchable, if perverse, creative power over the text; the extension of 
this power is the creation of a whole new character out of the text’s author. 
                                                                                                                                            
нарушены и содержание, и формы того совершенного языка, который мы зовем языком Пушкина, 
Блока […], Достоевского и Толстого”. 
65 Gorham 19. 
66 Dobrenko 1997, 153. 
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The problem with this new character in the post-Soviet context is that it should 
not exist, as the mode of reading supporting its creation is seemingly completely 
ideologically discredited. However, the “readerly power” to create literary characters 
perhaps proved to be tempting for post-Soviet literature. A function of the Soviet porous 
boundary between the reader and the writer, this distinctly “magical” power allows one to 
maintain a conceptual connection between literary reception and literary production, a 
connection no longer sustained by the institutions of literary culture. 
Another of Viktor Pelevin’s early 1990s short stories provides an insight into the 
post-Soviet literary treatment of the classics, which points to the fetishistic mechanism of 
appropriating the national cultural heritage. This mechanism works, synchronically, in 
order to maintain a semblance of a unified field of national culture; diachronically, it 
manifests the desire to establish historical continuities when none are to be had. 
Mardongi (“The Mardongs”) is a novella pretending to be a piece of cultural 
criticism. It analyzes the history and ideology of a religious sect in Russia in the early 
1990s. The sect, headed by a spiritual leader, Nikolai Antonov, follows Tibetan spiritual 
teachings on life and death, summarized in the following passage: 
It turns out there is no death, because it has already happened; every human 
carries within a so-called ‘inner corpse’, which gradually overpowers the identity. 
Life, according to Antonov, is not much more than being pregnant with a corpse 
that develops inside, like a fetus. Physical death is a final actualization of the 
inner corpse, and thus represents a delivery. A living human, being a fetus of a 
corpse, is a defective and inferior being. The corpse, on the other hand, is thought 
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to be the highest form of existence, for it is eternal (not physically, of course, but 
conceptually)67. 
Antonov’s teachings are acted out in magical rituals, of which the creation of a 
mardong is the most important. A mardong is the actual (not the “inner”) corpse of a 
prominent person that has to be preserved and exhibited upon death to commemorate the 
person’s achievements. 
The continuity of the eternal existence of the corpse, then, requires the adherent of 
Antonov’s philosophy to conceptually reconcile two paradoxes. Firstly, continuity 
emerges in Antonov’s framework only as a result of undergoing a rupture (death), a 
paradox that the Antonovites resolve by claiming that death should be treated as birth into 
eternal life. Secondly, eternal existence is achieved through the process of objectification, 
with the resulting object bearing little resemblance to the “original” being; this paradox is 
also resolved through claims of inauthenticity of the “original”. The paradox of 
sacrificing “conventional” authenticity of the object in order to achieve an authenticity of 
some higher order may seem to be just a clever satirical pastiche of quasi-religious 
teachings68 until Antonov’s philosophy suddenly expands the notion of mardongs: 
Antonov writes of spiritual mardongs, formed after the death of people who had 
left a significant trace in the group consciousness … the unilateral interpretation 
of the words and the thoughts of the deceased [metaphorically] serves as 
bricks... According to Antonov, [Aleksandr] Pushkin’s spiritual mardong was 
                                                
67 Mardongi is cited from: Viktor Pelevin, “Mardongi." (Viktor Pelevin - sait tvorchestva. 
http://pelevin.nov.ru/rass/pe-mard/1.html (accessed September 8, 2010)). 
68 Civil freedoms associated with perestroika included freedom of religion, previously guaranteed only de 
jure. The 1990s saw numerous religious and para-religious philosophies, Christian and non-Christian, 
competing to fill the void of religion created by the Soviet ideology. For more on this competition, along 
with post-Soviet “preference” for mysticism, see “Dvadsat’ let religioznoi svobody v Rossii (Moskva: 
ROSSPEN; Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 2009)(«Двадцать лет религиозной свободы в России» (М.: 
РОССПЭН; Московский Центр Карнеги, 2009). 
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ready by the end of the 19th century, with Tchaikovskii’s operas served as the 
final painting [of the mardong]. Cultural space, according to Antonov, is a 
Communal Grave where the spiritual mardongs of ideologies, masterpieces and 
great men repose; the presence of the living in this sphere is offensive and 
inadmissible… 
The obvious foreignness of the concept of cultural space for the potential rank-
and-file Antonovites aside (the essay even mildly discourages readers’ requests to reveal 
the physical site of the Communal Grave), the space of Russian culture is thus infused 
with the paradoxical continuity discussed above. After all, even if this space is “not the 
culture itself, of course, but… its mardong,” the dead greats inhabiting it are in fact alive, 
if inauthentic. 
The creation of continuity out of compulsive repetition of discontinuities becomes 
focused once Aleksandr Pushkin comes into picture. Pushkin is often credited to be the 
father of modern Russian language, and his oeuvre has been, in Vail’ and Genis’s words, 
“long ago overshadowed by the image [literally,obraz (icon). – DK] of Pushkin himself. 
His writing itself has become the sole reason and the sole justification for the independent 
existence of this masterpiece of harmony.”69 
Pushkin, then, is to be understood, so to say, an sich: the author and his writing 
conceptually merge (and become the signifier collapsing on itself). Pelevin’s text 
provides an ironic commentary to that effect: one of the Antonovite practices is called “A 
talk about Pushkin” and concludes in a mantra, “Pushkin pushkinski velik” (Pushkin is 
                                                
69 Vail’ and Genis 2003: 76. “Образ Пушкина давно уже затмил самого Пушкина. Его творчество 
стало поводом, оправданием для самостоятельного существования этого шедевра гармонии”. 
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pushkinesquely great)70. Pushkin[‘s greatness] is explained through Pushkin’s greatness, 
the signified disappears as the signifier stands for itself (just as we have seen in Ukhriab). 
What remains is a possibility of language sustained by an appeal to the (fantasy of) 
national literary tradition. In other words, while the metaphoric connection fails (Pushkin 
does not stand for anything other than himself), the repetition of the signifier provides for 
the metonymic connection to the language itself. 
Indeed, in Ryazanova-Clarke’s words, “The Pushkin myth, for almost two 
centuries used as a symbol of Russian national identity, has also experienced a successful 
transposition into [post-Soviet]… culture. The name as well as the image of Pushkin, […] 
represents metonymically the Russian language itself.”71 The metonymic nature of the 
connection is acutely felt in Tatiana Tolstaia’s The Slynx (1999), where, in the post-
apocalyptic Moscow, a group of intellectuals, in an attempt to “preserve the spiritual 
heritage”, persuades the unwilling protagonist to carve out an idol to represent Pushkin72. 
The naïve protagonist, Benedikt, born after the apocalypse which wiped out modern 
Russian culture and threw the country back to feudalism, fails to understand the reason to 
memorialize a person he has never heard about. He asks his mentor about Pushkin’s 
                                                
70 The source of the mantra is Vladimir Mayakovskii’s misquotation of Russian ego-futurist poet Igor’ 
Severyanin. Severyanin’s 1923 volume, Nightingale (Solovei), includes a poem titled “Pushkin”, with the 
final stanza: “Пускай он стар для современья, / Но современье для него / Ничтожно: ведь его 
мгновенье - / Прекрасней века моего!” (He [Pushkin] may be old for the modern age/ But the modern 
age is for him / Just nothing… etc.). Mayakovskii (intentionally?) misquoted this stanza in his 1930 speech 
to the Moscow Krasnaya Presnia Komsomol organization, where he quoted the poem as: “Да, Пушкин 
мертв для современья, / Но Пушкин пушкински велик” (“Yes, Pushkin’s dead for the modern age / But 
Pushkin’s pushkinesquely great!”). Mayakovskii, then, “kills off” Pushkin where Severyanin only saw 
slight redundancy. (See: Fond “Fundamental’naia Elektronnaia Biblioteka”. Vladimir Mayakovskii. 
“Vystupleniie v dome komsomola Krasnoi Presni na vechere, posviaschennom dvadtsatiletiiu deiatel’nosti” 
(http://feb-web.ru/feb/mayakovsky/texts/ms0/msc/msc-422-.htm). Fundamental’naia Elektronnaia 
Biblioteka: Russkaia Literatura i Folklor. (Фундаментальная Электронная Библиотека: Литература и 
Фольклор. Владимир Маяковский. “Выступление в доме комсомола Красной Пресни на вечере, 
посвященном двадцатилетию деятельности”). 
71 Ryazanova-Clarke 49. 
72 In the novel, the idol is meant to replace the famous “Opekushin’s Pushkin,” a monument to the poet 
erected on Strastnaia Square in Moscow in 1880 and, in the novel, ostensibly destroyed in the apocalypse. 
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significance and the answer he receives is, as per the Russian intellectual tradition, 
“Pushkin is our everything.”73 
In The Slynx, then, Pushkin too is an empty signifier – here, it stands not for itself 
like in The Mardongs, but for everything else. Just how empty this signifier is becomes 
apparent when Benedikt dutifully carves out “the pushkin” (now even being denied 
capitalization of the last name). Six-fingered, legless, Pushkin is erected in someone’s 
modest vegetable patch, and the birds promptly cover the idol with their droppings, while 
the inhabitants of the post-apocalyptic Moscow are perplexed as to the reasons why 
anyone would want to waste their time on memorializing something that has no 
significance. 
Such perverse memorializations of Pushkin, as a mardong in Pelevin or as a 
wooden idol in Tolstaia, lend themselves to a question: do these texts satirize the Russian 
myth of the classics which used to be reinforced in the Soviet era by the prescriptive 
normativity of interpretation? They certainly seem to do so, exposing the reproduced 
images of Pushkin to be simulacra, copies whose original is inaccessible if not precisely 
nonexistent; the mardong of Pushkin reveals that what Vail’ and Genis’s “Pushkin 
image” covers is not the meaning of the myth, but its lack. 
Lyudmila Parts reads a range of post-Soviet texts that use the “image of Pushkin” 
to critique late and post-Soviet cultural reality: 
Each text centers on an attempt … to make a symbolic break to [Pushkin] through 
the layers of ideological gloss… All of these attempts invariably fail, and instead 
                                                




of ‘the living Pushkin’ the characters are left with various versions of a 
“mummy”: a ghost, a death mask, a blurred photograph, a monument.74 
This conclusion certainly suggests that the master signifier of the national literary 
tradition, Pushkin, may have lost most of its signification power for the post-Soviet 
attempts to define contemporary social reality. However, what does the persistent attempt 
to decorate the post-Soviet literary landscape with the mardongs of the classics mean, 
then? 
Some arguments propose that post-Soviet literature’s irreverence towards the 
national literary heritage is a reaction to the “centuries of logocentrism.”75 The persistent 
references to classical heritage seem to evidence the crisis of the author, which, as 
Wachtel would have it, is indeed a feature of any post-Communist literary landscape. 
Yet, the Russian canon writers (Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Chekhov) 
nonetheless76 constitute the “persistent myth of Great Russian Literature,”77 an 
entrancing, bewitching78 symbolic cache. Russian classics 
matter not as authors of actual works…; as cult figures, these writers are nothing 
but symbolic entities by and through which culture identifies itself and on which 
it relies to assure its identity and continuity… During the periods of cultural 
instability, cult names served as pivotal figures who ensured the unity of culture. 
                                                
74 Lyudmila Parts, The Chekhovian Intertext: Dialogue with a Classic. 2 ed. (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2008), 29 
75 Epstein 1995, 328. 
76 Parts 11. 
77 Ibid.,7. 
78 Aleksandr Ageev, “Conspectus of the crisis: Sociocultural Conditions and the Literary Process” , in Re-
Entering the Sign: Articulating New Russian Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 
170-189, 176, quoted in Parts 12. 
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New texts congregated around them and created a productive field between texts, 
allowing for interaction among writers of different epochs.79 
In other words, while the attempts to articulate the contemporary social reality 
through the master signifiers of national literary tradition fail in post-Soviet texts, the 
persistent references to cult Russian writers in post-Soviet texts can be read as enabling 
post-Soviet literature to (re)establish a diachronic unity of the national literary field. 
However purposefully inauthentic this particular continuity may have become80, we have 
argued that, for literature, an evidently empty signifier is always better than the absence 
of any possibility of signification. 
How is this “reaching out” to the classics accomplished? The classic approach to 
the issue of intertextuality considers the ways in which the author’s text enters into a 
dialogue with other texts. However, the persistent model of the national literary field, 
with its peculiar distribution of the creative agency, the model shaped by the cultural 
memory of the porous Soviet boundary between the writer, the reader, and the literary 
character, complicates the Bakhtinian dialogic intertextuality. It is a surprisingly 
monologic dialogue, as the post-Soviet texts address the symbolic entities of the Russian 
classics, the master signifiers of national literary tradition who they know are already 
dead, having become mardongs. 
The illusion of dialogue with the classics, a dialogue which does not imply a 
response, is connected to the peculiarities of the Soviet mode of reading. Of course, post-
Soviet writers read their classics; however, the Soviet reader, not really interested in 
reading the author’s text because he was busy creating his own, shines through the 
                                                
79 Parts 7. 
80 Post-Soviet texts, after all, have to “reach out” to the classics through another constructed gap in the 
national literary tradition, created by the Soviet period. 
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following (post-Soviet) description of the role of Pushkin’s Evgenii Onegin (1825-32) in 
Russian public consciousness: 
We all live with our personal Eugene Onegin – and it is an intimate relationship 
[…] Everything is known about this novel, and in fact it is not necessary to read it 
[italics mine. – DK] – it is with us even without reading, in the form of countless 
quotes, be that on the level of the language itself, or on the level of the image or 
an idea.81 
If “reaching out” to the classics does not even mean reading them, how does 
intertextuality, in a sense of a stylistic and thematic dialogue with other texts, work for 
post-Soviet literature? What is the mardong of Pushkin: an intertextual reference, a 
metaphor for the current state of Russian literature, or something else altogether? Does 
the persistent post-Soviet return to the grotesquely distorted, inauthentic Pushkin signify 
disillusionment in the myth of the Great Literature or an attempt to reinforce it? 
We remember that Pelevin has “successfully” resolved the issue of a mardong’s 
inauthenticity, and indeed the issue of its post-mortem existence itself. This post-Soviet 
Pushkin may be dead and inauthentic to a casual (positivist) observer, but the 
counterintuitive philosophy outlined in The Mardongs does not deny symbolic value to 
empty signifiers—it just learns to work around this emptiness to create its own 
mythological structure. It is able to do so by blurring the boundary between the writer and 
the literary character, actualizing in the text the conceptual transition characteristic, as 
Dobrenko suggests, of Socialist Realist aesthetics. Pushkin the writer becomes Pushkin 
the character, and there is a good reason for it: Vail’ and Genis, for example, explaining 
                                                
81Vail’ and Genis 2003:81. “Все мы живем со своим личным “Евгением Онегиным” -- вполне 
интимноВсе известно про этот роман, и на самом деле читать его совершенно не обязательно: и без 
того он с нами в виде бесчисленных словесных, образных, идейных цитат.” 
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what “Pushkin” is, or at least should be, for the post-Soviet reader, propose to read a 
tome of Pushkin’s poetry as a narrative of the protagonist’s evolution82. Of course, the 
process of reading is thus metaphorized. However, this is yet another problematic 
metaphor, as Russian cult authors become characters of Vail’ and Genis’s own book, of 
the metatext of Russian literary tradition, thereby attesting to the persistence of the Soviet 
legacy in the ways post-Soviet culture conceptualizes the relationship between the writer, 
the reader, and the character. Why would both post-Soviet fiction and criticism want 
Pushkin, along with other Russian cult authors, to become characters, to repeat the path 
outlined for them by Socialist Realist aesthetics? 
The Soviet reader, as we remember, was an idealistic, demanding creature. He 
looked to literature for answers but the text he read meant little in comparison with the 
text he created through the process of reading. Reading Russian classics through the 
Soviet interpretative lens made this reader into the post-Soviet writer. 
Vladimir Sorokin’s Blue Lard: Russian Literature as a Textual Laboratory. 
In 2002, the activists of a pro-Putin youth organization, “Iduschiie Vmeste” 
(“Marching Together”), organized an infamous political event in Teatral’naia Square in 
Moscow that bore all features of an avant-garde happening, complete with Duchamp 
references. The group unveiled an installation, consisting of a foam plastic model of a 
toilet bowl, and proceeded to fill it with brochures containing quotes from Vladimir 
Sorokin’s 1999 novel Goluboie Salo (Blue Lard) soaked in chlorine bleach. In the course 
                                                
82 Vail’ and Genis 2003:68-69. “И если читать эту книгу… в хронологическом порядке, то мы 
обнаружим в ней один из самых сложных и увлекательных романов русской литературы. Черты 
классического романа этой книге придает естественная последовательность -- от рождения поэта до 
его смерти. Эволюция главного героя -- тема книги. От страницы к странице меняется герой, а 
вместе с ним и форма, в которой запечатлены эти перемены”. 
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of the legal battle between “Iduschiie Vmeste” and Sorokin that followed this symbolic 
cleansing of the post-Soviet literary landscape, “Iduschiie” alleged that the novel 
contained obscenity and pornography and attempted to have it banned. The 
“pornographic” episode “Iduschiie” mentioned in their lawsuit is a relatively short (for 
Sorokin, at least) graphic description of a sexual act between two characters named Stalin 
and Khrushchev. Though the characters bear little resemblance, physical or otherwise, to 
the historical Stalin and Khrushchev in Sorokin’s phantasmatic alternative history of 
Russia, there is little doubt that the young Russian nationalists were unhappy not 
precisely with the graphic sex but with Sorokin’s political “audacity” that ran against the 
Putin government’s effort to put a stop to the widespread “desecration” of Soviet symbols 
underway in 1990s. 
The novel contains equally controversial, episodes of child rape and elaborate 
sexualized torture; furthermore, Sorokin’s prose featured taboo vocabulary and explicit 
descriptions of sexual acts for quite some time before Blue Lard. However, the Blue Lard 
scandal was significant in that it illuminated a kind of a “reverse shift” of the role of 
literature in the post-Soviet consciousness. One single book, again, could hold the public 
imagination, even if it happened via “pornography’s” engagement with ideology (to 
borrow from Eliot Borenstein)83. Sorokin’s “pornography” of the 1990s was not yet able 
to do the trick; his infamous Tridtsataia Lyubov’ Mariny (Marina’s Thirtieth Love, 1982-
84, first published in Russia in 1995) hardly produced any public outcry. Putting Stalin 
and Khrushchev in bed together in the early 2000s, however, led to a paradoxical effect: 
the very dense, if beautifully so, experimental novel acquired an unexpectedly large 
                                                
83 See Eliot Borenstein, “Stripping the Nation Bare: Russian Pornography and the Insistence on Meaning”, 
in International Exposure : Perspectives on Modern European Pornography, 1800-2000. New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 2004. Ed. Lisa Z. Sigel, 232- 255, 234. 
71 
 
audience84, cementing Sorokin’s status as a cult Russian writer, a status he continues to 
openly resist in his numerous interviews. 
The plot of Blue Lard, too, resists summarizing, but can be generally outlined: in 
the future, somewhere in the northeast of what used to be Russia, a group of scientists are 
locked in a secret laboratory. The narrator, Boris Gloger, a self-described 
“biophilologist”, explains in letters to his young male lover that he is responsible for an 
important part of the experiment: the research group clones Russian writers. The clones 
then enter a “script-process,” during which they ostensibly produce clones of the classic 
texts. The researchers, however, are not interested in these texts; they are after blue lard, 
which deposits in the clones’ bodies after they finish writing. Blue lard, complex quasi-
scientific explanations suggest, promises eternal life and potentially allows solving the 
problem of perpetual motion. 
The first narrative break occurs when the narrator is killed: the narration shifts 
from first to third person as the lab is destroyed (and blue lard stolen) by a nationalist 
religious sect of Zemleioby (“Earthfuckers”). A description of the history of the sect and 
its entertaining magical practices follows, while the sect leaders decide to send blue lard 
to the past. The Earthfuckers want the magical substance to end in the hands of the 20th 
century Soviet government. 
Another narrative break occurs, and the reader is transported into a perversely 
decadent version of Stalinist Russia, complete with the Khrushchev/Stalin scene, cocaine 
snorting and pedophilia. Stalin’s best friend in this universe is Hitler, who expresses a 
desire to partake in the use of blue lard. After several plot twists, Stalin battles Hitler for 
the last remaining syringe of lard extract. The syringe pierces Stalin’s eye and the lard is 
                                                
84 By 2009, at least four editions of Blue Lard were published. 
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injected directly into his brain, making it grow larger than the universe itself. Yet another 
narrative break, and Stalin (a “different” Stalin) wakes up as a servant to the young man 
who was Boris Gloger’s addressee in the opening part of the novel. 
The plot of Blue Lard is entertaining, not just ironically commenting on Soviet 
history, but also tickling the (Russian) reader’s fascination with taboo subjects and 
language. Sorokin’s prose is a little too experimental to be a bestseller, however. 
Characterizations like “nasiliie nad iazykom” (literally, “violence over language”) and 
“blowing the text up with a blast of narrative”85 abound in critical responses to Sorokin’s 
prose. Before the reader gets to the infamous sex scene in the middle of Blue Lard, then, 
they would have to deal with a staggering amount of linguistic experimentation in the 
midst of a protean narration. 
The Russian language of the future in Blue Lard is a mix of Russian, German, 
Chinese and English, topped with invented and outright incomprehensible words86. 
Sorokin is kind enough to provide two separate glossaries (one for Chinese words, 
another for “all other words and expressions”) in the appendix, but, of the five opening 
lines of the novel, each already features one or two neologisms and/or non-Russian 
words, tucked between oxymorons and unexpected paragraph breaks. Ingunn Lunde 
argues that the mixture of different linguistic elements in Blue Lard is “a kind of 
commentary on the language situation in Russia today.”87 We have touched on the 
                                                
85 Viktor Erofeev, “Russkie Tsvety Zla”, in Russkie Tsvety Zla: Sbornik, ed. V. Erofeev (Moscow, 1997), 
7-30, 10-12: “[Sorokin is] the leading monster of the new Russian literature.. he blows them [the texts] up 
with a blast of narrative”. Quoted in Dirk Uffelmann, "Led tronulsia: The Overlapping Periods in Vladimir 
Sorokin’s Work from the Materialization of Metaphors to Fantastic Substantialism" in Landslide of the 
Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet Russia (Bergen: Slavica Bergensia, 2008). 100-126, 102. 
86 As Ingunn Lunde shows in her reading of the novel. See:Ingunn Lunde, “Language Culture in Post-
Soviet Russia: The Response of Literature”, in Landslide of the Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet 
Russia (Bergen: Slavica Bergensia, 2008), 64-80, 68. 
87 Lunde 69. 
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challenges the Russian language faced when the formulaic Soviet discourse failed to 
support the production of meaning. It may seem, then, that Blue Lard indulges in a 
linguistic experiment, so to say, with a purely mimetic purpose: in a classic dystopian 
move, the novel outlines the present state of national language through a temporal 
displacement. To continue with this line of thought, the novel’s deconstruction of classic 
narrative conventions may indeed even be a similarly negative commentary on the 
present state of Russian literature. 
However, while it is tempting to read the novel as a lament of the state of national 
language and literature, it seems that Blue Lard also offers a strong protection to the 
seemingly disintegrating Russian language by shaping it in the form of a novel, however 
distorted this form may have become. Lunde notes that 
[I]n Sorokin’s novel… the limits, challenges and potentials of language are 
investigated within a closed linguistic environment… in Sorokin’s literary 
universe there are no problems of communication between the characters, while 
the reader is constantly challenged by non-comprehension and the potential 
meaningless of what he or she is reading88. 
In other words, within the novel, and on its own terms, there is nothing wrong with the 
[Russian] language. It is only when the reader comes into picture that Sorokin’s “textual 
violence” becomes apparent. 
The reader, then, is an indispensable component of Sorokin’s “method,” which 
may at the first glance seem to purposefully ignore the reader to indulge in the pure 
artistry of linguistic experimentation. The shifts in the narrative perspective, and the 
incomprehensibilities resulting from the linguistic combinations and narrative breaks, 
                                                
88 Ibid., 70. 
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paradoxically, create the reader by demanding a response from them. Rajendra Chitnis, 
examining the narrative breaks in Sorokin, suggests that 
Sorokin’s writing may be understood as an attempt to restore to literature Roland 
Barthes’s notion of jouissance…Barthes argues that the pleasure of 
reading…‘proceeds from certain breaks…’ resulting from the redistribution of 
language89… [Breaks in Sorokin’s texts] seek to teach this hesitation, a sudden 
awareness of helplessness…90. 
In Chitnis’s analysis, the novel takes a pedagogical function: it shapes and molds the 
reader, demanding that the reader possesses an agency, even if it manifests in an 
emotional response like that of “Iduschiie Vmeste”, thoroughly disgusted by the 
grotesque blend of ideology and pornography. Blue Lard, thus shaped to elicit reader’s 
response, makes (concerned) citizens out of “Iduschiie”. While creating the reader 
through making the process of reading difficult may seem a complete ideological and 
stylistic break from the principles of Soviet art, the Socialist Realist mode of producing 
state readers is thus paradoxically re-launched. 
Dobrenko describes concerned Soviet readers who demanded “more realism,” or 
simpler language, in their letters to the publishers. The Blue Lard scandal convincingly 
demonstrates that just such a concerned “Soviet reader” became possible again, rising 
from Sorokin’s post-Soviet linguistic abyss. Though the path towards (re)making the 
Russian reader was increasingly circuitous in Sorokin’s case, within the linguistic 
ruptures of Blue Lard there lives a nostalgic desire to have the kind of literature which 
                                                
89 Rajendra A. Chitnis, Literature in Post-Communist Russian and Eastern Europe: The Russian, Czech 
and Slovak fiction of the Changes, 1988-1998 (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European 
Studies, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 127. 
90 Chitnis 129. 
75 
 
elicits response, and which overcomes the post-Soviet reader’s passivity outlined by the 
Levada report - even if literature has to drastically change its methods to achieve this 
effect. 
In Chitnis’s reading, the violated reader experiences hesitation because of the 
narrative and linguistic breaks, thus emerging as a paradoxical subject who acquires 
power by being rendered helpless. In Sorokin’s prose, however, not just Sorokin’s own 
text produces this paradoxical subject: textuality in general seems to have this kind of 
power, as Sorokin appropriates other “texts” to expose the breaks in conventionalized, 
“classic” textuality. 
To explore the issue, let us go back to the clones of Russian writers diligently 
producing blue lard in the underground lab. Appropriately for the dystopian, magical set-
up, there are seven clones: Tolstoy-4; Chekhov-3; Nabokov-7; Pasternak-1; Dostoevsky-
2; Akhmatova-2; and Platonov-3. Tended to by Boris Gloger and the rest of the staff, the 
clones perform their “script-process,”91 and promptly hibernate to produce the lard. The 
texts they produce are seemingly a mere byproduct92 of the operation93. 
The texts the clones produce have been popularly read as a stylistic 
deconstruction of Russian classics94. Dostoevsky-2, for example, produces a text titled 
“Count Reshetovskii”, appropriately set in that gloomy version of St. Petersburg which 
appears across (the original) Dostoevsky’s texts so often that it has come to be popularly 
                                                
91 The term used to describe writing seemingly eliminates any traces of creativity from the practice. 
92 For a representative reading of this kind, see Dirk Uffelmann, "Led tronulsia: The Overlapping Periods in 
Vladimir Sorokin’s Work from the Materialization of Metaphors to Fantastic Substantialism" in Landslide 
of the Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet Russia (Bergen: Slavica Bergensia, 2008), 100-126. 
93 As evident in Boris’s businesslike attitude when he sends the texts to his lover, to be kept in a “script 
collection” Boris maintains. 
94 See, e.g., Erich Poyntner. Anderswelt: Zur Struktur Der Phantastik in Der Russischen Literatur Des 20 




known as “Dostoevsky’s Petersburg.” The arrival of two visitors to Count Reshetovskii’s 
mansion culminates in a scene where the numerous characters experience a range of 
extreme emotions as a reaction to the Count’s proposition to spiritually unify humankind 
by physically sewing the humans together. This amusing (and disturbing) scene is a 
parody of numerous Dostoevskian scenes that explore the interactions between sublime 
emotions and human irrationality, most notably the money-burning scene in The Idiot 
(1868). 
Not just the plot, but the style too becomes the subject of the parody in Sorokin. 
The disjointed dialogue, unexpected movements of the characters, narration going on 
tangents, complex sentence structure, italicizing, as well as indirectly addressing the 
reader by adding a polite postposition to the end of the sentence, all parodically 
exaggerate the distinctive features of Dostoevsky’s narrative style. 
The text that emerges from this exaggeration is undoubtedly disturbing: it 
provides little context to the characters’ emotions, and is confusingly catachrestic. One of 
the Count’s visitors has a “dead, yet extensively long snake” as a belt; ever-expanding 
metaphors exhaust themselves in repetition: people flock to the Count’s famous 
receptions “like bees to the beehive, yes, like little swift fussy bees to a new, sturdy 
beehive, though beehives can be of different structure there are ones that look like 
houses…,yessir” etc.95 It seems that the stylized “Dostoevskian” language is thus 
recreated to bring it down: none of the features of Dostoevsky’s style are left unattended 
                                                
95 Vladimir Sorokin, Goluboie Salo, in Vladimir Sorokin. Sobraniie Sochinenii v trekh tomakh. Tom 3 
(Moskva: Ad Marginem, 2002), 7-302, 33. “[К]ак пчелы к улью, да, как проворные, хлопотливые 
пчелки к новому, добротно обделанному улью хотя ульи имеют разную конструкцию есть колоды 
есть домики и борть и земляные ульи-с”. 
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to, and each, as if deliberately, presents a frustration as to either its role as an element of 
the narrative, or to its very meaning. 
The clones’ texts have been thus read as a deconstruction of the type of textuality 
associated with the Russian classics.96 Indeed, the parodic texts blow up the smoothness 
of Tolstoy’s narrative when Tolstoy-4’s text compulsively recreates the characteristically 
Tolstoian sprawling description of a hunt – the digression from the “original” being that 
the 19th-century Russian aristocracy in the clone’s text uses serfs instead of hounds. Or, 
the harmony of poetic sublimity is deconstructed when Pasternak-1’s poem turns out to 
feature not (the original) Pasternak’s favorite image, a star, but a cunt, based on the 
phonetic similarity of the two Russian words. 
Does “Sorokin [feed] … on authoritative discourses,”97 as Mark Lipovetsky 
suggests? Does this de(con)structive parodying represent a radical breakdown of the 
“classic” textuality by stripping it of dignified authority, or by demonstrating through 
exaggerated, yet surprisingly faithful, stylistic imitation that the classic masterpieces of 
mythologized textual harmony are not (and never were) in any way “harmonious?” Of 
course; yet, if we consider that the classic texts in our analysis of post-Soviet engagement 
with the classic legacy so far mattered less than the mythologized entities of the classic 
writers themselves, we can argue that Sorokin’s deconstruction of the classics’ style(s) 
has a paradoxical effect. 
                                                
96 Poyntner 111-112. 
97 Mark Lipovetskii. “Goluboie salo pokoleniia, ili dva mifa ob odnom krizise.” Online version available at: 
http://www.srkn.ru/criticism/lipovetskiy.shtml. “Классики русского модернизма подверглись 
канонизации только в последние годы, обросли мифами и легендами, стали героями школьных 




The string of catachreses in Dostoevsky-2’s text (the device that seems to be 
favored by the rest of the clones, too) creates incomprehensibilities in the text, but instead 
of reading the deconstruction of the “metaphoric ability” of classic textuality as a 
symptom of the post-Soviet breakdown of the myth of Russian literature, we may read it, 
in view of the resurrection of the engaged reader in Sorokin, as something else entirely. 
Valentin Asmus, the Soviet critic who was instrumental in theorizing the aesthetic 
paradigm of the Soviet art, maintained that “what is called ‘incomprehensibility’ in art is 
perhaps simply an inexact name for reader laziness… his lack of desire to exert 
himself.”98 This notion, which shaped the idealized, sacrificial nature of Soviet reading, is 
picked up by Sorokin’s text. The amount of exertion required of the reader of Sorokin is 
staggering, but out of it, paradoxically, emerge the distilled versions of Russian classic 
textualit(ies). 
The peculiarities of Dostoevsky’s style emerge from Sorokin’s parody precisely 
because the clone’s text magnifies the elements of Dostoevsky’s style, and reactualizes 
these elements by making them visible in the text which, as we have seen, already 
demands the reader’s undivided attention. This insistent reconstruction achieved through 
estrangement, then, reinvests the text with significance. Sorokin explains what 
Dostoevsky’s text is by showing what it is not. 
The classical texts mutate in the dystopian setting of the novel, metaphorizing 
post-Soviet literature’s necessity to mutate in the (in its own way post-apocalyptic) post-
Soviet context. This mutation is a complex reaction to the Soviet aesthetics of reception, 
which froze Russian classical texts into their respective fixed interpretations. The 
                                                
98 Quoted in Dobrenko 1997: 17-18. 
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classical texts became frozen words, just like the words Pantagruel throws to his 
companions in an episode from Rabelais that is an epigraph to Blue Lard: 
He then threw us on the deck whole handfuls of frozen words, which seemed to us 
like your rough sugar-plums, of many colours… and when we had somewhat 
warmed them between our hands, they melted like snow, and we really heard 
them, but could not understand them, for it was a barbarous gibberish.99 
While it might seem that the classic texts become in Blue Lard “barbarous gibberish”, 
deconstructed and stripped of meaning, a byproduct of blue lard, the epigraph to Blue 
Lard also metaphorizes a concurrent process: Sorokin’s text, in a way, “melts” the fixed 
interpretations, allowing the reader to “hear” the Russian classics again. 
Mark Lipovetsky argues, in conjunction with Sorokin’s treatment of the clichés of 
Soviet discourse, that 
In … Sorokin’s works…two parallel processes occur simultaneously: the 
remythologization of the discourse, the reconstruction of its ritual semantics, is 
combined with the consequent revelation of the discourse’s contradictions – in a 
word, with the deconstruction of the discourse, which brings it into a state of 
absurdity of complete chaos. But since both of these parallel processes take place 
simultaneously, the result of any text by Sorokin is the mythology of the 
absurd.100 
Transferring this argument to Sorokin’s treatment of another authoritative 
textuality compromised in the post-Soviet context - the classical literary heritage - we 
                                                
99 The epigraph to Blue Lard is taken from Chapter LVI, Book Four of Francois Rabelais, Gargantua and 
His Son Pantagruel, quoted here from Francois Rabelais, Gargantua and His Son Pantagruel (Project 
Gutenberg) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1200/1200-h/p4.htm#2HCH0055. 
100 See Mark Lipovetsky, Russian Postmodernist Fiction: Dialogue With Chaos (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999), 214-15. 
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may argue that Sorokin’s own text accomplishes what the “frozen” classics themselves 
failed to accomplish. It insists that while the mythologized status of Russian literature is 
challenged by a variety of social and aesthetic factors, literature remains a functional 
medium, if not precisely for meaning-production, then at least for production of the 
mythological “textual magic.” This magic is promptly conserved in the controlled 
environment of the laboratory (and, by extension, in the environment of the (literary) text 
of Blue Lard itself), preserved in Boris Gloger’s “script collection,” and substantiated in 
the metaphor of the magical blue lard101. 
Blue Lard is another example of post-Soviet “literary fetishism.” The novel 
knows very well, and does not conceal the fact, that literature can no longer be what it 
used to be: a universal frame of reference; a powerful avenue of identity production. 
However, the desire for these kinds of myths is evident in that, for deconstructing these 
myths, Sorokin appeals to, and makes use of, the Soviet model of literary production and 
reception. Gleb Shul’piakov discusses the violence Blue Lard inflicts on the myth of 
Russian literature, suggesting that 
[Sorokin proves] that even after all his experiments [Russian literature] remains 
alive. It turns out that Russian literature is still “fireproof”: it’s just that in the 
present conditions it needs a new method of tempering… Blue Lard is a novel 
about how the steel was tempered, [tempering Russian literature as] the steel.102 
                                                
101 For the detailed discussion of Sorokin’s substantiation of metaphors in Blue Lard, see Dirk Uffelmann, 
"Led tronulsia: The Overlapping Periods in Vladimir Sorokin’s Work from the Materialization of 
Metaphors to Fantastic Substantialism" in Landslide of the Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet Russia 
(Bergen: Slavica Bergensia, 2008), 100-126, esp. 115. 
102 Gleb Shul’piakov, “Potselui menya v zvezdy”, http://www.srkn.ru/criticism/shulp.shtml. “Что делает с 
[русской литературой] Владимир Сорокин? Доказывает, что даже после всех его экспериментов она 
остается живой. Оказывается, что русская литература все также огнеупорна: просто в нынешних 
условиях ей требуется новый метод закаливания...”Голубое сало” - роман о том, как закалялась 
сталь, где в роли металла выступает великая русская”. 
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Here, Shul’piakov notes an unmistakably Socialist Realist aesthetic at work in 
Sorokin’s experimentation. He compares the novel to the epitome of Socialist Realism, 
Ostrovskii’s How the Steel Was Tempered, which, as we have seen, provided a model for 
the interaction of literary production and reception for Socialist Realism. Sorokin’s avant-
garde experiments with literary language, conventions, and heritage in Blue Lard, while 
representing a radical break with Socialist Realist aesthetics on the formal level, 
nonetheless conceptualize the interaction between the reader and the text in a way that is 
surprisingly similar to the Socialist Realist model. 
On the one hand, by illuminating Russian classic textuality through its 
deconstruction, Blue Lard mocks the mode of reading the classics installed by the Soviet 
pedagogized aesthetics of reception, where the “ideological enjoyment,” filtered through 
the mythologized author figure, proscribed enjoying the language and the style, the 
enjoyment of reading the author’s text. 
Yet, on the other hand, while the novel thus “depedagogizes” the fixed 
interpretations of the classics, it does so through proscribing the reader’s access to the 
“authentic” classical text. Just as the Soviet aesthetics of reception allowed the reader to 
effectively ignore the author’s text to create his own, Sorokin’s text makes the reader not 
read the classics, again. Sorokin, rather violently, hijacks the creative agency from the 
congealed symbolic authority of the classics. The reader, of course, ends up reading not 
Dostoevsky, but Sorokin, who comes to complete, metaphorically, the Soviet 
“hermeneutic circle” of production and reception. A diligent reader of the Russian 
classics (as evident from the beautiful stylistic mimicry of the parodies), Sorokin 
demands of the classics that which they can no longer offer in post-Soviet context, that is, 
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symbolic authority. In a way, Sorokin thus “becomes” a writer by taking it onto himself 
to shape and mold the reader through linguistic and narrative experimentation, and by 
sustaining, if perversely, the mythologized status of Russian literature. 
The ambivalent treatment of the symbolic authority of the writer in Blue Lard 
elucidates the reasons for Sorokin’s emphatic denial of his cult status. On the one hand, 
literary textuality, as we have seen, is reinvested in the novel if not with conventional 
symbolic authority, then at least with the power to influence the reader’s mind. The 
classical texts are to be preserved in Boris Gloger’s collection, even if they had to 
undergo a drastic mutation to be perversely re-actualized for the reader. On the other 
hand, however, the figure of the author himself becomes in Sorokin’s text yet another 
mardong, a speechless lab monster described, in the case of Dostoevsky-2, as “a 
specimen of indeterminate gender, of medium height and with pathology of chest 
development.”103 
What do we make of this “split” of symbolic authority? Textuality itself 
reacquires it as a result of Sorokin’s experimentation; the figures of the authors are, 
conversely, stripped of it. The “alternative Stalinist Moscow” segment of the novel 
features characters with names AAA (easily recognizable as Anna Andreevna 
Akhmatova), Osip (Mandel’shtam), and Iosif (Joseph Brodsky). The culmination of the 
plot line (complete with drinking urine, yelling obscenities and others of Sorokin’s 
shock-value favorites) occurs when AAA gives birth to a mysterious black egg, to be 
swallowed by the “next big poet.” 
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A number of children, recognizable as 1960s Soviet poets Robert 
(Rozhdestvenskii) and Zhenya (Evgenii Evtushenko) among them, fail to swallow the 
disgusting object, and AAA laments that “the golden chain will be broken… and you 
won’t know what the stars are,”104 in a mocking reference to trite metaphors used to 
describe the continuity of Russian poetic tradition. Another child, Iosif (Brodsky)—in 
Sorokin’s depiction an excessively unpleasant young man — manages to swallow the egg 
and is envied by the rest of the phantasmatic poetic circle.105 
The episode is as physiologically detailed and disgusting as it is elucidative of 
Sorokin’s ambivalent treatment of the writer’s symbolic authority. What do the acid 
pastiches of this group of (Soviet) writers,106 and the fact that none of them merited a 
parody of their texts, mean? Certainly the parodies of the texts of some Russian canon 
writers in Sorokin still can potentially be read as (dialogically) intertextual references, 
signifying that post-Soviet literature cannot quite let go of the mythological riches of the 
Russian/Soviet literary heritage. Yet how do we deal with the symbolic entities of the 
writers who are thrown outside of the field of conventional intertextuality by being made 
into stick-characters, their connections with their texts irreparably severed? 
                                                
104 Vladimir Sorokin, Goluboie Salo, in Vladimir Sorokin. Sobraniie Sochinenii v trekh tomakh. Tom 3 
(Moskva: Ad Marginem, 2002), 7-302, 217. “Разорвется цепь златая…Будете прыгать по земле, как 
блохи, и не знать, что такое звезды...” 
105 The episode mockingly metaphorizes the circle of young poets who congregated around Anna 
Akhmatova in her later years, and the symbolic “transfer of the poetic lyre” from the older poet of national 
stature to the younger. The “transfer of the lyre” is modeled on the famous episode of Russian literary 
history, popularized by Yurii Tynianov’s fictionalized biography of a German-Russian romantic poet, 
Wil’gelm Kukhel’beker, Kukhlia (1925). In the novel, the Russian classicist poet, Gavriil Derzhavin, 
comes to a poetry recital in St. Petersburg Lyceum where adolescent Aleksandr Pushkin is a student. Upon 
listening to Pushkin reading his own poems (and running away in embarrassment), Derzhavin cries and 
goes to look for Pushkin, which the subjective narration from Kukhel’beker’s perspective interprets as the 
“transfer of the lyre.” In Blue Lard, Anna Akhmatova’s relationship with Joseph Brodsky and her 
continuous support during Brodsky’s trial and exile is interpreted as such symbolic “transfer of the lyre.” 
106 Mark Lipovetsky suggests that this group was “canonized” relatively recently, thus entering the cultural 
space where Sorokin “feeds on authority.” See: Mark Lipovetskii. “Goluboie salo pokoleniia, ili dva mifa 
ob odnom krizise.” Online version available at: http://www.srkn.ru/criticism/lipovetskiy.shtml. 
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To trace the issue, we will need to go back to the “clone text” which stands out 
from the rest: while all of the clone texts are relatively faithful stylistic parodies, this one 
is not. The clone of Anna Akhmatova, Akhmatova-2, produces two pastiches of 
Akhmatova poems, and then another text, a sprawling Soviet folk ballad.107 The source of 
the poem is one of the forgotten masterpieces of Soviet folklore, the Tatar ballad “In the 
Spring of 1930” (“V tridsatyi god vesnoiu”), narrating an all-too-familiar108 story of 
collectivization and martyrdom: a pro-collectivization woman is murdered by the kulaks, 
the criminals are brought to justice, and the Soviet collective farm workers triumph. The 
broken iambic foot, the unusually long (for poetry in Russian) lines and couplet rhyming 
produce an entrancing effect, which Sorokin’s parody picks up, magnifying the ritualistic 
modality of folk poetry and making visible the structure(s) of symbolic authority upon 
which Soviet mythology relies. 
In the “clone poem”, set against the background of 1930s collectivization, three 
female Tatar collective farm workers plead with the local Party official, Comrade 
Akhmat, to help them against the village’s wealthy kulaks, who wish to interfere with the 
women’s plans to build a school. Comrade Akhmat helps the women; grateful, they 
spend the night with him, in due course giving birth to three sons. The narrative 
continues, interspersed by poetic interjections: the sons, each named Akhmat, become 
                                                
107 For a thorough survey of Stalinist folk ballads, see Frank J. Miller, Folklore for Stalin: Russian Folklore 
and Pseudofolklore of the Stalin Era (New York: M.E. Sharps, 1991). The ballad in question was published 
in Russian translation in the 1937 volume Folk Arts of the Peoples of the USSR (Tvorchestvo narodov 
SSSR), edited by Maksim Gor’kii himself and commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Revolution 
of 1917. “V tridsatyi god vesnoiu…”, in Tvorchestvo narodov SSSR, M. Gor’kii, ed. (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo 
redaktsii “Pravdy”, (1937?)), 408-409. 
108 The most famous of the collectivization inspirational tragedies, the murder of a youth (Pavlik Morozov) 
in Tavda, Siberia, was fictionalized in Vitalii Gubarev’s 1933 short novel, Pavlik Morozov. Morozov was 
killed, in the official version, by his relatives who detested the fact the youth supported collectivization. 
Morozov became an (ethically suspect) role model for the members of Young Pioneers organization: he 
denounced his own father to the authorities after learning that his father, a local minor Party official, forged 
documents and sold them to the kulaks, who fought compulsory relocation during collectivization. 
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great Soviet citizens, and are noticed by the “Great Lenin-Stalin” himself, who asks the 
three Akhmats to join him in his “Invisible Kremlin” in “Heavenly Moscow”, where they 
live in complete unity with the mythical (and magically zoomorphic) entity of “Lenin-
Stalin”, in fact on Lenin-Stalin’s sacred body parts that each rule a particular aspect of the 
universe: chest, horns, and genitalia. 
While this amusing story does little to reconstruct the textuality of Russian 
classics through its deconstruction (as the rest of the clones’ texts do), it does illuminate 
the mechanism by which symbolic entities of Russian writers become loci of symbolic 
authority. Grammatically, Russian last names are possessive adjectives referring to the 
father’s name (“Akhmatova” means, literally, “Akhmat’s”); simultaneously, the Russian 
last name is homonymous to two case forms of the father’s name. The three sons of the 
collective farm workers by the name Akhmat become, through their names being used in 
a variety of case forms, a ritualistic repetition of Anna Akhmatova’s last name. This 
sacrally multiplied Anna Akhmatova goes on to join the all-encompassing, omnipotent 
“Lenin-Stalin”, the master signifier of the Soviet symbolic order, a benevolent father who 
validates all kinds of symbolic authorities (the Akhmats’ sublime citizenly qualities and 
Anna Akhmatova’s writerly authority) by subsuming them. 
Such metaphorization of Stalin in Sorokin is, of course, another ironically 
grotesque exaggeration. Yet, in view of the way that exaggeration functioned for Sorokin 
so far, we may argue that Stalin as Groys’s “artist-tyrant” re-emerges from Sorokin’s 
deconstruction. It is through this paternal validation that the (Soviet) writer can enter the 
space of intertwined literary production and reception, to cross the boundary between art 
and life and to become a character. Sorokin not just magnifies this aspect of Socialist 
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Realist aesthetics by metaphorizing, in Akhmatova-2’s poem, the way in which Russian 
writers can become characters; Sorokin compulsively recreates it for post-Soviet 
textuality by allowing the Russian writers to exist as literary characters in Blue Lard 
itself.  
Repetitively examining “Lenin-Stalin’s” “mighty horns” and “hairy balls” in 
Ahkmatova-2’s poem, along with making Stalin the object of Khrushchev’s lust in the 
novel may look like a transgression of symbolic authority, and it is. So is making Joseph 
Brodsky swallow the disgusting black egg, and the rest of Sorokin’s grotesque portrayals 
of the Russian classics. Yet, we can argue (in the Bakhtinian vein) that controlled 
transgression of the law affirms and sustains the law. Sorokin’s own text becomes an 
occasion to dissect the laws governing the myth of Russian literature, and while these 
laws do not work for the duration of the text, their existence is illuminated by their very 
absence. To follow in the same vein, Sorokin’s text then becomes a site of carnival, a site 
of legitimized (and tightly controlled) transgression of the symbolic authority of the 
mythologized Russian literary tradition. 
Blue Lard demonstrates that the continuum of literary production and reception 
staged by Socialist Realist aesthetic paradigm remains a lucrative space for post-Soviet 
literature as it mourns the magical porosity of the boundary between art and life. This 
porosity used to ensure the functionality of the myth of Russian literature by allowing the 
reader, the writer, and the character to seamlessly transition between these “states of 
matter” in the field of literary production and reception. This is a seemingly dead magical 
space: it is validated by the already-dead symbolic Father, its magic destroyed and its 
language dysfunctional; it is populated by the monstrous caricatures of Russian writers-
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cum-characters. And yet, the real existence of a mardong of culture begins after its death, 
Viktor Pelevin reminds us: in the controlled textual environment of Sorokin’s monster 
laboratory, the congealed symbolic entities of the Russian classics melt under the “lexical 
impact” of Sorokin’s linguistic experimentation, both Russian classical textuality and its 
symbolic authority thus re-actualized in the post-Soviet cultural field. 
Conclusion: The Writer, the Reader, the Character: The Post-Soviet Politics of 
Textual Appropriation. 
In 2009, Lev Tolstoy makes a grand re-entrance into the post-Soviet literary 
landscape as the protagonist of Viktor Pelevin’s most recent novel, T. What at the onset 
looks like historical crime fiction, a genre popularized in the early 2000s by Boris 
Akunin’s bestselling imperial nostalgia series,109 introduces an image of Tolstoy familiar 
to every school-educated Russian: the Count-turned-peasant ploughs the fields in search 
of spiritual revelation. The novel then makes a series of sharp plot turns, revealing Count 
T. to be, first, an accomplished martial artist suffering from amnesia, and, later on, a self-
aware character in the not-yet-completed post-Soviet historical crime fiction bestseller. 
The creator of Count T., Ariel, his Shakespearian origins mockingly apparent, is a cynical 
writer for whom writing is a commercial project, controlled by mysterious (and very 
powerful) investors. Ariel reveals himself to his protagonist, and Count T. has to follow, 
dumbfounded, the twists and turns of the complex politics of post-Soviet publishing as 
the investors reject one plot line and demand another. 
                                                
109 Boris Akunin’s continuing Fandorin series, an experiment in genre fiction by eminent Georgian-Russian 
literary critic Grigorii Chkhartishvili, includes fourteen books (1998-present). Akunin’s highly engaging 
prose is stylized to resemble fin-de-siecle Russian language, and features an intelligent, attractive 
protagonist detective, an exoticized sidekick, romantic love stories, and political and social commentary 
that posits the last years of the Russian Empire as a beautiful, diverse, exciting space of cultural stability. 
Four of Akunin’s novels were adapted for screen in 2000s, with A-list cast, affirming the continuing 
popularity of the genre. 
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Instead of following the original plan to send Count T. on a quest to find the place 
of great spiritual significance, Optina Hermitage (little to no relation to the actual 
Orthodox monastery which historical Lev Tolstoy visited), Ariel puts the Count into 
excessively random tight spots, which allows the Count to showcase his impressive 
martial arts skills as he contemplates his identity as a self-aware character. Crossing the 
media boundaries on the whim of the publishing executives, Count T. meets another 
action hero, Fyodor Dostoevsky, a protagonist of a video game and a skilled 
sharpshooter.110 
The bewildered Count tries to reacquire some agency in the story where he is the 
powerless protagonist, and begins to write, real landscapes emerging before his eyes from 
the words he puts on paper. Several complicated, Dan Brown-like conspiracy theories, 
many philosophical discussions about the nature of reality, and a multitude of clever puns 
later, Lev Tolstoy dreams about the novel Pelevin’s reader is currently reading and 
concludes that the writer has to pretend that he is a character in order for the character to 
appear. Immediately, we are back to Count T., who in the course of his quest has 
acquired greater understanding (and mysterious powers). These powers enable him to 
eventually collapse his creator’s world, annihilating Ariel and leaving Count T. in the 
textual space of Pelevin’s text, complete with references to earlier Pelevin novels. The 
appeased protagonist rides into the sunset, while the narration switches, for the first time, 
from third person subjective to objective, claiming that all words are but a dream. 
                                                
110 This video game character has to navigate a post-apocalyptic, sun-less landscape of, ostensibly, St. 
Petersburg. Ariel explains to the puzzled Count that the first-person shooter game will be marketed as 
“Dostoevsky’s Petersburg” (re-branding the already-mentioned gloominess associated with the notion as a 
post-apocalyptic landscape), and that the branding decision is based on rock-solid market research, attesting 
to the persistence of this imaginary literary space in the post-Soviet public consciousness. 
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By 2009, Pelevin has cemented his status as the “most influential Russian 
intellectual”111 and has become a cult Russian writer with websites, discussion forums 
and a series of mockingly “deep” web comics112 devoted to his carefully cultivated, 
enigmatic public persona. The publisher’s description of T ironically comments on the 
cult of Pelevin through a reversal of authority: “T is the new novel by [Viktor Pelevin]. 
[During his reign], Brezhnev, Gorbachev and Putin served the people.”113 The blurb 
omits Boris Yeltsin from the sequence of Russian leaders, thus positing the 1990s as a 
gap in Russian statehood, a gap whose edges are held together by the figure of Pelevin. 
The 2009 return to the figure of the writer sustaining a mythological continuity of 
national history is significant: in the 1990s, we have seen thoughts about the place that 
national literature occupies in the public consciousness scattered across the collections of 
short stories (in Pelevin) and tucked between the deconstruction of Soviet master 
discourses (in Sorokin). However, no single novel dealt with the post-Soviet challenges 
to the mythologies of Russian literature as extensively and as directly as Pelevin’s T. 
The Russian writers-turned-characters in T are, at the first glance, stick-figures 
produced by the “literature-centric school education,” reduced to formulas like “Tolstoy 
ploughed the land,” operating in similarly formulaic space like “gloomy, deserted St. 
Petersburg” as it “always” appears in Dostoevsky. These formulas are piled on top of 
other formulaic tidbits of globalized popular culture imagery, like martial artist-cum-
superhero shooting zombies. Making Lev Tolstoy do back flips is a strategy more fit for a 
                                                
111 See “Samyi Vliiatel’nyi Intellectual Rossii. Opros v detaliakh” (ArtMedia Group, December 12, 2009), 
OpenSpace.Ru (http://www.openspace.ru/society/russia/details/15155/) 
112 For some amusing examples, see Pelevin’s fan site: Pelevin.nov.ru, “Viktor Olegovich”  
(http://www.pelevin.nov.ru/victorolegovich/) 
113 The publisher’s description of T: “Т – новый роман писателя, в эпоху которого служили народу 
Брежнев, Горбачев, Путин”. 
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media fandom in a post-industrial society than for the otherwise surprisingly traditional 
Russian novel of ideas, which makes me propose that the intertextual strategy staged by 
Sorokin and fully developed in Pelevin is what Michel De Certeau calls “textual 
poaching.” 
De Certeau argues that the consumer of culture, marginalized by the cultural 
industry (as the post-Soviet writer, the reader of the classics, was marginalized by the 
post-Soviet economic and cultural transition) appropriates the authoritative text through 
reading it, to simultaneously transgress and reinforce its symbolic authority.114 Textual 
poaching ultimately produces a derivative textuality aimed to cover a perceived lack in 
the original text. However, it also produces a transgressive enjoyment at the intersection 
of textual production and reception, blurring the boundary between the reader and the 
writer. Such a blurred boundary sustained the myth of Socialist Realist total art, and 
continues to sustain contemporary Russian literature as it negotiates its place in the post-
Soviet cultural field. 
In Pelevin’s novel, there exists a kind of “total textuality” where the boundaries 
between text and life are impossible to define. And of course, this totality emerges as an 
outcome of the act of reading. Pelevin allows Count T. to start out as a conventional 
character, and then to become a developed, self-aware character who questions the nature 
of the creative process and possesses as much free will as a character of such an 
ironically self-aware novel could. Count T., then, openly acts out the process to which 
Sorokin’s not-less-formulaic, reductive pastiches of the Russian classics pointed: he 
constructs a textual fantasy of an inseparable creative unity between the writer, the 
                                                
114 Michel De Certeau, “Reading as poaching”, in The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 165-176, esp. 171,174. 
91 
 
reader, and the character. “The Writer, You [Count T.], and the Reader – that [is] the 
Trinity,” Count T. learns. “It seems that there is a difference between these three notions. 
But in fact they point to one and the same thing, and there is nothing else beside that 
thing.”115 Of course, as Pelevin’s earlier texts demonstrated, the one who “learns” 
something here is the reader of Pelevin’s text, who has so far been a little lost as to their 
own place in the interplay of creative agency in the novel. Now that this metaphor for 
total art comes into picture, let us dwell on this suddenly magnified the role of the reader 
in T. 
Before T, Pelevin has already sketched his extensively complex vision of the 
interaction of creative agencies in literary production and reception.116 In T, the woes of 
post-Soviet readership discussed in the beginning of this chapter finally come to be 
articulated. On the plane of the novel that is a satire of post-Soviet society (the genre 
which brought Pelevin most of his success), Pelevin outlines the somewhat frightening 
monetary power that the consumer of culture wields in the post-Soviet context, and the 
reader’s ability to influence (albeit indirectly) the decisions of production. 
On another level, Pelevin’s inquiry into the nature of the creative process and into 
the amount of a reader’s participation in it yields a theory of creativity which appeals to 
the principles of Soviet art as much as it grounds itself in the mysticism associated with 
the magic of the written word, with the same logos that was rotting in the mouth of the 
Russian intellectual roughly fifteen years before. 
                                                
115 Viktor Pelevin. T (Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 2009), 365. “Автор, Ты и Читатель – таким было его 
[Соловьева] понимание Троицы. Кажется, что между этими тремя понятиями есть разница. Но в 
действительности они указывают на одно и то же, и кроме него нет ничего вообще”. 
116 In an earlier short novel, Numbers (Chisla, 2003), Pelevin’s jaded protagonist kills time by flipping 
through pages of a wildly imaginative postmodernist intellectual journal, learning through the nearly 
Derridean pun based on rearrangement of syllables that the conventional dichotomy “writer-reader” 
(pisatel’- chitatel’) apparently does not take into account the other two agents of the “creative rectangle”, 
“the scratcher and the feeder” (chesatel’ – pitatel’). 
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Count T. learns (together with Pelevin’s reader) in the course of (their) spiritual 
quest that: 
When a person practices mysticism, he should as if divide himself into two parts: 
the book, and its reader. The book is all the movements of our soul…all our 
thoughts, fears, and hopes… We are unable to let go of these black pages. But, 
instead of flipping through these pages day after day, one ought to find the reader. 
To be joined with this reader is the utmost spiritual goal.117 
Now that the reader takes on the function assigned by contemporary monotheistic 
religions to none other than God himself, the problem of post-Soviet literature’s inability 
to enter into a dialogue with the Russian literary canon is, to an extent, resolved. What 
looked like a unilateral dialogue with silent classics, reduced to idols, was always a 
dialogue with the reader, filtered through a fetishistic appeal to the symbolic authority of 
the classics. The mardongs of the classics populating the post-Soviet literary landscape 
are there to join forces with the post-Soviet writers in order to sustain the fantasy of the 
ideal reader who, as we have seen, makes the very existence of literature possible. 
                                                
117 Viktor Pelevin. T (Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 2009), 210. “Его учение заключалось в том, что человек, 
занимаясь мистическим деланием, должен как бы делить себя на книгу и ее читателя. Книга – это 
все содрогания нашего духа, все порывы и метания, все наши мысли, страхи, надежды… мы не 
можем оторваться от этих черных страниц. Но, вместо того, чтобы перелистывать их день за днем, 




National Past, Lubok-Style: Post-Soviet Cinematic Construction of the Historical Past 
Glasnost’, Chernukha and the Emergence of the Past 
In one of the earliest post-Soviet monographs on the theory of cinema, Semen Freilikh 
notes an acute structural similarity in cinematic representations of the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917 and of late-perestroika and early post-Soviet experience. In Freilikh’s view, these historical 
moments are represented in cinema as points of rupture, when “the historical ties are broken.”2 In 
the 1990s, this breaking of historical ties looked definitive, not in the least because it was, 
primarily, metaphorical.3 When scholars metaphorized the disappearance of the Soviet Union as 
“fall” and “collapse,” the very discourse that described the socio-cultural shift underway in post-
Soviet culture became the first conceptual step on the way to distancing Russia’s present from its 
past. 
Yet, late-Soviet cinema was already preoccupied with the past, uncertain about language 
and reliant on the absurdist aesthetics as far back as the early 1980s. The Soviet films of the 
period already searched for a new aesthetic that pushes outside of the boundaries of the 
conventional, teleological Soviet narratives.  In the words of Lily Avrutin: 
an artistic model capable of arriving at new meanings … represents not a forward 
movement along a straight road—as in traditional narrative—but a wandering, roaming 
                                                
1 Parts of this chapter appeared in: Daria Kabanova, “National Past, Lubok-Style: Post-Soviet Cinematic 
Construction of the Historical Past”. In honour of Peeter Torop 60. A Collection of Paper from Young Scholars. 
Olvasatok/Readings 2. “Russian Literature and Literary Studies”. University of Tartu: Department of Semiotics. 
Tartu and Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University, 2010. 36-65. 
2 This is probably one of the first uses of the term “rupture” in relation to the tropes of late Soviet cinema by Russian 
scholar Semyon Freilikh, Teoriia kino: ot Eizenshteina do Tarkovskogo (Moskva, Iskusstvo, 1992), 270. 
3 I am drawing here on the argument put forward by Kevin Platt in Kevin M.F. Platt, “The Post-Soviet is Over: On 
Reading the Ruins”, in Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts 1, no. 1 
(May 1, 2009): http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/41. 
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exploration in a space of collage, where the labyrinth of closed time-space is the most 
suitable chronotope for searching out new post-totalitarian meanings.4 
The search for new meanings in late-Soviet cinema was facilitated by glasnost’, the 
policy of “openness” and transparency that Mikhail Gorbachev promoted along with economic 
restructuring, the perestroika, in the late 1980s. Glasnost’ is almost universally acknowledged to 
be a failed policy,5 on the one hand not radical enough, yet on the other too radical and therefore 
responsible for the collapse of the system that it was meant to reform. 
Something interesting happened in the way late-Soviet culture absorbed glasnost’. 
Officially a policy to reduce corruption and increase social accountability in government 
institutions,6 glasnost’ almost immediately acquired an additional cultural meaning: it became 
quickly associated with freedom of speech and freedom of information. In turn, this ensured that 
glasnost’ opened a space for freedom of artistic representation. In the late eighties, the horrific, 
the absurd, and the bleak aspects of Soviet reality become the representational focus of film and 
literature, reversing the prescriptive representational cheerfulness previously required by official 
policy. 
Fig. 1, Glasnost! by Andrei Komoltsev, is one of the most well-known posters 
proclaiming the advent of the new state policy. An emotional face, brow furrowed and mouth 
slightly open as if in the beginning of an utterance, in tinted black-and-white evoking an old 
newsreel, dominates the white poster. Under the face, which expresses concern and 
determination, the word glasnost’ is in red, followed by an exclamation mark. On the left and 
                                                
4 Lily Avrutin, “The Soldier, the Girl, and the Dragon: Battles of Meanings in Post-Soviet Cinematic Space.” 
Cinema Journal 38, no. 2 (Winter 1999), 72-97, 75. 
5 See Edward Hewett, Viktor Winston, Milestones in Glasnost’ and Perestroyka: Politics and People (Washington, 
DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1991), esp. 6-7. 
6 For a comprehensive account of the social and political processes that brought about glasnost’, see Chapter 1 in 
Hewett, Winston 1991. 
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right, the face is framed by what looks like the remnants of a shabby bluish-gray brick wall, 
inlayed with crumbling words like “slander” (kleveta), “forgery” (podlog), “bribe” (vziatka), 
“bureaucracy” (burokratiia) and “lie” (lozh’). 
 
Fig. 1. Glasnost’! (V. Komoltsev, 1988) 
<http://plakat-ussr.blogspot.com/2007/01/1.html> 
 
We are invited to read the poster as if these words are crumbling under the power of the 
emotion in the face that breaks the shabby wall with the newly-acquired force of free speech. 
However, only two of the five words the poster uses to describe the pre-glasnost’ state of public 
affairs belong to the sociopolitical discourse per se (“bureaucracy” and “bribe”), while the rest 
refer to broader moral evils. It was effortlessly, then, that the initially strictly governmental 
policy acquired the new set of meanings, as it expands in the poster from bettering the 
government system and towards the need to improve core social and cultural values. 
Further, the poster represents the current state of affairs for the Soviet Union as 
something dark, shabby, and crumbling. This kind of cultural trope is indicative of a whole 
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genre, spreading across several media,7 but most often used to refer to a peculiar cinematic 
aesthetic, the chernukha (literally, the darkness, the bleakness), which comes to define Russian 
art cinema of the late eighties and early nineties. Chernukha8 concerned itself with, primarily, 
representing that which formerly could not be represented due to strict control over cinematic 
production. Films like Kira Muratova’s Asthenic Syndrome (Astenicheskii Sindrom, 1989), Pavel 
Lungin’s Taxi Blues (1990), and Vassilii Pichul’s Little Vera (Malen’kaia Vera, 1988) are the 
most often-cited examples of the genre, all dealing with existential hopelessness and the 
absurdity of late-Soviet existence as the filmmakers explore it against the background of bleak 
everyday reality. 
Chernukha was far from being a non-problematic aesthetic.9 For the party functionaries, 
these films were obviously anti-Soviet; for the film critics, they were too pretentiously artistic.10 
The Russian national cinema felt the impact of the chernukha films in the 1990s: George 
Faraday explores the “decline” of Soviet cinema in the late 1980s and early 1990s, tracing the 
post-Soviet transition from a state-controlled institution to a producer cinema.11 While 
acknowledging the negative impact of state ideological control on the spectatorship during the 
Soviet time, Faraday also notes the effect that the filmmakers’ “liberated… creative 
aspirations”12 began to have on spectatorship once state control was eliminated. Neither state-
controlled cinema nor the now-possible art cinema, Faraday argues, could meet the spectators’ 
demand for entertainment, as “the abolition of directly political forms of censorship [during 
                                                
7 First used in reference to Ludmila Petrushevskaia’s prose. See Andrei Zorin, “Kruche, Kruche, Kruche… Istoriia 
Pobedy: Chernukha v kul’ture poslednikh let”, “Znamya”, #10, 1992, 198-204. 
8 For a survey of chernukha, see Seth Graham, “Chernukha and Russian Film”, “Studies in Slavic Cultures”, vol. 1, 
2000, 9-27. 
9 Ibid, 11. 
10 Ibid, 11-12. 
11 George Faraday, Revolt of the Filmmakers: The Struggle for Artistic Autonomy and the Fall of the Soviet Film 
Industry. (University Park, PA, The Pennsylvania State UP, 2000). 
12 Ibid., 17 
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glasnost’] contributed to the marked deterioration of both ‘artistic’ and ‘professional’ 
standards.”13 
Chernukha, the aesthetic which comes to symbolize the era of glasnost’, complete with 
crumbling buildings, puddles and hungry stray dogs dominating the visual field, was a 
compensation mechanism14 for the prescribed celebratory aesthetic of Soviet cinema.15 
Chernukha was, at least in intention, a naturalist16 representational paradigm, based on 
conventionally mimetic principles of representing social reality, and it indeed was able to get 
closer to social reality than any Socialist Realist text could. Paradoxically, it could do so only by 
using the same politics of hyperbolization as Socialist Realism: chernukha exaggerated the 
bleak, the macabre and the absurd elements of late-Soviet and early post-Soviet culture, just as 
the Socialist Realist texts hyperbolized the festive, the celebratory, and the optimistic aspects of 
Soviet life. In chernukha films, the slow progression of cinematic narrative, the claustrophobic 
mise-en-scene, and the camera’s lingering on elements of space that are preferably barren or 
crumbling17 create an effect of static, unmoving time; in the words of Eliot Borenstein, in 
chernukha everyone “lived unhappily ever after.”18 
                                                
13 Ibid., 131. The term chernukha is connoted negatively in Russian: this negativity, together with the films’ 
preferred tragic subject matters, prompted the viewers to turn to Hollywood entertainment cinema. Faraday 
describes the early 1990s as a time when “the theater audience for Russian films shrunk hundredfold” (Faraday 2). 
By the later 1990s, then, the national cinema’s role as an instrument of state ideology was diminished precisely at 
the moment when the search for the new national idea was officially sanctioned and cinematically launched. 
14 As suggested by T. Khlopliankina, “Vsio Razresheno?”, Iskusstvo Kino, #7, 1989, 49-51. A similar idea is voiced 
by Helena Goscilo, “Body Talk in Current Fiction: Speaking Parts and (W)holes,”, quoted in Graham 12. 
15 The Carnival Night, a 1956 film by El’dar Riazanov, is a prime example of this aesthetic, as evident already from 
the film’s title. 
16 For a discussion of chernukha as artistic naturalism, see Mark Lipovetsky, “Rastratnyie Strategii, ili Metamorfozy 
Chernukhi”, in Novyi Mir, 1999, #11, online version at <http://magazines.russ.ru/novyi_mi/1999/11/lipowez.html>, 
accessed Sept 19, 2009. 
17 See, e.g., a review of Taxi Blues: Herbert Eagle, “A Review of Taxi Blues”, “Slavic Review”, Vol. 52, No. 2 
(Summer, 1993),353-354, esp. 354. 
18 Eliot Borenstein, Overkill: Sex and Violence in Russian Popular Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2008), 7. 
98 
 
Chernukha dominated Russian cinema of the late 1980s and early 1990s so effectively 
that in the 1992 film, Prorva (Moscow Parade, dir. Ivan Dykhovichnyi), reviewers are struck by 
a sudden reversal of the chernukha aesthetics. According to Alla Efimova, 
In the film [Moscow Parade]… the charms of Soviet power are recreated with 
straightforward clarity. The intensely beautiful visual clichés not only form a background 
for the film’s narrative but almost seem to be the object of the film, its main characters. 
The sparkling gilded stations of the Moscow metro, the sun-drenched Fountain of 
Friendship at the Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition, the tanned athletes clad in white 
and waiving red banners – these are now the cliché images of Stalinist Russia that are 
replacing images of the Gulag or communal apartments.19 
Why, on the cusp of 1990s, amidst the tragic dreamscapes of Russia’s present constructed 
by the chernukha films, does there emerge the intense beauty of Stalin’s Moscow? In this 
chapter, I will trace visual and narrative strategies which the Russian films of the 1990s employ 
to construct Russia’s national past out of the historical rupture that the end of the Soviet state 
produced, mythologizing the past of the country that seemed stuck in its present. 
Perestroika and Beyond: Establishing the Past. 
Karen Shakhnazarov’s City Zero: Musealization. 
Late-Soviet cinema’s mode of “roaming exploration” (as Avrutin calls it) characterizes 
Karen Shakhnazarov’s City Zero (Gorod Zero, alternative title Zerograd) that appeared in 1988, 
amid the gradual disillusionment with glasnost’. Glasnost’s relative freedom of speech and 
information almost immediately opened a cultural field too vast to be readily navigated. Soviet 
                                                
19 Alla Efimova, “Touch on the Raw: The Aesthetic Affections of Socialist Realism” in Art Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1, 
Aesthetics and the Body Politic (Spring, 1997), 72-80, 72. 
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values now had to be negotiated within the stream of Western cultural products and commodities 
pouring into USSR. The early reviews20 of City Zero appear on the pages of the Sovetskii Ekran 
(The Soviet Screen) journal among articles that confusedly attempt to make sense of the new 
names, titles and trends to which they now have access. 
City Zero received mixed reviews: the reviewers either blamed Shakhnazarov for creating 
a film with an unclear ideological message, or criticized the film’s absurdist aesthetics. Every 
reviewer, nonetheless, acknowledged Shakhnazarov’s directorial skill.21 Indeed, City Zero is 
ideologically suspect: 
In Karen Shakhnazarov’s Zero City, a flip-flop paraphrase of [Gogol’s] The Inspector 
General, a Soviet yuppie inspector comes to a remote Russian town only to find himself a 
part of a ludicrous puzzle without a clue, a labyrinth with no way out. The secretary of 
the plant office that he has been sent to inspect appears in full nude before him. In a 
restaurant, he is served a cake in the shape of his own head for dessert. A psychic boy 
tells him that he will never escape…22 
In fact, the protagonist, Varakin, manages to escape the city after a series of bizarre and 
meaningless encounters; however, his fate is still unclear: “In the end, the hero is left in a small 
rowboat in the middle of the lake, shrouded in a thick fog.”23 The rowboat has no oars, 
allegorically denying the protagonist any mastery of his own fate. 
City Zero is a direct, though complex, reaction to the public disillusionment with the 
policy of glasnost’: “In… Zerograd … the alleged bright hope of glasnost’ is seen as an open 
                                                
20 See “Igra Pustogo I Porozhnego”, “Sovetskii Ekran”, #9 (1990), 5. 
21 See P. Cherniaiev,“Gorod Zero”, in “Sovetskii Ekran’,  #22 (1988), 12-13; also, A. Shemiakin, “Po tu storonu 
zdravogo smysla”,” Sovetskii Ekran”,  #16 (1989), 14-15. 
22 See Michael Brashinsky (1993),“Closely watched drains: Notes by a dilettante on the Soviet absurdist film”, in 
Inside Soviet Film Satire: Laughter With a Lash, ed. Andrew Horton (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 58-65, 61. 
23 Anna Lawton, Kinoglasnost: Soviet Cinema in Our Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 223. 
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Pandora’s box of death, destruction, betrayal, failure and hostility.”24 However, the “bright hope 
of glasnost’” was precisely the reason why a film like City Zero was made in the first place; just 
a few years earlier, the state’s strict financial and ideological control of film production would 
have made this kind of artistic experimentation impossible. Shakhnazarov himself later lamented 
the end of censorship system that, in his view, eliminated the only institutional selection 
mechanism within Soviet film production (in the absence of market economy).25 In 1988, 
however, the dangers of “artistic autonomy” to the institution of national cinema and to 
spectatorship were not yet felt clearly. Shakhnazarov readily used the opportunities of glasnost’s 
new semantic regime to criticize the unexpected consequences of this very regime, his absurdist 
critique of the late-Soviet disintegrating public space de(con)structing this space further. 
Michael Brashinsky’s theory of Socialist absurdism is largely based on his reading of 
City Zero as he claims that “Socialist absurdism, unlike existentialist absurdism… creates 
models of the oppressed society, not of the universe.”26 Indeed, in the context of Soviet cinema’s 
narrative model that propels the protagonist towards the (preferably ideologically sound) goal, 
the protagonist’s impassive rambles through a chain of meaningless, disconnected encounters 
comment upon (and negate) Soviet cinema’s compulsory ideological charge. The plot of the film 
is “not the point in this inventive dark allegory without a punchline. It is enough to know that 
Varakin is both the hero and victim of various narrative strands.”27 As they serve Varakin a cake 
in the form of his own head as a dessert that he did not order, as they accuse him of being 
accomplice to the suicide of a restaurant chef who everyone believes to be Varakin’s father, there 
is no sense of progression, Anna Lawton suggests, continuing that  
                                                
24 See Horton and Brashinsky 1992, 210. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Brashinsky 1993, 61. 
27 Horton, Brashinsky 1992, 210. 
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In Zero City … dystopia is conveyed in the form of a personal nightmare… The emphasis 
[is] on the search for a breakthrough into the future, which does not seem to exist. 
Without being solemn, the film raises the ontological question: do we still exist? […] 
Zero City is a city without coordinates, a zero on the world map, existing only as a visual 
expression of Varakin’s inchoate fear. On the other hand, Varakin’s predicament is 
absolutely real and, what is worse, shared by millions of Soviet citizens. The whole 
country, the film suggests, may very well end up in a big, round zero.28 
Varakin’s wanderings are the only thing that holds the cinematic narrative together, but 
the protagonist is often effectively removed from it.29 The camera tends to leave him to 
concentrate on static objects or slowed-down movements. In the opening sequence, when 
Varakin arrives to the city, the camera eagerly leaves him to look at the train that is slowly 
leaving the station; yet, the camera does not even bother following the train, clinging to its 
position on top of the bridge over the tracks, “forgetting” to suture the viewer with the character. 
Later, the camera seems to be more interested in the dark corner of a hotel room than in the 
protagonist washing his hands. Further, the setting is often presented from unexpected angles and 
the shots are extensively long, allowing the characters to move in and out of the frame of the 
disinterested camera. 
These techniques create the “frozen time”30 of the film, with no sense of narrative 
progression. The film’s peculiar temporality, magnified by the absurdity of the protagonist’s 
encounters, invites a reading of the film as a social commentary: Soviet reality has no future; its 
inhabitants are bewildered and lost. This is not just a social commentary, however; it is also a 
commentary on the Soviet aesthetics. City Zero’s protagonist is as much locked in the frozen 
                                                
28 Lawton 1992, 221-222. 
29 Horton, Brashinsky 1992, 211. 
30 The term is used in Lawton’s essay. 
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time of the late Socialism as the new Soviet men were locked forever in the epic Great Time of 
Socialist Realism, in the never-ending carnival night of high Socialist culture that portrays life as 
it should be, “already there”, already utopian.31 City Zero dystopianizes this narrative temporality 
by laying bare the character’s aimless wanders, no longer sustained by ideological illusion. 
While the never-ending present of Soviet narratives, then, loses all of its utopian 
celebratory charm and acquires instead the quality of existential tragedy in City Zero, one of the 
most commented-upon scenes in the film deals not with the Soviet Union’s present, but with 
history. In this scene the protagonist is lost during another fruitless attempt to escape the city; he 
finds himself in a museum in the middle of the woods. A talkative custodian offers to show 
Varakin the museum collection and leads him through a bizarre museum of living waxworks: the 
waxworks’ bodies are immobile but their eyes watchfully follow Varakin’s movements. The 
waxworks portray events of Soviet history up through the late 1970; a dashing waxwork version 
of a younger Stalin, too, dutifully watches Varakin. In the museum sequence, the protagonist, a 
common Soviet citizen, becomes an object of history’s gaze – yet, this history is perverse. 
The Russian/Soviet history becomes in the scene “a carnival gone wrong, a mishmash of 
images, statues, heroes real or fabricated… with seemingly no connection between them.”32 The 
most peculiar characteristic of the exhibition is its seeming randomness and artificiality, or, as 
another critic puts it, 
[Varakin’s] tour of the exhibition… is a journey through Russian-Soviet history; actually, 
a grotesque parody of it. Events and figures are placed in phony contexts, chronology is 
                                                





distorted by odd juxtapositions, and cheap embellishments-cum-hyperbolic-ornaments 
degrade history to the level of a fairground attraction.33 
Indeed, when the custodian cheerfully recites the impossibly absurd “historical events,” 
his speech is a set of ideologically charged clichés, which Shakhnazarov’s late-Soviet viewer 
would immediately recognize as the party-sanctioned discourse of Soviet history. However, 
when the custodian mentions the “heroes of the Trojan War” who supposedly played a vital part 
in the local history, it becomes apparent that the authority of the Soviet discourse is seriously 
compromised. The “real” events of national history become as much of a fiction as the presence 
of Trojans in (presumably) European Russia, precisely because the discourse used to talk about 
both is virtually the same. 
The museum sequence of City Zero nearly begs to be (and was34) read as a postmodernist 
pastiche of national history. Anna Lawton claims that “[o]bviously, in Zero City history is dead, 
and so is the collective memory of the past. In the end, the hero is left in a small rowboat in the 
middle of the lake, shrouded in a thick fog. Because where there is no past there cannot be any 
future.”35 
However, in the final sequence of the film, long after Varakin is gone, the museum 
custodian takes a long time going around the museum, switching off the lights. The shapes of the 
waxworks are visible in the dark, waiting for their next visitor. What is dead is not precisely 
history but a conventional assumption of its authentic quality; by deconstructing Soviet history 
and putting its bits and pieces safely underground, the film leaves a conceptual space for 
history’s overall possibility of existence amid the never-ending late-Soviet present. Of all 
                                                
33 Lawton 1992, 222. 
34 For a close reading of the museum scene as an associative pastiche, see Gerald McCausland, “The Post-Soviet 
Condition: Cultural Reconfigurations of Russian Identity” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 156-157. 
35 Lawton 1992, 223. 
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Varakin’s journeys, his grotesque tour of the museum is, paradoxically, the most coherent one; 
the film builds up a site to store the symbols and images associated with the Soviet state, truth 
and lies alike - the museum. 
Musealization of history, the creation of distinct places where the artifacts of the past can 
be (seemingly) safely preserved, is a compensatory mechanism that, in the words of Andreas 
Hyussen, “acknowledges a loss of national or communal identity but trusts in our ability to make 
up for it.”36 Musealizing history, Huyssen warns, contains an amnesiac possibility, as the 
artifacts of the past lose their “authentic” contextual ties and thus their authentic meanings 
through being preserved.37 
Yet, while City Zero lays bare the risks of musealized national history, it also makes use 
of these risks. The very decontextualization of images in the museum sequence provides if not an 
authentic Soviet history, then at least an unexpectedly genuine one. In the film, the museum is 
the only “alternative” to the bleak, desolate landscape of City Zero. While early reviews of the 
film read the sequence as signifying that Soviet history is dead (just as Huyssen warns that no 
“true” history can arise from musealization), the film does not search for a true history; rather, it 
attempts to assess and preserve the symbology associated with the past, magnifying the 
exaggerations and outright lies of Soviet history in the museum setting. 
City Zero acknowledges the impossibility of history’s authenticity and yet proceeds with 
recreating it amidst the cultural obsession with the never-ending late-Soviet present. The past, in 
the film, is sufficiently removed from the bleakness of the present, and, however bizarre and 
absurd, is safe: it can be visited, and it is organized rationally (far from being Horton’s “complete 
                                                
36 See Andreas Huyssen, “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia”, in Arjun Appadurai, ed., Globalization (Duke 
University Press, 2001), 57-78, 71. 
37 The article version of the above: Andreas Huyssen, “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia”, in Public Culture 
12.1 (2000), 21-38, 24 
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mishmash of images”, the exhibition is arranged in a conventional historiographic way from past 
to present). The film creates a fetishistic modality of representing national history that will be 
picked up by later Russian cinema. The fetishist’s “I know very well [that this is not the real 
object of desire] but all the same” attests to the dilemma that a musealizing culture faces in 
Huyssen’s argument. A muzealizing culture has to reconcile the desire to ward off cultural 
amnesia with the understanding that there will emerge no “authentic” past. Russian films of the 
later 1990s and early 2000s will treat national history in a way strikingly similar to that of City 
Zero: history will again be confined to a cinematic space where objectively verifiable facts are 
interspersed with complex symbolic fantasies and historical falsifications, all equal in potential 
mythopoetic (and thus ideological) value. 
The museum sequence of City Zero stages the divide between the late-Soviet eternal 
present and the Soviet past, simultaneously warding off the amnesia that the unmoving late-
Soviet national time produces, however “imperfect” the mode of doing so may be. The museum 
of City Zero is already a nostalgic creation, preserving not the national past per se but the 
representational modality used to speak of history in the Soviet Union, a modality that was 
seemingly quickly disappearing together with the celebratory aesthetics of Socialist Realism. The 
museum is, in the film, a defense against cultural amnesia: its existence ensures that there is a 
place for the past, a place that can be visited and which safely holds all the symbols associated 
with the past, truth together with lies, horrors together with celebratory posters. 
Furthermore, while the sequence denies history its authenticity, it also provides for an 
unexpected source of enjoyment, however perverse. Horton examines the film through 
Bakhtinian notion of the carnivalesque, arguing that the film leaves open the possibility “in the 
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future of a carnival that again finds its roots and its liberating laughter, both joyful and satiric.”38 
The source of the carnivalesque in the film is its absurdist take on the reality: the weak 
connections between the occurrences in the film, the disorganized space and the purposeless 
movements break both narrative and cinematic conventions, thus allowing for the Bakhtinian 
"temporary suspension of all hierarchic distinctions and barriers… of the prohibitions of usual 
life."39  
The Bakhtinian carnival is a cultural space where decontextualization can be a source of 
enjoyment and simultaneously serve as a form of memorialization. City Zero imagines precisely 
this kind of space: the protagonist’s existential tragedy is, through its sheer absurdity, 
transformed into a cinematic carnival. Boris Groys notes in his "Between Stalin and Dionysus" 
(1989) that the thin line between tragedy and comedy is only too penetrable in the carnival:  
…no one is given the democratic right to shirk carnival, to not take part, to remain on the 
sidelines. On the contrary, precisely those who try to do so are the first to be subject to 
well-deserved “cheerful vilifications and beatings.” According to Bakhtin, this nightmare 
is transformed into carnival thanks to the laughter that accompanies it.40 
Horton’s assessment of the film as “a carnival gone wrong,”41 then, can be, 
paradoxically, read as a carnival going exactly right. City Zero looks for the means to transform 
the horrifyingly bleak and hopeless everyday reality into a spectacle of defamiliarization. In 
order to do so, it turns to totalitarian aesthetics. 
The most striking shot of the museum sequence shows a museum installation in the shape 
of a red rotating platform vaguely resembling a multi-tiered layer cake, crowned by a red star. 
                                                
38 Horton 1993: 148-149. 
39 See Bakhtin 1984, 15. 
40 Boris Groys, “Mezhdu Stalinym I Dionisom”, in “Sintaksis” # 25 (Paris, 1989), 92-97, 95, quoted in Caryl 
Emerson, The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin,  (Princeton University Press, 2000), 171. 
41 Horton 1993:149. 
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The “cake” is laden with wax figures that represent peasants in traditional dress, workers holding 
their instruments, but also with the newer additions to the late-Soviet landscape like a stilyaga, in 
a tailored skinny suit and sunglasses, complete with Elvis-like brilliantined hairstyle - a figure 
that was a subject of many accusations of anti-Sovietism in the 1960s and 1970s. The installation 
evokes the way Stalinist culture conveyed the message of unity by putting together images of 
various “typical” figures, preferably in circular order, in the mesmerizing excess of the mass 
ornament, to borrow from Siegfried Kracauer.42  
Perhaps the most famous example of this kind of art is the Friendship of Nations 
Fountain at the Moscow Exhibition Fair (built in 1954). The fountain features sixteen golden 
figures encircling a sheaf of wheat, representing sixteen43 Soviet republics. The architecture of 
the fountain elucidates two aspects of totalitarian ideology, order and inclusiveness (of course, 
“within bounds”), which are parodied in the museum installation of City Zero by being taken to 
the extreme: everyone, even the “anti-Soviet elements” like stilyagi, is included into the mock-
celebration of Soviet culture, arranged in a distinct pattern but in no meaningful order. 
This satiric take on the Soviet dominant aesthetic is what prompted the earlier readings of 
the film to argue that Soviet history is highly disorganized in the film’s interpretation. However, 
the museum installation, satirical as it is, does not quite let the totalitarian aesthetic go: the “layer 
cake” becomes a locus of the late-Soviet absurdist aesthetics of glasnost’ just as the Friendship 
of Nations Fountain is a locus of high Soviet ideology. The principles of Soviet art, seemingly 
completely rejected in late-Soviet era, are thus already put to use; the museum installation takes a 
totalitarian pattern (which is in the late-Soviet era already dysfunctional in its ability to project 
                                                
42 See Siegfried Kracauer, “The Mass Ornament”, in The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, trans. Thomas Y. Levin 
(Harvard University Press, 2005), 75-89, esp. 83, where Kracauer argues that the mass ornament “reveals itself as a 
mythological cult”, also 84. 
43 The sixteenth republic is the Karelo-Finnish SSR, which later was integrated as an autonomous republic into 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1956. 
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Soviet ideological meanings but not in its structure and composition), and invests it with a new 
meaning, that of anti-totalitarian (and liberating carnivalesque) inclusiveness. 
City Zero creates a vault out of Soviet history and musealizes the Soviet symbols that 
have lost their authentic meaning in the late-Soviet cultural milieu.44 It is paradoxical that this 
becomes possible only through evoking the aesthetic of high Stalinism, yet in some way this is 
not entirely surprising. The key to this representational continuity is totalitarian art’s celebratory 
defamiliarization of reality. 
The Friendship of the Nations Fountain will prominently reappear in Ivan 
Dykhovichnyi’s 1992 film Prorva (Moscow Parade), which explicitly returns to the celebratory 
festivity of Stalinist culture. This return, while it has surprised the critics amidst the bleakness of 
the chernukha’s cinematic landscapes, is not as surprising as it may seem at the first glance: late-
Soviet cinema never let the Socialist Realist aesthetic go even as it critiqued and deconstructed it. 
The deconstruction revealed the “sentimental value” of Stalinist culture as a place of nostalgia 
where life is bright and beautiful even as it is fake, as a place where the Soviet paternal metaphor 
is functional. 
Moscow Parade and the Undead Stalin: Nostalgic Idealization of the Past and 
the Resurrection of Paternal Metaphor. 
The disappearance of censorship over cinematic production during glasnost’ is one facet 
of a larger symbolic shift at work in the late-Soviet culture. In Lacanian terms, the outcome of 
glasnost’ marked the definitive disintegration of the Soviet version of the Name-of-the-Father, 
embodied in the figure of Stalin. 
                                                
44 For more on the mechanism of this process, see the discussion of Aleksei Yurchak’s theory (in his Everything 
Was Forever until It Was No More: the Last Soviet Generation) in Chapter 3. 
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Critics often note the dependence of the Soviet narrative of the nation on the figure of 
Stalin.45 Yana Hashamova notes a “particular [Russian] political tradition of upholding the leader 
as the father of the nation,”46 a tradition that weakens after Stalin’s death and especially in the 
last quarter of the 20th century. Anna Lawton examines the role of Stalin as a master signifier of 
the Soviet narrative, arguing that the return to symbolic representations of Stalin as well as the 
heightened (if negatively colored) interest in the historical figure itself during perestroika 
signified not only the impending collapse of the narrative of state, but also was an attempt on the 
part of the filmmakers to hold together the Soviet narratives falling apart. Lawton suggests that 
the subsequent “trivialisation of the demon”47 is among the mechanisms of the collapse itself. 
She reads the repetitive appearance of the “ghost of Stalin” on screen (like the one in City Zero – 
a waxwork with no real agency but nonetheless taking time to watch the protagonist) as a 
delayed reaction to the historical trauma of Stalinism. 
This ghost dominates the 1992 film Moscow Parade (Russian title, Prorva, “Abyss”). 
The film narrates a story of a (former) noblewoman, Anna, who marries a top-tier NKVD (State 
Security) officer in the 1930s. Anna’s hate towards the Soviet ruling elite needs to be contained, 
because Anna does not want to let go of the luxurious lifestyle this elite enjoys. Her love for a 
young porter, Gosha, develops against the backdrop of omnipresent paranoia (“who is to judge 
the traitor of the state better than his friend,” says one of the characters) and the ruling elite’s 
excesses and violence. The love story has an unhappy ending, but along with torment and 
                                                
45 The collection Stalinism and Soviet Cinema, the first post-Soviet study of the figure of Stalin as Soviet Russia’s 
Big Other,45 not just explores implications of Stalinism affecting all the levels of cultural production and the role of 
Stalin’s figure in shaping the cinematic narratives of nation in the films of 1930-40s, but also analyzes the “Stalin 
legacy” in the Soviet cinema of glasnost’. 
46 Hashamova 116. 
47 Lawton 1993, 200. The metaphor refers to the title of Russian modernist writer Fyodor Sologub’s novel, Petty 
Demon (1902), which depicts the protagonist’s gradual descent into madness as he is terrorized by a little 
hallucination which, though seemingly insignificant, is able to torment and manipulate the protagonist. 
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paranoia – the definitive tropes of assessing Stalinism in late-Soviet and early post-Soviet culture 
– there emerges something unexpected. 
The film’s subplot is a preparation for a parade in Moscow’s Red Square, in which 
Anna’s husband takes part. The Red Square parades, besides showcasing the military might of 
the Soviet Union, were in the Stalin era also an excuse to showcase the New Soviet Man. The 
opening sequence of the film shows supposedly documentary footage of a pre-WWII Red Square 
parade. Repeatedly shown is one rotating parade float that looks like a giant wheel, with athletes 
as the wheel’s spokes. The wheel’s imperially slow movement conceals the large billboard that 
the float passes on its way through the Red Square. The billboard features a portrait of Stalin; he 
looks slightly to the side, which, together with the angle of the shot, creates the impression that 
Stalin looks at the camera in those brief seconds that his face is visible in between the athlete-
spokes. This is not a direct gaze, and Stalin is sufficiently concealed from clear view, so that his 
presence at the parade is a phantom presence, hardly registered visually because of the wheel’s 
rotation. Yet, the opening shot sets Stalin’s presence throughout the film, as the camera 
repeatedly lingers on the Kremlin towers, looking upwards on the raising towers from roughly 
the same angle as in the opening sequence. Though there is no Stalin per se in these shots, the 
camera focuses on the symbols of Russian statehood assuming the same vaguely subservient 
position as it did when it looked at the image of Stalin. 
The most prominent trope of the film is constant juxtaposition of the private, dark though 
luxurious spaces of the security officers’ apartments with brand-new, grand buildings of Moscow 
of the late 1930s, brightly lit by the sun. The gilded sculptures of the Friendship of the Nations 
Fountain dominate those several scenes in the film which examine the possibility of friendship 
and love under Stalinism. However, the prominence of this totalitarian masterpiece in the film 
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perhaps inadvertently reveals the degree of historical manipulation that went into constructing 
the paranoid, yet strangely tempting, atmosphere of Stalin-dominated Moscow. The appearance 
of the fountain in the film (perhaps deliberately) destroys all pretense the film might have had for 
any kind of historical accuracy: the fountain was built fifteen-odd years after the events of the 
film take place, as (to borrow a Freudian turn of the phrase) the director, Dykhovichnyi, 
obviously knows very well, but his representational goals lie elsewhere. What the film creates is 
a panorama of an historical era not rooted in the conventional principles of (objective) historical 
representation. Instead, the Stalinist era acquires in the film a phantasmatic quality, constructed 
as a site of memory: the film brings together, in the same cinematic space, symbols, concepts and 
artifacts associated with totalitarianism, allowing the celebratory aesthetics to coexist with 
paranoia, violence, and betrayal. Stalinist Moscow becomes a space that contains all of 
Stalinism, irrespective of the symbol’s place in “objective” history. 
This mechanism seems to be very productive in creating the usable simulacrum of a 
national past that is the function of post-Communist nostalgia48. The nostalgic current of the film 
emerges from its evidently uneasy position towards Stalinism. Stalinism was repeatedly 
condemned in Soviet (and post-Soviet) public discourse from the XX Communist Party Congress 
of 195649 up to the 2000s when in the context of the move towards authoritarianism50 there 
                                                
48 As discussed by Svetlana Boym: see Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001). 
49 The XX Party Congress (February 14-25, 1956) is known for the first open discussion of the “cult of personality,” 
in the context of Nikita Khruschev’s Report to the Congress, first published only in 1989 (in Izvestiia CK KPSS, 
1989, #3). The Congress outlined a resolution to eliminate the consequences of this cult in all spheres of social and 
political life. 
50 For more on authoritarian tendencies in Russian society of the late 1990s, see Chapter 3. The process manifested 
itself clearly in the early 2000s, when the scope of Putin’s policies aimed at centralization of government and at 
control over media became apparent. For a comprehensive survey of Putin’s move towards authoritarianism, see, 
e.g., Leon Aron, “Putinism” (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Outlook Series), AEI Online 
(May 2008), online version <http://www.aei.org/outlook/27958>, accessed May 7, 2009. 
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emerges an apologetic trend.51 On the one hand, the horrors of Stalinism, like inhumanity, 
paranoia and betrayal, seem to be the primary ideological focus of the film. On the other, it is 
impossible to miss the camera’s loving, lingering treatment of the exceptionally dynamic public 
space that is dominated by flowing water, interplay of light and shade, bright colors, waiving 
banners, and people constantly traversing the camera’s scope. 
The (imagined) festivity of Stalinist everyday culture (which is a no less important 
subject of the film than the peculiar mindset of the characters under totalitarianism) is juxtaposed 
in Moscow Parade not just with the private tragedies of the characters, but also with a 
conceptualization that one of the protagonists, a talented young writer, unexpectedly offers. 
During a stroll, he asks the female protagonist, Anna, for a synonym to the word prorva (the 
Russian title of the film; the approximate translation is abyss, with the connotation of the abyss 
possessing an agency). The writer thinks prorva to be the best word to describe that which 
everyone is afraid of in Russia. He says, “that which everyone is afraid of is just nothing, but this 
nothing sucks [one] in and destroys.” While the writer is saying this, the camera follows his gaze 
to look at the Kremlin towers yet again, which establishes a striking connection between the 
“nothing” he speaks of, Russian statehood, and Stalin. Stalin, thus, comes to occupy a markedly 
ambiguous position within the film, on the margin of existence and non-existence. This 
assessment is reinforced in one of the film’s striking final sequences. 
                                                
51 I would not venture here into citing every Russian historian, legitimate and otherwise, who offer apologetic 
opinion of Stalin’s legacy. Symptomatic is the trend in Russian public discourse: in 2004, the speaker of the Russian 
House of Representatives, the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, offered a characteristic of Stalin as an “exceptional man” 
(nezauriadnyi chelovek), citing the victory in Great Patriotic War and industrialization as Stalin’s accomplishments. 
Gryzlov noted that the social attitude to Stalin “changes with time”, therefore in essence outlining the new official 
position on Stalinism, as Gryzlov himself is a prominent member of the Yedinaia Rossiia Party that was at the time 
known as Putin’s party (See Izvestiia, 21 December 2004). In a recent development (2009), another prominent 




In that sequence, the Parade that took so much effort on the part of Anna’s husband has 
successfully taken place, and the security officers join other high-ranking members of the 
military for a ceremonial photo with Stalin in one of Kremlin’s majestic halls. Stalin, wearing a 
snow-white uniform with no insignia, is immediately visible in the front row as everyone is 
preparing for the picture to be taken. When everyone is finally settled down, one of Stalin’s aides 
approaches him and whispers something to his ear, upon which Stalin immediately leaves, and 
the gap in the row is quickly filled by one of the security officers. The frame then freezes for a 
split second, suggesting that the picture has been taken, with no Stalin in it. The temptation to 
read the episode through Barthes is too tempting: the film does not allow Stalin to be fixed in a 
photograph, that is, does not allow him to die.52 Just as Anna hates her milieu yet cannot let it go, 
the film itself exposes the evils of Stalinism but at the same time wallows in the Stalinist 
culture’s celebratory magnificence. 
The peculiar festive visuality of Stalinist culture is predicated on the peculiar 
interpretation of mimetic principles of representation, as evident from the iconic Stalinist poster 
(Fig. 2), “Thank you, dear Stalin, for our happy childhood.” 
                                                
52 As Barthes puts it in his Camera Lucida (Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (NY: 
Macmillan/Hill and Wang, 1983)), “all these young photographers who are at work in the world, determined upon 
the capture of actuality, do not know that they are agents of Death. This is the way in which our time assumes 
Death; with the denying alibi of the distractedly ‘alive’” (92), and, earlier, “I am neither the subject nor object [being 
photographed], but a subject who feels he is becoming an object… I am truly becoming a specter. The Photographer 




Fig. 2. “Thank you, dear Stalin, for our happy childhood” <davno.ru> 
In the poster, two children, a boy and a girl, give the benevolently smiling Stalin bunches 
of roses, Stalin half-embracing the happy boy; immediately apparent is the glossed-over 
representation of both Stalin and the generically happy and healthy children. Furthermore, the 
painting style, evoking pre-revolutionary Russian marketing art with slightly disproportionate 
figures, softened edges of objects and flattened perspective, projects the image’s ideological 
goals with innocent, nearly instinctual subtlety. Indeed, while on the surface a realist painting, 
the poster does not attempt realist representation in the least: both Stalin’s and the boy’s hands 
are in the wrong positions for either being given roses or holding the bouquet. Stalin, then, 
projects the festively bright red roses or, otherwise, wears them as medals on his uniform. The 
poster showcases the Socialist Realist representational principle in action: mimetic principle is 
easily sacrificed for the sake of creating an ideologically relevant paternal allegory. Though the 
red roses in the poster “objectively” cannot be in the boy’s hands, they are nonetheless exactly 
where they should be, projecting a set of stable ideological meanings of celebration and paternal 
authority as they emanate from Stalin’s figure. Such non-mimetic visuality, paradoxically, is a 
source of relatively clear ideological messages, and the “effortlessness” of meaning-production 
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in totalitarian art, as it seems, is at the core of the post-Soviet nostalgia, if not for Stalinism then 
at least for its artistic method.53 
Moscow Parade’s nostalgic recreation of the simulacrum of a culture long gone, 
dominated by the figure of the undead Stalin, is one of the modes which post-Soviet cinema 
adopts for resurrecting the lost paternal metaphor. This mode consists of rearranging bits and 
pieces of the Soviet grand narrative,54 or, as Nina Tsyrkun puts is, “[building] the new 
mythology from the ruins of the old [one].”55 Tsyrkun argues that the essence of this national 
mythology remained virtually unshattered in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, while 
the arrangement of its components has undergone substantial change. The existence of this 
mythology is predicated on the functional paternal metaphor.56 
The desire to resurrect the paternal metaphor and the nostalgia for a place structured by 
ideologically unambiguous symbols come together in post-Soviet cinema when it is asked once 
again to become “the most important of all arts” (in the words of Vladimir Lenin57) to serve the 
perceived needs of the emergent, state-sanctioned Russian nationalism. A distinct, temptingly 
beautiful and ideologically charged simulacrum of national past emerges in the films of the later 
                                                
53 I am elaborating here on the opinion voiced by Svetlana Boym, who, using a Bakhtinian discussion of the 
carnivalesque to talk about the festive nature of everyday Soviet (that is, Stalinist) culture in its cinematic 
representation, argues that the social change brought about a kind of solidification and mythologization of the Soviet 
space, thus creating a place of nostalgia. See Boym 1995, 75-94.  
54 Making the past a “safe place” shaped by a functional paternal metaphor runs concurrently (and complements) a 
range of hypermasculine, violent and xenophobic tendencies in post-Soviet cinema. These trends have been read as 
indicative of the culture’s attempts to compensate for the loss of the paternal metaphor. Importantly, Susan Larsen 
traces the effort to reaffirm national identity within the post-Soviet cinema, arguing that it is realized through 
conflation of national authority with heroic masculinity that is the major structural trope of the films under her 
scrutiny. See Susan Larsen, “National Identity, Cultural Authority and the Post-Soviet Blockbuster: Nikita 
Mikhalkov and Aleksei Balabanov”, in Slavic Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Autumn 2003); and Nina Tsyrkun, “Tinkling 
Symbols: Fragmented Society – Fragmented Cinema?”, in Russia on Reels: The Russian Idea in Post-Soviet 
Cinema. Ed. Birgit Beumers ( London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). 
55 Tsyrkun, 1999, 62. 
56 The desire to reaffirm the functionality of paternal metaphor is a continuous current in post-Soviet cinema and 
sometimes becomes disproportionate: thus, Yana Hashamova, in her analysis of Koktebel (2003, dir. Boris 
Khlebnikov), demonstrates that “film [Koktebel] insists on the resurrected father even if it contradicts the logic of 
the narratives and the characters” (Yana Hashamova, Pride and Panic: Russian Imagination of the West in Post-
Soviet Film (Bristol/Chicago, Intellect, 2007), 120). 
57 Lenin’s famous maxim states that “Of all the arts, the cinema is for us the most important”. 
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nineties and early 2000s, its way paved by the mechanisms of musealization and problematic 
nostalgic idealization discussed above. Populated by larger-than-life characters, visually 
stunning, seemingly ideologically sound, this cinematic model of the past is hyperreal because, 
in an attempt to recreate a teleological version of national history, it looks for the points of 
contiguity between the imaginary Russia of olden days and the Soviet culture. 
In its late-nineties cinematic construction, Russian national history reacquires some 
continuity because the strategies associated with representing the Russia of the old and the 
representational strategies of Socialist Realism have a number of striking similarities. The 
idealized national past is allowed to emerge in its peculiar, ideologically charged visuality 
because it is filtered through the conceptual legacy of Socialist Realism.58 
The Rise of Ornamental Nationalism: Russia, Lubok-Style, in Nikita Mikhalkov’s The 
Barber of Siberia. 
The Debate on the Role of Cinema. 
Russian cinema of the 1990s, of course, was not homogeneously indulging in the 
aesthetics of chernukha. There was another trend in early post-Soviet cinema that Julian Graffy59 
calls the “[cinema of] healing myths for an age of uncertainty,”60 featuring compelling narratives 
and “catering to popular taste.”61 While scholars of post-Soviet Russian cinema uncover the 
centripetal62 forces at work in cinema in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Graffy 
                                                
58 The hyperreality of Russian national past in the cinema of the late 1990s and early 2000s has another source: aside 
from having to juggle the “domestic” sources of symbols associated with the past, this cinematic model of the past 
attempts (and fails) to digest a number of visual and narrative conventions offered by contemporary Hollywood 
cinema.  
59 Graffy 1999,161-179. 
60 Ibid., 176. 
61 Ibid., 161 
62 I am borrowing this extremely lucky term from Birgit Beumers, "To Moscow! To Moscow? The Russian Hero 
and the Loss of the Centre." In Russia On Reels: The Russian Idea in Post-Soviet Cinema (KINO - The Russian 
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notes that younger filmmakers like Dmitrii Askrakhan turn, in their popular “amusing dramas,” 
to the traditional Russian myths responsible for identity formation (self-sacrifice, resourceful 
self-help) and to the metaphor of family to provide a boost of “vital energy” for their spectators. 
However, the cinema of Astrakhan, as well as a number of films from the early and mid-
1990 that do not bother raising existential questions and provide for honest and relatively 
mindless entertainment (like Vladimir Men’shov’s Shirly-Myrly (1995) and Aleksandr 
Rogozhkin’s Osobennosti Natsional’noi Okhoty (Peculiarities of the National Hunt, 1995)), 
seem to be nonexistent in the arguments put forward at the Third Congress of the Filmmakers’ 
Union in 1997. These arguments portray Russian national cinema as unnecessarily artistic, too 
experimental, too serious and viewer-unfriendly. 
Film director Daniil Dondurei addressed the Third Congress,63 speaking of the economic 
progress that the industry had made since 1991 in a celebratory fashion. Nevertheless, Dondurei 
criticized the Russian filmmakers, essentially, for their inability to cater to the tastes of the 
public. The total absence of state control in post-Soviet cinema, for Dondurei, had created a 
situation where filmmakers indulged in the newly-found artistic freedom, experimenting with 
modes of representation and violent and/or depressive content. 
Why does Dondurei overlook films like those of Astrakhan, Men’shov, and Rogozhkin? 
Cinema, for Dondurei, appears to need to have a “serious”, socially relevant message, which 
“low-art” slapstick comedies like Shirly-Myrly evidently lack. This is the most surprising part of 
Dondurei’s address; after nearly a decade when Russian cinema had no “goals” (such rhetoric 
having been firmly associated with party-sanctioned Soviet public discourse on art), Dondurei 
                                                                                                                                                       
Cinema) (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999. 76-91). 87. In this essay, Beumers explores fragmentation of national space in 
post-Soviet cinema. 
63 See Daniil Dondurei,“The State of National Cinema” (December 1997), in Russia on Reels: The Russian Idea in 
Post-Soviet Cinema. Ed. Birgit Beumers (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 46-50. 
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communicates the need to establish these goals. He turns back to a purely Socialist Realist 
formula to speak about art and cinema: “art, above all, is a means to model future successfully,” 
Dondurei says. This retort to Soviet rhetoric is symptomatic of the problems the institution of 
Russian national cinema had to face. Identifying the industry’s goals, for the Congress, was not 
an unexpected “blast from the past”, but instead a way to cope with a number of challenges, 
ranging from economic (decline of viewership, little to no government support) to ideological 
(acutely perceived “Americanization”, absence of national ideology) that post-Soviet cinema 
encountered in the 1990s. 
What was wrong with chernukha’s undoubtedly serious, socially relevant messages? The 
problem was that by the later 1990s, these messages were ill-suited for contributing to the 
emergent ideology of the new Russian state. Chernukha films reflected the post-Soviet reality 
too well, yet not only the bleakness of chernukha was the issue in the debate about the goals of 
national cinema of the late 1990s. The identity-reasserting cinema of Astrakhan and the post-
Soviet slapstick comedy that gently satirized the post-Soviet social reality did provide for both 
“positive” messages and viewer’s entertainment. Nonetheless, these films could contribute as 
little to the project of reconstructing the Russian national(ist) ideology underway in the later 
1990s as chernukha could. This is because their subject, too, was contemporary post-Soviet 
reality: while the chernukha approached it critically and philosophically, films like Shirly-Myrly 
presented a panorama of post-Soviet culture, with iconic markers of social change (like criminals 
in posh suits driving expensive cars) and markedly Western additions to Russian urban landscape 
(like Coca-Cola billboards).  
Shirly-Myrly juxtaposes these markers with the satirized remnants of the Soviet past, like 
boorish servers in restaurants, corrupt police and drunken hospital personnel. The exceptionally 
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diverse post-Soviet panorama in Shirly-Myrly is overflowing with seemingly disconnected 
symbols: post-Soviet social reality in general proved to be too eclectic, devoid of clear 
dichotomies, and unmanageable, to provide cultural tropes for building up a new national(ist) 
ideology. The post-Soviet present, no matter whether it was presented in films in its existential 
chernukha incarnation or in its abysmally carnivalesque absurdity, was not exactly what the 
functionaries of Russian cinema had in mind when they spoke about the need to produce a 
socially relevant and positive message. The post-Soviet present, suspended between the Socialist 
past and the uncertain future, could not function as a setting for such a message, because there 
was nothing certain about it, nothing that could be made into an easily interpretable message, and 
thus nothing that could serve as a basis for a solid ideological construction. 
This “unsuitability” of the country’s present for the emergent national(ist) ideology 
explains Russian cinema’s eventual programmatic fallback to the representational principle that 
sounded suspiciously Socialist Realist: social reality now had to be constructed, not “reflected.” 
What should Russian cinema show now that it, again, has a goal? 
Any national(ist) ideology understandably turns to the national past in search for the 
continuities of culture. The importance of national cinema in Russia’s search for the national 
past— the cinema’s ability to, essentially, construct a national ideology— was evident already in 
1992, when the title of Stanislav Govorukhin’s documentary, The Russia That We Have Lost 
(Rossiia, Kotoruiu My Poteriali) became “the mantra for a widespread sense of nostalgia for a 
Russia that is imagined to have existed as an organic whole before it was betrayed by the 
Bolsheviks.”64 Govorukhin’s documentary imagines pre-revolutionary Russia to be a prosperous, 
                                                
64 See McCausland 23. 
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culturally rich place,65 mapping Russia’s potential ways of economic and cultural development.66 
Govorukhin’s film imagines what would have been if World War I and the Revolution of 1917 
had not happened, outlining and largely solidifying the nostalgic sentiment in post-Soviet 
culture. 
When the (arguably) most influential contemporary Russian film director, Nikita 
Mikhalkov addressed the Extraordinary Congress of the Filmmakers’ Union (1998),67 his speech 
was a manifesto of strengthening governmental control over cinema and of the revival of 
nationalist rhetoric surrounding film production in Russia in the late 1990s. In the address, 
Mikhalkov stressed the political reasons to produce “positive” films instead of economic ones. 
That Mikhalkov is more concerned with the issues of nation-building than with the industry’s 
profits is significant: by 1998, the Russian government, with which Mikhalkov has long been 
firmly associated,68 thought it was ready to invest in cinema, having rediscovered the value of 
cinema as an ideological tool just as it sought to “strengthen the vertical of power” (the 
government rhetoric of the time69). 
                                                
65 However idealizing Govorukhin’s vision is, the last ten years of the XIX century (and up to the First Russian 
Revolution of 1905) were indeed a period of relative economic stability; furthermore, the Silver Age of Russian 
culture falls roughly into the same period. Similar nostalgic sentiment towards the late XIX century will be seen in 
Mikhalkov’s The Barber of Siberia. 
66 There emerges a whole trend of cultural texts operating on the same premise of “what would have been,” 
prompting what I call post-Soviet “nostalgic potentiology” and manifested in the heightened attention to the genre of 
alternative history. For more on this, see Chapter 4, esp. the analysis of the film First on the Moon. 
67 See Nikita Mikhalkov, “The Function of National Cinema” (May 1998), in Russia on Reels: The Russian Idea in 
Post-Soviet Cinema. Ed. Birgit Beumers (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 50-56. 
68 Mikhalkov, a son of the author of the Soviet national anthem, came to national prominence at the age of 18, when 
he played the sweet young boy Kolya in Georgii Daneliia’s I Step Through Moscow (Ia shagaiu po Moskve, 1963). 
The title song from the film is known by virtually every Soviet (and post-Soviet) citizen. In the early nineties, 
Mikhalkov, by then a successful actor, director and businessman, became president of  Russian Cultural Fund 
(1993), and since then the list of his government affiliations exponentially expands to include more than twenty 
government-affiliated positions. He then became the President of Russian Filmmakers’ Union. 
69 The “vertical of power” refers to hierarchy of executive branch of Russian government, which was the focus of 
reform immediately upon Putin’s ascent to power. The most significant of those reforms were the reform of the 
Upper House of Russian parliament, the Duma, in 2000-2002, whereby elections into this House were eliminated, its 
members to be appointed by the President; and consolidation of Russian regional governments into larger “federal 
districts”, their heads too appointed by the President. 
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In the address, Mikhalkov, spicing up the Socialist Realist formula with some Cold War 
rhetoric, calls cinema “our most powerful weapon” and even warns that this weapon can be 
“seized by our enemies and turned upon us.”70 For Mikhalkov at least, Russian cinema now 
identifies itself with state power. The role of national cinema within such a framework can only 
be to explore all things national, from identity to history to landscape. 
Mikhalkov had little doubt about the mode of such exploration. His 1999 film, The 
Barber of Siberia, creates a cinematic mode of (re)constructing Russianness through nostalgic 
idealization of pre-revolutionary Russia. Mikhalkov’s film infuses the mythical vision of Russian 
history with the tropes and visual strategies that it imagines to signify Russianness. These tropes 
and strategies bind several (“real” or imaginary) periods of Russian history together into an 
unexpected aesthetic continuity. This allows The Barber to create a nostalgic cinematic space 
where the modern viewer can wallow in “larger than life” characters, emotionally charged plots, 
and, most importantly, visually striking imagery that all come together to project a variety of 
ideological messages. In the words of Yana Hashamova, 
Historical time in this film [The Barber of Siberia]… is constructed as linear time, as 
progression, project, and teleology… [T]he film attempts to advance a national identity 
that is rooted in the certainty of a celebrated mythical past presented as reality, thereby 
avoiding the dilemmas confronting the present.71 
Nikita Mikhalkov’s The Barber of Siberia: Imagining a Cultural Continuity. 
The Barber is perhaps the most extensively studied post-Soviet film; mentioning it, even 
if in passing, is seemingly imperative for any study of post-Soviet cinema. This is not in the least 
due to the project’s sheer magnitude in terms of production, distribution and reception. In 1999, 
                                                
70 Mikhalkov 1999, 52. 
71 Hashamova 69. 
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The Barber was the most expensive film in the history of Russian cinema, with a budget of 
around $40 million (only nine years later to be matched by Fyodor Bondarchuk’s sci-fi 
blockbuster The Inhabited Island (Obitaiemyi Ostrov, 2009)). With a sprawling runtime of 180 
minutes, an unprecedented promotional campaign72 (with a tagline, “He’s a Russian. That 
explains a lot”), and an international cast featuring the Russian A-list ageing heartthrob Oleg 
Men’shikov and Hollywood’s own Julia Ormond as star-crossed lovers, the film attracted much 
critical attention because the film’s production was immediately deemed to be full of excesses.73 
These excesses directly translated into the film’s equally excessive content, both in terms of 
visuality and of the ideology that this visuality projects. 
The opening shot of The Barber shows vast stretches of presumably Siberian coniferous 
forest filmed from above, while the opening credits reveal an interesting (and most likely 
intentional) “mistake.” While many post-Soviet films mention their government agency sponsor 
in the opening credits,74 the credit in The Barber simply says “The film was made with the 
support of Russian Federation” (“fil’m sniat pri gosudarstvennoi podderzhke Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii”), presenting the film as a result of a collective national effort. The film’s 
unmistakably populist and nationalist message is thus conveyed on the meta-cinematic level. If 
the viewer does not catch this, as I did not the first several times I saw the film, the message still 
                                                
72 Stephen M. Norris, “Tsarist Russia, Lubok Style: Nikita Mikhalkov’s Barber of Siberia (1999) and Post-Soviet 
National Identity”, in Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television. Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2005, 101-118, 110-
112. 
73 For a discussion of the film’s “excessiveness” through Peter Brooks’s theory of melodrama, see Susan Larsen, 
“National Identity, Cultural Authority and the Post-Soviet Blockbuster: Nikita Mikhalkov and Aleksei Balabanov”, 
in Slavic Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), 494. For a survey of “excesses” of production and distribution, see 
Norris 2005. 
74 Most often, the Russian Federation’s State Committee of Cinematography. 
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lingers in the old (pre-Revolution) spelling of the film’s title: the iota and the yer, letters that fell 
into disuse after the early Bolshevik spelling reform, feature prominently in the title.75 
One critic writes, “[Mikhalkov] tells a love story without a happy ending, one that runs 
counter to Hollywood films, but he tells it in the most Hollywood-like film ever made in Russian 
history.”76 Indeed, a perceived artificiality77 of the film’s plot is likely a result of simultaneous 
denial of and reliance on the plot conventions of classic Hollywood narrative cinema. The 
Barber’s dramatic plot, complete with secret children, phantasmagorical forest-shaving machines 
and vast panoramas of the Imperial Russia, provides for Hollywood-style entertainment, at the 
same time concerning itself with the “eternal questions” that are a marked departure from the 
entertainment paradigm. Mikhalkov, nonetheless, steers the plot between a compelling narrative 
and a conventional Russian critique of Hollywood as mere entertainment.78 
It was not the film’s relationship with Hollywood, however, but its “message,” that was 
strikingly unusual for the time. In the words of Stephen Norris, “Mikhalkov presents a more 
positive look at Russia and its values, morals and heritage than other films of the 1990s, which 
tended to portray the bleakness that had set in after communism’s fall.”79 Indeed, in a seemingly 
straightforward attempt to reclaim the national past, the film turns to the reign of Alexander III 
(1881-1894), which in post-Soviet historiography is perceived as the last relatively stable period 
                                                
75 This evokes the public interest in pre-Revolution spelling which emerged in Russia in the 1990s. Such spelling, 
associated with national tradition and historical continuity, prompted in the 1990s a social phenomenon of 
“Slavianizing” the spelling of many company names. Of these, several prominent ones remain to this day, most 
importantly, the Kommersant newspaper that crowns its final “t” with a silent yer, adding a traditionalist flavor to a 
markedly “capitalist” notion. 
76 Norris 2005, 103-104. The article is written before Timur Bekmambetov’s explicit adoption of Hollywood 
blockbuster model (in terms of visuality and production/distribution, and, to a lesser extent, of the film’s themes) to 
Russian cinema with his Night Watch and Day Watch (2004-06). 
77 See, e.g., Tat’iana Moskvina, Ne govori, chto molodost’ slubila, in Iskusstvo Kino, 1999, #6, online version 
available at: <http://www.kinoart.ru/1999/6/4.html>. 
78 A common anti-Hollywood sentiment in Russian cinema is predicated on the dichotomy of high and low art and 
contains claims of Hollywood cinema’s shallowness in its pursuit of profit. For a case study of Russian cinema’s 
“denial” of and dependence on Hollywood, see Nancy Condee, The Imperial Trace: Recent Russian Cinema 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), esp. 233-236.  
79 Norris 104. 
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in Russian history.80 The highly moral and very attractive protagonist is inscribed into the 
landscape that repeatedly assures the viewer that it is a national landscape. The film insistently 
flaunts nearly every symbolic marker of Russianness: the church cupolas, the golden-leaved 
birches, Russian flags and double-headed eagles, and peasants in traditional dress and folk 
festivities all dominate the visual field. The past to be reclaimed by The Barber, however, is far 
from being unproblematic. Yana Hashamova argues that 
Mikhalkov, […] disappointed in the dark and hopeless filmic representations of Russia’s 
current reality, certainly offers aspects of the past, but he does so only to idealize it […] 
Mikhalkov creates a mythic visual world, in which viewers cannot conceive of the 
present and the future without the symbolic configuration of the past.81 
The film mythologizes Russian history: this is evident from the inconsistency between 
The Barber’s implicitly proclaimed historicity (evident from the film’s panoramic approach that 
inscribes the characters’ stories into a detailed reconstruction of everyday life) and the little 
effort that went into concealing the act of mythmaking. Indeed, scholarship on The Barber notes 
that “viewers have had numerous difficulties with the representation of history in this film.”82 
Critics and historians have noted a myriad of historical inaccuracies in the film’s portrayal of the 
era.83 Hashamova mentions that  
Mikhalkov constructs the historical mystification as reality and transforms illusion into 
truth. Such transformations of selective and manipulated historical episodes into real 
                                                
80 As discussed above, the late XIX century is a period in Russian history particularly prone to idealizing; 
interestingly, Mikhalkov goes against the grain of his own idealization project by including an (inaccurate) historical 
reference to terrorism (Norris explains that by the time the events of the film are claimed to take place, the wave of 
domestic terrorism (by Socialist anarchist organizations like Narodnaya Volia) has already subsided) in order to be 
able to emphasize the protagonist’s acquisition of heroic masculinity through the set of challenging encounters, one 
of those with terrorists. 
81 Hashamova 69 
82 Hashamova 67. 
83 In and of itself, this is a somewhat unexpected consideration, given that film’s main plot vehicle is a phantasmatic 
contraption of a logging machine. 
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history and the insistence on truthfulness and credibility underlie the ideological discourse 
of the film and its teleological orientation.84 
While the film’s claim to historical objectivity, then, falls apart upon any attempt at 
verification, it seems that The Barber’s portrayal of the era is in a way “truthful”, if not 
objective. The “genuine” nature of historical representation in the film stems not from its 
mimetically accurate reconstruction of the era (just as it was the case with City Zero and Moscow 
Parade). Instead, the film builds up on a set of visual tropes that appeal to the imaginary 
construct of “genuine Russianness” without explicitly defining what this “Russianness” might 
mean. 
The representation of history in the film, as early critics noticed, bears a striking 
conceptual similarity to the traditional genre of Russian popular art, the lubok: an early review of 
the film notes that it is a “Mercedes 60085 pretending to be a lubok.”86 The lubok, a unique 
Russian popular print featuring allegorical images with short texts squeezed in often-rhyming 
formulas,87 according to Norris, who studies The Barber in the context of the lubok, 
[became] a source of propaganda and a means through which Russians began to conceive 
of their place within Russian nation [in the seventeenth and eighteenth century]… [T]he 
lubok was one of the most important cultural products that entered into a large percentage 
of Russian’s [sic] homes… the popular prints helped a largely illiterate population to 
understand Russia’s [wartime] conflicts, and they also helped Russians to imagine 
                                                
84 Hashamova 68. 
85 The automobile that has become an iconic marker of post-Soviet culture’s period of “wild capitalism” of the early 
1990s. 




themselves to be part of Russia… Ultimately, the tsarist print provided ideas about what 
made Russia ‘Russia.’88 
The lubok conveyed its message through simplified, allegorical figures; it was this 
simplification of complex social and political notions that prompted the nineteenth-century 
Russian intellectuals to resent the lubok, perceived as “a synonym for anything coarse and 
cheap… a source of propaganda that shaped the masses and made them compliant.”89 This 
position largely shapes the negative domestic reviews of The Barber that characterize the film as 
“a Russian souvenir.”90 In Norris’s reading, Mikhalkov’s glossed-over representation of Russian 
history shares with the lubok an implicit goal of popularizing ideology. Norris writes, “Many 
believed that Mikhalkov was attempting to sell an outdated patriotism that glossed over the 
tsarist past… this fear corresponds with similar feelings among Russian elites in the nineteenth 
century about the lubok, who often referred to it as ‘artistic garbage.’”91 
The similarities of The Barber and the lubok do not end here. Russian film theorist Neia 
Zorkaia calls the lubok “the first post-folkloric stage of mass art, first evidence of folklorism [in 
Russian culture].”92 For Zorkaia, folklorism, the rediscovery of what is perceived to be a body of 
genuine cultural heritage (folklore itself), becomes particularly relevant for the cultures in 
transition looking to redefine their identities,93 like late-Soviet and early post-Soviet culture. 
While, according to Norris, Russian intellectuals tend to use the term lubok as a negative label 
for cultural products, Zorkaia’s argument is concerned not with the judgment of lubok’s artistic 
value but with examining the relationship of the lubok art to the system of artistic genres and to 
                                                
88 Norris 102. 
89 Ibid., 102. 
90 Ibid., 108. 
91 Ibid., 112. 
92 See Neia Zorkaia, Fol’klor, Lubok, Ekran (Moskva, Iskusstvo, 1994), 17. 
93 This is in opposition to many Western folklorists who define folklorism as a “fake-lore,” a 
commercialized/popularized use of folklore. For a survey of definitions of folklorism, see Guntis Šmidchens, 
"Folklorism Revisited", in Journal of Folklore Research (Vol. 36, # 1), 51-70, esp. 51-52. 
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cultural chronologies. The lubok art, Zorkaia claims, “constantly [mixes] genres and types of 
[texts], transplants and transforms them into one another… [A]nother important feature is… its 
eclecticism, formed by bringing together different chronological layers [of culture].”94 
Lubok’s eclecticism and semantic compression are strategies that The Barber applies to 
the Russian national history. The “goal” of a lubok print is to communicate an ideologized 
message by simplifying this message, complemented by a set of manipulative rhetorical 
strategies. No matter how “inaccurate” the representation of national history is in The Barber, the 
film does not bother to conceal this inaccuracy because it is not after the authentic history. Out of 
the film’s manipulation of history arises a solid, mythological space of pre-revolutionary Russia, 
a vast country of subdued beauty where not only is the paternal metaphor functional, it is also 
unquestionably appealing. An often-discussed scene in the film features a graduation ceremony 
in the beautiful Kremlin inner plaza: the protagonist, with his cadet friends, listens to the Tsar 
giving an inspirational speech, the shots of the Tsar’s benevolent face intercut with those of the 
cadets who look like they are madly in love with the Tsar. Whether or not the Tsar’s speeches at 
military academy graduations are an accurate, verifiable historical detail is, of course, irrelevant. 
While the historical detail may or may not be “fake”, the mechanism of cinematic identification 
ensures that the spectator partakes in the illusion of a genuine feeling (achieved by the actors’ 
very convincing performances) and, by extension, in the illusion of a functional paternal 
metaphor. 
The Barber does not just make use of the lubok’s rhetorical strategies. The lubok’s 
peculiar visual aesthetics, too, provide a potential source for a post-Soviet nationalist 
iconography. Norris notes that “among certain members of the Russian educated classes… the 
                                                
94 Zorkaia 50. 
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prints became associated with peasant culture and the search for ‘authentic Russia.’”95 This is 
because the lubok relies heavily on Slavic (pre-Christian) art in its ornamentality, infusing it with 
the conventions of Russian Orthodox iconography. An Orthodox icon is not supposed to 
represent its subject truthfully, instead attempting to capture God’s essence. This implicitly anti-
mimetic, allegorical aspect of Orthodox iconography is picked up by the lubok and directly 
translates into The Barber’s representation of history. The lubok’s use of elaborate, ornamental 
detail that makes its imagery “larger than life,” literally as well figuratively, explicitly invites one 
to read the lubok image not by “matching” it with real-life objects but by assuming the image is a 
metaphor for something and thus needs to be unpacked. 
In this way, Russian cinema functionaries’ appeal to return to Socialist Realist principles 
of representation of life as it should be – bright, beautiful, populated with characters who are 
“better” and certainly more inspiring than whatever Russian social reality of the late 1990s had 
to offer – intersects with and makes use of the principles of lubok popular art. This art is 
accessible, allegorical, ornamental, not pretending to be a truthful reflection of “reality.” In the 
set of scenes in The Barber depicting Shrovetide festival (Maslenitsa, Pancake Week), the 
female protagonist, Jane, and her companion have to navigate the vast space on the banks of 
Moskva River peppered with semi-permanent wooden kiosks where people in peasant dress sell 
blinis (pancakes) with caviar, vodka, and crafts. The Shrovetide festival is chosen as a setting to 
showcase the excess of “Russianness,” complete with half-naked men on the ice of the river who 
are about to engage in the customary group fistfight. Their blood is so bright and their bodies so 
prominent against the white snow that the 19th-century Russian peasants consuming caviar along 
with the aristocracy stop presenting any conceptual problem for the spectator. Everything being 
shown is taken to the extreme – the too-bright colors of clothing, the elaborate pyrotechnics that 
                                                
95 Norris 102. 
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find some unexpected way to the festival and mark a high point of the celebration, the more-
aggressive-than-usual montage that attempts to capture simultaneity of many movements, the 
running children, the close-ups of smiling faces and bloody mouths in the fistfight scene etc. 
When the female protagonist of The Barber first arrives to Moscow, she offers the 
following opinion: “It looks like a Turkish mosque, but brighter and cleaner.” Her observation 
sums the film’s mode of dealing with pre-revolutionary Russia’s iconography: the cadets’ 
uniforms are wrinkle-less and spotless even after the shootout in one of the earlier scenes of the 
film; the general’s shot glass is sparkling; the teeth of the fistfighters in the Shrovetide sequence 
are snow-white in their bloody mouths. Even the scene where the male protagonist is sent to 
Siberia features a grand, orderly, spotless hall of a train station, filled with prisoners in overalls 
of a distinctly flattering fit. 
Borrowing visual conventions from the lubok aesthetic allows The Barber to take a 
circuitous path in its return to the principles of representation informed by Socialist Realism. The 
discredited Communist ideology no longer able to back up the mythological construction of the 
historical era, the film appeals to what is perceived to be the genuine “roots” of Russian culture. 
The lubok iconography in The Barber compresses multiple ideological messages into the festive 
cinematic space in a manner very similar El’dar Riazanov’s 1956 classic Carnival Night - though 
no historian would venture to argue that either the folk festival of Shrovetide, the centerpiece of 
The Barber, or the lavish New Year celebration in Carnival Night are accurate representations of 
their respective historical periods. The carnivalesque festivity of Socialist Realism is replaced in 
The Barber by another type of carnivalesque festivity; as one aesthetic is substituted for the 
other, a certain Soviet-post-Soviet cultural continuum emerges as the Socialist Realist aesthetic 
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is nostalgically lingered upon in Moscow Parade and then exchanged for another one with 
strikingly similar conditions of visuality and representational goals, in The Barber. 
Mikhalkov’s visual version of pre-revolutionary Russia most resembles the nostalgically 
glossed-over version of Russia as it appears in paintings of Boris Kustodiiev (1878-1927). 
Kustodiiev’s contribution to Russian art is popularly known as “Kustodiiev’s Russia” 
(kustodiievskaia Rossiia), a rubric for his series of portraits and landscapes of a peculiar, 
nostalgic festivity. Russian art historians generally assess Kustodiiev’s art, rediscovered in the 
late 1980s, as utopian,96 noting the discrepancy between “real” life in pre-revolutionary Russia 
and Kustodiiev’s representation thereof. Kustodiiev’s paintings, for the critics, are naturalist 
reflections of people’s dreams about happy fulfilling life.97 
Kustodiiev described his artistic method as follows: “I never paint from life, my paintings 
are a fruit of my imagination, of my fantasy. They are called “naturalist” only because 
[stylistically] they produce an impression of real life, which, however, I have never seen and 
which never existed.”98 Kustodiiev’s apologetic remark reveals that the mimetic illusion is 
perhaps too successful in his paintings, the excess of staged festivity concealing the non-
naturalist elements like flattened perspective, too-clearly-shaped objects and too-bright colors. 
This was why Soviet art critics initially eagerly accepted Kustodiiev’s unmistakably 
modernist art, dealing, thematically and stylistically, with the mythological representation of 
Russian culture. Though only one Kustodiiev’s painting, Bolshevik (1920), can fit the thematic 
mold of revolutionary art, his “Festivals” series too was in line with the mythmaking machine of 
the nascent Socialist Realist project. The ease with which Kustodiiev’s modernist panoramic 
                                                
96 See N. Dokuchaieva, “Kustodiiev I Russkaia Narodnaia Utopia”, in Iskusstvo, 1985, # 12, 59-67. 
97 Interestingly, this opinion carries over from Soviet to post-Soviet art historians: Mark Etkind (Mark Etkind, Boris 
Kustodiev: paintings, graphic works, book illustrations, theatrical designs (Leningrad, Avrora, 1983)) and V. 
Kruglov (V. Kruglov, Kustodiiev (Moskva: Zolotoi Vek, 2007)) express very similar opinions. 
98 S.P. Ostanina, Entsiklopediia Naturmorta (Moscow, OLMA-Press, 2002), 137. 
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“dreamscapes” were accepted as a reflection of Russian tradition attests not only to Boris 
Groys’s observation about the inherently modernist nature of Socialist Realist project,99 but also 
to the conceptual interconnectedness of modernist visual mythmaking, Socialist Realism, and the 
lubok. 
Indeed, in a famous historical snippet, when one of Kustodiiev’s most recognizable 
pieces from the “Festivals” series, Maslenitsa (Shrovetide Festival, 1916) was considered for 
purchase by Russian Academy of Art, the arguments against the purchase called the painting a 
lubok, deeming it artistically unfit to grace the Academy’s collection. In these exact same words, 
the film critics of the late 1990s would lambast The Barber, a film that evokes not only 
Kustodiiev’s manner of arranging figures and objects in the space of a folk festival, but also the 
painter’s bright, somewhat garish color palette in staging its Shrovetide scene.100 
 
Fig. 3. Portrait of Fyodor Shalyapin (Boris Kustodiiev, 1922), detail 
                                                
99 Boris Groys proposes in his The Total Art of Stalinism that the “Stalin era satisfied the fundamental avant-garde 
demand that art cease representing life and begin transforming it by the means of a total aesthetico-political project” 
(see Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond (Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 36. Groys, then, establishes a continuity between Russian modernism and Socialist 
Realism. 
100 Consider Fig. 3 and 4. The structural element that connects the two images is, of course, the bright balloons (in 




Fig. 4. Shrovetide Festival in The Barber of Siberia 
The excess of visuality in The Barber, borrowed from the Russian lubok tradition and 
used to advance the politics of representation similar to those of Socialist Realist art, becomes a 
vehicle to ground Russian national history in a concrete, elaborately detailed, ornate space. Even 
if this space is a cinematic illusion, in it the mesmerizing ornamentality of Russian folk art 
finally meets Socialist Realist mythmaking. This is possible because the excessive visuality of 
the film allows for actualizing national history in the cinematic space. The Barber clings to a 
panoramic representation of various facets of everyday life and makes these facets look 
beautiful, thus materializing the time of Russian history in the cinematic space. This Bakhtinian 
move,101 in Hashamova’s reading, “transform[s] the small and the insignificant of everyday life 
into profound history, [therefore making] national time … concrete and localized,”102 ready to 
enter into the post-Soviet figuration of national history. 
Catherine Merridale, an historian of contemporary Russia, argues that 
                                                
101 Bakhtin’s term means a unity of spatio-temporal elements “makes narrative events concrete, makes them take on 
flesh, causes blood to flow in their veins….Thus the chronotope, functioning as the primary means for materializing 
time in space, emerges as a center for concretizing representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel. All the 
novel’s abstract elements … gravitate towards the chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood, permitting the 
imaging power of art to do its work” (Bakhtin, Mikhail. "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes 
Towards a Historical Poetics", in Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson 
and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 250). 
102 Hashamova 68. 
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Even when Communist power had gone and even as some Gulag camps were turning into 
tourist destinations, the old Soviet mentality …, Soviet language … and Soviet 
expectations of the future … thrived within people's minds. There was never a decisive 
turn away from these values and nothing has emerged since that competes with them. 
Stalin's ghost still walks, in other words, and, though it is easy to condemn the Kremlin's 
new occupants for invoking it in their pursuit of power and wealth, the strategy could 
work only because a large proportion of Russia's people was ready to welcome the old 
villain home with open arms.103 
It is not Stalin per se, but what he stands for in the cultural memory, that becomes the 
structuring metaphor of post-Soviet nostalgia for a utopian vision of history. The strategies of 
representation that the films discussed here employ,musealization, idealization and ornamental 
excess, reaffirm the mythic existence of the utopia by actively constructing the national past as a 
cinematic space that behaves “as if” it was genuine. It is in this “over-constructed” space, 
paradoxically, that the non-existence of “genuine” Russianness, the non-existence exposed by 
the gap in national history that the end of the Soviet state created, can be happily forgotten for 
the duration of the cinematic illusion. 
 
                                                





The Future-in-the-past: Post-Soviet Dystopia. 
Situating Post-Soviet Dystopia 
The “overconstruction” of the past at work in post-Soviet film is, as we have seen, 
a function of post-Soviet nostalgia. In this chapter, I will trace the post-Soviet treatment 
of another historical category, the future. The starting point of my argument is that the 
historical future, a source of Soviet utopian fantasies, is seemingly (and expectedly) 
deconstructed in post-Soviet texts as the Soviet teleological model of history falls apart in 
the 1990s. The scarce visions of the future of Russia produced in the 1990s and beyond 
attest to the shift in the mode of imagining the future from utopian to dystopian. Yet, the 
nostalgic memory of Soviet utopia makes post-Soviet texts craft extremely ambivalent 
fantasies of the future of Russia, creating textual sites that metaphorize the tension 
between the “good” and the “bad” parts of the Soviet legacy characteristic of the post-
Soviet imagination. Nostalgia for the illusionary stability of the Soviet state counteracts 
the horrors of totalitarianism in post-Soviet dystopias: metaphorizing the workings of the 
Soviet state, these texts imagine places where the totalitarian regimes violently punish 
transgression (as they should), but also, unexpectedly, offer symbolic (and magical) 
protection to the subjects within the dystopian milieus. 
Two major dystopian post-Soviet texts, Tatiana Tolstaia’s 2001 novel, The Slynx, 
and Vladimir Sorokin’s The Day of the Oprichnik (2006), are both set in the future, after 
a more or less apocalyptic event. In The Slynx, the dystopian premise is the nuclear Blast 
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‘After’ History in Tatiana Tolstaia’s The Slynx”. In The Other Animals: Beyond the Human in Russian 




that produces a range of genetic mutations, while in The Day of the Oprichnik it is the 
restoration of authoritarian monarchy in Russia, accompanied by rapid globalization, that 
radically reshape society. Both Tolstaia and Sorokin’s novels describe totalitarian 
societies where the secret police reigns supreme, and thus at first glance conform to the 
classic model of dystopia that has become a staple of European and American literatures 
in the 20th century. However, upon closer look, a very important difference becomes 
apparent: though the texts claim to be set in the future, just like the classic dystopias of 
George Orwell and Aldous Huxley, this future turns out to be modeled on recognizable 
periods or episodes of the Russian national past. In The Slynx, Russian society after the 
Blast is thrown back to feudalism; in The Day of the Oprichnik, the new Tsar of Russia 
reinstalls the viciously violent Secret Police of Ivan the Terrible, the oprichnina, as the 
all-controlling state institution. These dystopias seem to relive the national past; yet, in an 
interview, Sorokin offered a revealing comment on The Day of the Oprichnik, claiming 
that it is "of course a book about the present."2 
Are post-Soviet dystopias “about” the past, the present, or the future, then? Why 
should the cautionary tales of the future coming out of post-Soviet Russia be so utterly 
non-futuristic? Where does the compulsion to repeat history come from? In this chapter, I 
will attempt to trace the reasons for this unlikely conceptualization of what the future 
should not be. I will read three representative dystopias from the early 1990s to the mid-
2000s, examining the mechanisms and sources of post-apocalyptic chronotopes of post-
Soviet dystopias. In order to explore why post-Soviet dystopias recreate the past rather 
than conventionally construct the future, I will start by building up on the argument put 
                                                
2“’Russia Is Slipping Back into an Authoritarian Empire’: Spiegel Interview with Author Vladimir Sorokin, 
Spiegel”, trans. Christopher Sultan, in Spiegel, Feb 2, 2007. 
< http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,463860,00.html>, accessed Jun 10, 2009. 
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forward by Mikhail Epstein and complemented by Dragan Kujundzič. In this argument, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union put post-Soviet culture in its own “post-apocalyptic” 
context, destroying the Soviet teleological model of history and the notion of a common 
national future3 with its utopian meanings. In this context, post-Soviet Russian culture 
loses not just the utopian future, but the future altogether, because it is, so to speak, 
situated “after” the ultimate point of the future, the apocalypse, on the conventional 
historical timeline. 
Is the genre of dystopia at all possible in this context? Sorokin’s “of course” refers 
to the classic convention of dystopian fiction: by moving the setting to the future, the 
dystopian text creates a textual space for social commentary that is conceptually safe 
from allegations of being a social critique of contemporary society, because, after all, 
what is being critiqued is not the sociopolitical milieu contemporary to the text, but a 
fictional society of the future. The utopian sentiment, then, is constitutive of the very 
genre of dystopia, because the existence of the genre is predicated on the idea that there 
can be a textual space (conceptualized as a temporal category, the future) that will be 
politically safe enough so that the much-needed social critique can be provided from it. 
Though the concealed utopian sentiment is the implicit premise of dystopian 
fiction, the Soviet Union was no place for dystopia: the scarce texts that portray 
dystopian societies either predate Socialist Realism (Yevgenii Zamyatin’s We, 1920) or 
are associated with Socialist science fiction (most notably, Arkadii and Boris 
Strugatskii’s Prisoners of Power, 1969), which uses a dystopian society as a counterpoint 
to the utopian Communist society of the future (which is the primary subject of its scope). 
                                                
3 As shown by Epstein 1995 and Dragan Kujundzič “After: Russian Post-Colonial Identity”. MLN, Vol. 
115, # 5, Comparative Literature Issue. (Dec., 2000), 892-908. 
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It was only in 1986 that an explicitly dystopian text, Vladimir Voinovich’s Moscow 2042, 
was published outside of Russia. The absence of dystopia from “mainstream” Soviet 
literature was the result of the tightly controlled Soviet literary production on the one 
hand, and of the utopian nature of Socialist Realism,4 on the other. The post-Soviet 
dystopia, then, should theoretically find itself in the opposition to utopian, perennially 
optimistic implications of the Socialist Realist method. The Socialist Realist maxim to 
represent “reality in its revolutionary development”5, proclaimed by Maksim Gor’kii at 
the All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, opened, perhaps unexpectedly for 
itself, a textual space for utopian fantasies by constructing an implicitly anti-mimetic and 
teleological representational modality. 
Interestingly, the ideological collapse of the 1991 did not bring about an 
explosion of dystopian texts as a straightforward reaction to Soviet cheerful utopianism. 
1990s saw chernukha instead: the genre where, in the words of Eliot Borenstein, 
everyone “lived unhappily ever after,”6 preoccupied with the country’s gloomy, dreary 
present. Yet, in the 2000s, critics note, “there appeared, before our own eyes, a whole 
stream of literature, where the authorial imagination is focused on the immediate future 
of Russian society, primarily – the political aspects of this future.”7 The reason for the 
                                                
4 For a discussion of Socialist Realism’s utopian nature, see the Introduction to Clark 1981; for a very 
thorough discussion of the aesthetic implications of Socialist realism’s “methodology”, see Part 1 of: Robin 
1992. 
5 For a discussion of the implications of this maxim for the realist method, see Brandon Taylor, “Socialist 
Realism: “To depict reality in its revolutionary development”, in Adventures in Realism,  Ed. Matthew 
Beaumont (Hoboken, NJ, Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 142-157. 
6 Borenstein 2008, 7. 
7 See Aleksandr Tchantsev, “Fabrika antiutopii: distopicheskii diskurs v rossiiskoi literature serediny 2000-
kh”, in Novoie Literaturnoie Obozreniie, 2007, No. 86. Online version, 
<http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2007/86/>, accessed Jun 10, 2009. “Буквально на наших глазах возник 
целый поток литературы, в которой областью авторского вымысла становится близкое будущее 
российского общества, преимущественно – политические аспекты этого будущего”. Tchantsev cites 
Dmitry Bykov’s Evakuator (2005), Sergei Dorenko’s 2008 (2005), Ol’ga Slavnikova’s 2017 (2006) and 
several other novels among texts that exhibit this “tendency”. Tchantsev suggests that, while on the surface 
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“gap” in the post-Soviet attempts to imagine the future is that the representation of a 
more or less totalitarian society and setting in the future constitute the dystopian genre. 
However, in the 1990s, representations of a totalitarian society in the future could hardly 
be cautionary tales for post-Soviet Russian culture. Totalitarianism in the post-Soviet 
context was not of the future but of the past, associated with the Soviet state that ceased 
to exist in 1991. 
Yet, the visions of the future were brewing in post-Soviet culture of the 1990s, 
hidden in the midst of the representations of the country’s tumultuous present. Viktor 
Pelevin’s 1999 novel Generation P makes an ironic prediction about the immediate 
future of Russia: 
The first point that must be taken into consideration, is that the situation that 
exists at the present moment in Russia cannot continue for very long. In the very 
near future we must expect … the collapse of the financial system and serious 
social upheavals, which will all inevitably end in the establishment of a military 
dictatorship. Regardless of its political and economic programme, the future 
dictatorship will attempt to exploit nationalistic slogans: the dominant state 
aesthetic will be the pseudo-Slavonic style. (This term is not used here in any 
negative judgmental sense: as distinct from the Slavonic style, which does not 
exist anywhere in the real world, the pseudo-Slavonic style represents a carefully 
structured paradigm).8 
                                                                                                                                            
the texts in question preserve the dystopian mode of a cautionary tale and are “directed into the future”, 
they nevertheless deal with the 
8 The English text is cited from Andrew Bromfield’s translation: Viktor Pelevin, Babylon (London, Faber 
and Faber, 2000), online version at <http://lib.rin.ru/doc/i/26414p.html>, accessed March 1, 2009. The 
Russian text is cited from Viktor Pelevin, Pokoleniie P, online version at <http://pelevin.nov.ru/romans/pe-
genp/>, accessed March 1, 2009. “Необходимо в первую очередь учитывать… что ситуация, которая 
сложилась к настоящему моменту в России, долго существовать не может. В ближайшем будущем 
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Pelevin’s protagonist, Tatarskii, proposes that the ideology that is supposed to 
replace the current ideological disarray of the 1990s will support itself on the semiotic 
system that it itself will consciously construct, the “pseudo-Slavonic style” 
(“lozhnoslavianskii stil’”). As we have seen in Chapter 2, Tatarskii was correct – in the 
late 1990s, the ornamentalized national past, the foundation of the emergent nationalist 
ideology, emerged from the pseudo-folkloric aesthetics of the lubok that anchored the 
post-Soviet reality in the illusory legibility of the Russian pseudo-folklore. 
Tatarskii makes it a point to not use the term as any sort of value judgment: it is 
precisely because he makes this a point that the attribute “lozhnyi” (fake) stands out. 
While Tatarskii could have possibly used a much more neutral term “pseudo,” 
psevdoslavianskii (which Andrew Bromfield’s translation does), he uses the negatively 
connoted “lozhno.” It is this “wickedness” of the simulacrum that is picked up by the 
post-Soviet fantasies of the future that use this artificial cultural repository in constructing 
their dystopian milieus. 
The dystopias that will be examined in this chapter know very well that the 
symbolic system associated with the Russian national past (which they utilize for 
constructing the future) does not quite “work,” yet they still enjoy using it. The source of 
this enjoyment is the possibility of semiosis, meaning-production, at the core of this 
symbolic system. The effortless production of meaning was, as we have seen, one of the 
losses post-Soviet culture experienced in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. 
                                                                                                                                            
следует ожидать … финансового краха и серьезных социальных потрясений, что неизбежно 
закончится установлением военной диктатуры. Вне зависимости от своей политической и 
экономической программы будущая диктатура попытается обратиться к националистическим 
лозунгам; господствующей государственной эстетикой станет ложнославянский стиль. (Этот 
термин употребляется нами не в негативно-оценочном смысле. В отличие от славянского стиля, 




Pelevin’s cautionary episode elucidates the fetishistic, and nostalgic, longing for the 
possibility of semiosis that the simulacra of the national past provide. Post-Soviet visions 
of the future dwell on these simulacra of the past because they seek to rediscover the 
country’s future that was, too, lost with the end of Socialism. It is not surprising, then, 
that post-Soviet dystopias turn to the past, the time when the future was still possible, to 
rediscover the utopia within the post-Soviet pessimistic vision of national history. 
Viktor Pelevin’s Bulldozer Driver’s Day: A Parallel Reality 
An early post-Soviet text that attempts a dystopian representation of society 
launches a trend in post-Soviet dystopias that deal with post-apocalyptic ahistoricity and 
irrationality of existence. The 1991 novella by Viktor Pelevin, who was then yet to 
emerge as the major figure of the Russian brand of postmodernism, is titled Bulldozer 
Driver’s Day. The novella portrays a day in the life of Ivan, a factory worker, who wakes 
up one morning and realizes he has forgotten everything that is really important about his 
life. Together with Ivan, the reader rediscovers his world, a bleak urban milieu evocative 
of the chernukha genre that on many levels is a hyperbole of a Soviet state. We learn that 
Ivan works at a secret factory that produces weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but 
officially is known to produce plush toys. It is at this factory that Ivan was hit on the head 
with an A-bomb stabilizer, whereby his amnesia is conveniently attributed to a head 
trauma. We discover that everyone in the city is working at a WMD factory, of which 
there are several; that everyone drinks; and that many people of the city are mutants 
because of nuclear radiation. The city is extremely isolated and has been so since the 
apocalyptic event, the Revolution. We learn that the three revolutionary leaders, 
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caricatures of the Soviet trinity of Marx-Engels-Lenin, prohibited entering and exiting the 
city in their first decree. 
The milieu Pelevin describes is a satire of the Soviet state, with the easily 
recognizable proliferation of slogans, scarcity of consumer goods and the familiar 
archenemies who are encouraged, in a drunken conversation, to “[jerk off] in their 
skyscrapers.”9 However, this is not just a satire of the Soviet material culture; it is also 
the satire of the Soviet temporality of the eternal present discussed in Chapter 2. Here, a 
parallel is drawn between this narrative temporality, and the post-apocalyptic “after”: 
Ivan’s head trauma and his amnesia affect the subjective third-person narration in a 
peculiar way. Ivan’s constant struggle to remember anything about his former self 
produces narrative stops during which Ivan muses on his feelings. As Ivan and his friends 
aimlessly wander the city, the narrative unfolds with no sense of progression. The effect 
is emphasized when the reader learns about the extreme predictability of existence in the 
city: in one episode, it is revealed that everyone in the city knows the exact time of the 
day when vodka shortages are to begin in the city’s stores. In the post-apocalyptic milieu, 
in the raw “after history,” historical time does not move forward. 
The rest of the story follows Ivan becoming more and more dissatisfied with his 
life as he learns more about it; he understands eventually that his feelings did not betray 
him – he remembers, through a complex phonetic association, that he is, in fact, a foreign 
spy. The details of his mission are unclear, and the story ends with him walking towards a 
                                                
9 The English text is cited from Viktor Pelevin, “Bulldozer Driver’s Day”, in Viktor Pelevin, A Werewolf 
Problem in Central Russia, trans. Andrew Bromfield (New York, New Directions, 1998), 126-158, 130. As 
mentioned below, expletives in the text are modeled on Soviet ideological clichés “Ну что, вымпелюги 
майские, схавали в своих небоскребах?” The expletive here is formed by adding a derogatory suffix to 
the root for vympel, “pennant”, a common Soviet symbol of labor achievement and/or winning a 
productivity competition displayed at the factories. The Russian text is quoted from: Viktor Pelevin, Den’ 
Buldozerista, online version at <http://pelevin.nov.ru/pov/pe-buld/1.html>, accessed January 30, 2009. 
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railway station. While the reader is not sure whether Ivan will ever leave the city, there is 
still some hope that he would be able to, because he finally knows who he is. 
The story bears most of the marks of a classic dystopian text, featuring a society 
with an unmistakable totalitarian feel. Furthermore, the story concentrates on the 
everyday practices that are, to the reader, monstrously distorted; yet the people inhabiting 
the society are oblivious to these distortions. Moreover, the story provides a sharp 
political and cultural commentary on Soviet society. However, the text lacks one of the 
most important explicit markers of a classic dystopian text, that is, any reference to it 
being set in the future. Therefore, the story does not explicitly create a “safe place” from 
which it can provide a social critique of the society contemporary to itself. Instead, 
having been written during the last years of the perestroika, the story critiques what at the 
time of its creation is still supposed to be a utopian present, or, rather, what is rapidly 
becoming a “dystopian past.”10 
Pelevin’s dystopian subjects inhabit a peculiar, ahistorical temporality, which, 
paradoxically, becomes that “safe place” from which the story can provide its social 
critique. Such temporality owes its existence to Socialist Realism. Dealing with “reality 
in its revolutionary development,” Socialist Realist texts adopted an implicitly futuristic 
modality of representation in their utopian conceptualization of reality. 
Interestingly, on the level of narratives, Socialist Realism did not produce any 
futuristic tales where Communism has already come, with the exception of Socialist 
                                                
10 The unexpectedly optimistic outcome of the plot seems to attest to this: by examining the hopelessness of 
the Soviet existence and providing a way out of it, the story is representative of the general feeling of 
hopefulness that was associated with relative cultural and economic openness of the late-Soviet society 
during perestroika. Furthermore, the plot expresses a common perestroika sentiment that associates the 
West with hopes for democracy and freedom, sociopolitical notions that, at least among Russian liberals, 
were meant to undo the “totalitarian” legacy of the Soviet state. 
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science fiction.11 Instead, this utopian impulse produced a perhaps unanticipated effect on 
the nature of narrative temporality in Socialist Realist texts that, in Katerina Clark’s 
words, are set in the mythic Great Time.12 Clark explains that the messianic societies like 
the Soviet Union under Stalin locate their Great Time, a source of transcendent reality, in 
the past and the future. In Socialist Realism, the Great Time is the reality that “should 
be,” that is, the “Communist reality.” Importantly, this reality is located “after” the 
advent of Communism on the historical timeline, that is, after the ultimate point in the 
Marxist vision of the historical process. Thus, the narrative temporality of the Socialist 
Realist texts halts historical time.13 Socialist Realist novels nearly uniformly produce the 
impression of being set in the never-ending present (at times, paradoxically, like Valentin 
Kataev’s Time, Forward (1932) where one day does not seem to end); however, this 
never-ending present is exactly what the post-historic Communist future should 
theoretically feel like. 
So, the ahistoric narrative temporality of Pelevin’s story, with no real sense of 
progression, is, however satiric its incarnation, a temporality common to Socialist Realist 
texts. Pelevin, then, satirizes and thus subverts one of Socialist Realism’s own methods, 
working against the non-progression of historical time by emphasizing its effect on the 
characters. In other words, the utopian Communist society turns in the text into a 
dystopian one not only because of the shift in cultural attitude towards social mechanisms 
of the Socialist state during the perestroika. There seems to be another shift underway in 
the late-Soviet culture: the utopian eternal present of Socialist Realism becomes a 
dystopian temporality as the positive (utopian) value attached to it is reversed. The 
                                                
11 For more on Socialist science fiction and its alignment with Socialist realist principles, see the Chapter 4. 
12 Clark 39-40. 
13 Katerina Clark considers this utopian temporality in: Clark 1981, 36. 
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utopian stability of the Soviet state becomes a stability of absence in Pelevin’s story: it is 
the absence of vodka in the stores that firmly structures the certainty with which the 
city’s inhabitants face the next day. 
How exactly does Pelevin’s text manage to create a satire of the eternal present? 
The appeal of the past as a cultural repository for conceptualizing the future lies not only 
in the post-Soviet inversion of historical temporality as theorized by Mikhail Epstein. 
This appeal also comes from the extrapolation that joins the past as an historical category 
yet to be defined, to the genres associated with this past, and the peculiar way of semiosis 
that these genres provide. While in Socialist Realism the underlying ideology implicitly 
ensured that the narrative temporality is devoid of flow of (historical) time, Pelevin’s text 
turns to folklore. The folkloric treatment of historical time is, paradoxically, very similar 
to that of Socialist Realism; while Socialist Realism, to an extent, denies history, folklore 
is yet unaware of it. 
A very important feature of Pelevin’s dystopian milieu is that it is permeated with 
oral culture with unmistakable roots in Russian folklore. Thus, the protagonist’s best 
friend, Valerka, aspires to achieve the rank of “People’s Nightingale.” The rank is a satire 
of various Soviet awards, and in this case, the award reflects the person’s ability to curse 
poetically.14 In Pelevin’s satirized Soviet society, “cursing” means faithfully recreating 
the party slogans and clichés of Communist discourse, adding derogative suffixes. The 
Soviet clichés are then compiled into a flow of nearly meaningless yet exceptionally 
                                                
14 This ability, too, is a satire of the value that Russian culture places on one of the performative aspects of 
the traditionally conceived masculinity, for which the creative use of Russian obscene language, the mat, is 
arguably elevated to the level of art For a discussion of Russian mat in conjunction with masculinity, see 
Vadim Mikhailin, "Russian Army Mat as a Code System Controlling Behaviour in the Russian army". The 
Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies 2004 (1), <http://www.pipss.org/index93.html> 
Accessed Jun 10, 2009. 
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emotional speech, teeming with phrases like “five Stakhanovs [Soviet labor hero. – DK] 
up your exchange of experience” and “shove the weak link up your Rot-Front and a 
superstructure in behind.”15 
Additionally, the party secretary in Bulldozer Driver’s Day is able to “tune in his 
mind for the faultless exposition of the party line,”16 thus finding common ground with 
the workers by appealing to the people’s folk “roots.” The party secretary adopts a 
specific “mode,” achieved by series of breathing exercises, upon which he is able to 
speak in what sounds like a vaguely comprehensible Slavic dialect, full of parallel 
constructions, repetitions and mildly offensive references to mysterious entities. The 
meaningless words combine,17 the in party secretary’s speech, into phrases that due to 
their repetitive syntax sound like incantations. 
The reasons why the performativity associated with oral genres permeates 
Pelevin’s satire of a Soviet utopia can be found in the Alexei Yurchak’s18 discussion of 
late-Soviet loss of the language’s constative dimension, i.e. the ability of signifiers to be 
unquestionably and “naturally” attached to their signifieds. This radical break between 
the signifier and the signified, a function of the endless repetition of the official discourse 
that had little to no relation to experiential reality, in the end made sustaining the 
ideological illusion impossible. 
What is left of a language that is, according to Yurchak, stripped of its constative 
element? If this is, indeed, pure performance, then a turn to genres that have the 
                                                
15 Pelevin 1998, 140. 
16 Pelevin 1998, 143. 
17 Through prefixation and suffixation. 
18 See Yurchak 2006, 21-26. 
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performative element of language at their core, namely, to folklore, becomes less 
surprising. 
Folklore’s expressive nature, tied to the beliefs in the power of language that 
assigns magic properties to words, plays into the project of “dystopianizing” the eternal 
present of the Soviet history. Russian folklore is a vast body of texts that, as we will see, 
will continue to serve, for the post-Soviet dystopia, as a symbolic and paradigmatic 
source of the post-apocalyptic temporality. Folkloric time, pre-national and pre-historical, 
is “timeless” time, and thus is metonymically related to both the Soviet “national time” of 
the never-ending present, and to its direct heir, the post-Soviet suspended temporality of 
Epstein’s “after the future.” 
Furthermore, the peculiarities of language in folklore, as it seems, answer the 
concerns that late-Soviet and early post-Soviet culture experiences in relation to the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified. In a perverse twist on the Russian 
logocentric paradigm of culture, post-Soviet dystopia picks up on one of folklore’s most 
salient features,19 namely, the spoken word being assigned magical properties. The 
language of folklore exerts control over the world not by the means characteristic of 
modernity, i.e., by active interpretation of meaning (a failed attempt in the case of 
compromised Soviet discourse, as Yurchak showed), but instead by an extension of 
Althusserian interpellation, where the signifier becomes equivalent to its signified. 
                                                
19 Bronislaw Malinowski, for example, in his Coral Gardens, discusses magical language’s pragmatic 
aspects; when words equal acts, Malinowski argues, the outcome is far from being just imaginary.  Instead, 
magical formulae, like Sorokin’s “incantation” against the grim future happening, are meant to instill 
individuals with hope, make them feel they are actively shaping their futures and are, in a way, in control of 
their fate, all of which are relevant social and cultural concerns in the post-Soviet context. For 
Malinowski’s pragmatic theory of magical language, see Bronislaw Malinowski, Collected Works, Vol. 
VIII: Coral Gardens and their Magic (London and New York, Routledge, 2001),esp. 50-54.  
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Magical thinking, as theorized by structuralist anthropology,20 posits symbols as 
complete equivalents of their referents. It is via this perverse reconnection, paradoxically, 
that the equally perverse gap between the signifier and the signified that the Soviet 
authoritative discourse produced can be closed. The return to folklore (folklorism), then, 
can be deemed a defense mechanism, however dysfunctional and problematic, against the 
late-Soviet disintegration of the definitive system of signification, i.e., the Soviet master 
narrative. 
Tatiana Tolstaia’s The Slynx: The Future of Nostalgia. 
An ahistoric temporality with no sense of progression, similar to the one Pelevin 
associates with the Soviet eternal present in Bulldozer Driver’s Day, operates in Tatiana 
Tolstaia’s 2001 novel, The Slynx (Kys’). The novel was written over a period of more 
than ten years, and thus arguably exhibits the late-Soviet sentiment characteristic of 
perestroika that we have seen shaping Pelevin’s 1991 novella. The novel deconstructs the 
very notion of functional history, focusing on creating the feel of a post-apocalyptic 
temporality. In the novel, the post-historic (and post-apocalyptic), never-ending present 
becomes the only possible temporality after the movement of history has stopped. 
The Slynx is a variation on the philosophical novel about the fate of Russia: thus 
its obvious references to Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Possessed; nearly direct quotations 
from Nikolai Gogol’s The Dead Souls (“And they come closer and closer and the clatter 
goes louder … There’s heat and whistles …and clods of mud fly up from the runners… 
                                                
20 For the theories of magical language, see Bronislaw Malinowski, “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive 
Languages”, supplement to C K Ogden and I A Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (London, 1923), and 
M. Mauss, A general theory of magic, trans. R. Brain (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1972) 
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and then they’re gone. … [I]n the distance the dull thud of felt boots dies down;”)21 and, 
most prominently, its play with the simulacrum of “the sun of Russian literature,” 
Aleksandr Pushkin who, expectedly, comes to symbolize in the dystopian milieu of the 
novel that which does not exist anymore, namely, culture.22 However, The Slynx subverts 
the traditional messianic content of the myth of “the fate of Russia,” because unlike 
Nikolai Chernyshevskii’s bright 19th-century fantasies of a utopian Socialist future that, 
in his What Is To Be Done?, are still just the protagonist’s dreams, in The Slynx the future 
has arrived and is here to stay. 
Rather than attempting a conventionally futuristic dystopian representation of the 
fate of Russia (either by introducing “progressive” ideas or a new technology gone 
wrong), The Slynx proposes the future of Russia to be the easily recognizable intellectual 
construct of its historic past, with feudalistic social structures and pagan cosmology. The 
national space that the novel creates is a complex simulacrum of “Russia” as mediated 
through the constructs of history and culture. 
This Russia of the future in the novel is a hybrid construct: it is recognizable as 
Russia (as Tolstaia’s readers know it) because of its overwhelming bureaucracy, bleak 
everyday life and the strict control that the unchallenged state executes over its subjects. 
As I have theorized earlier, post-Soviet texts struggle with the temporal setting of a 
dystopia (Pelevin’s text did not offer any explicit indicator of being set in the future); in 
The Slynx, the bureaucracy and the bleakness of everyday life, again, refer to the legacy 
                                                
21 The English text is cited from: Tatyana Tolstaya, The Slynx, trans. Jamey Gambrell. (Boston and New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003, 36. Further quotations refer to this edition. The Russian text is 
cited from Tatiana Tolstaia, Kys’ (online version), <http://www.lib.ru/PROZA/TOLSTAYA/kys.txt> 
(accessed February 15, 2009): “А они все ближе, а топот все громче, - вот, накатило! Жар, и свист, и 
хрипло дышит шестерка, и комья  грязи из-под  полозьев... и пронеслись. Тишина. Только вдали 
затихает тупая дробь валенок”). 
22 For more on Pushkin’s role in The Slynx seeChapter 1. 
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of the Soviet past which becomes a model for the future. Thus, a circular version of 
history is created, akin to Epstein’s “temporal loop” of Russian history. The Soviet past, 
in the novel, returns to haunt the people of the future, channeling the folkloric Russia 
which, at a first glance, shapes this future exclusively. This type of “layered past” is at 
work even in those late-Soviet and post-Soviet dystopian texts which do not make heavy 
use of the “pseudo-Slavonic aesthetics” in creating their simulacra of dystopian national 
space: in Vladimir Voinovich’s Moscow 2042 (1986), the dystopian Russia of the future 
is shaped by an explicitly proclaimed blend of Stalinism and feudalist Orthodoxy. 
The Slynx, too, exhibits the simultaneous tension and similarity between the 
parodic Soviet state and the pseudo-Slavonic folkloric space it occupies. Far from being 
an explicit political satire, however, the novel is preoccupied with the exploration of the 
post-apocalyptic milieu on a very intimate level, as it delves into the consciousness of the 
post-apocalyptic subject. 
The novel is set in an ahistoric space that is, technically, the Russia of the future. 
This Russia barely exists as a state, being just another “consequence” of the event that 
structures this space: the Apocalypse (presumably, an atomic “Blast”) that paradoxically 
catalyzes the mutation of not only the human subjects inhabiting the space, but also of the 
linear progression of time. The Blast, aside from being an obvious reference to the 
Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and a conventional Cold War metaphor for the Apocalypse, 
turns out to have more “consequences” than just the genetic mutations of the characters, 
as it can provisionally be read as a metaphor for the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Multiple references to the post-Soviet nostalgia for the material cultures of Socialism 
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point to the fact that the post-apocalyptic society of The Slynx is at least partly a nostalgic 
society, mourning that which has been lost. 
While the nostalgia of the novel’s characters is, in a way, conventional, directed 
towards the lost system of signification and material culture associated with the past, the 
novel itself is nostalgic in a different way. Svetlana Boym discusses one of the 
mechanisms of nostalgia, namely, its ability to create an identifiable place for itself by 
solidification and mythologization of the national space.23 The Slynx undertakes a similar 
conceptual operation in its own textual space, through positing Russia as an imaginary 
place which is structured by a signifying system associated with pre-modern period in 
Russian history. 
The pre-modern, folkloric, magical milieu where the novel is set is an ironic 
pastiche of Russian cultural heritage. Given this fact, the issue of whether or not The 
Slynx’s turn to the past is a nostalgic move is an important one. In the novel, the past 
itself is a highly problematic category: though Russian culture of the future turns out to 
be modeled (again) on the recognizable period of the national past (or, rather, on its 
simulacrum), the experiential past, so to say, is not accessible to many of the inhabitants 
of Tolstaia’s dystopian society. The third-person subjective narration belongs to the 
young, neurotic, naïve and exceptionally honest Benedikt, a protagonist who has no 
memory of life before the Blast; thus, for him, the past hardly bears any significance. 
Other social groups in the novel, discussed below, do have the memories but are stripped 
of narrative power, which is why the novel problematizes nostalgia via diversifying the 
levels of access to memories. 
                                                
23See Boym 1995, esp. 76-80. 
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The nostalgia in The Slynx, so to say, initially has no real agency, because the 
reader is compelled to follow the protagonist as Benedikt unconsciously attempts to shed 
his primitivized, non-nostalgic self by rediscovering the lost culture, symbolized by the 
books that are banned in the post-apocalyptic Russia of the future. Benedikt’s quest for 
reading, then, exposes the inner workings of nostalgia, demonstrating that he longs for 
that of which he hardly has conscious memory and for what he can hardly call his own. 
Indeed, Benedikt’s love for books turns out to be a perverse love, because when he gains 
access to his father-in-law’s private library, it turns out that whether to read Lermontov or 
agricultural manuals makes no difference for Benedikt: he reads for the process, not for 
the ideas, as he should have been had the novel been more of a conventional 
philosophical Bildungsroman. 
Yet, even as the novel exposes the conceptual pitfall of nostalgia by questioning 
the protagonist’s right to be nostalgic, it still clings to nostalgic sentiment. This sentiment 
appears in the novel because of the inversion of historical linearity that it performs in 
creating the post-apocalyptic milieu, and consequently, because of the “identification 
split” that the reader has to undergo to be able to read the novel as dystopian. The post-
Soviet reader’s allegiance to the characters in the novel is split between the protagonist, 
whose very intimate perspective the third-person subjective narration ensures, and 
another class of the inhabitants of world of The Slynx, with whom this reader shares not 
only the memories of the past, but also an ability to conceptualize history. 
The post-apocalyptic society in which The Slynx is set is exceptionally diverse. 
This diversity is on the surface structured along the susceptibility to genetic mutation 
and/or, metaphorically, along the lines of class; on a deeper level it turns out to be more 
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determined by access to the memory of the past than by anything else. Thus, the Oldeners 
(Byvshiie) have no physical “consequences” (mutations), except for their seeming ability 
to live forever and become, in this eternal existence, the keepers of the “spiritual 
heritage” that is of interest only to them. The mutants (pererozhdentsy) have mutated 
after the Blast; many of them keep the memories of the life before the Blast, but these 
memories are limited to the clichéd recollections of worldly possessions, i.e., for them 
nostalgia becomes precisely the cultural fetishism that Boym theorizes to be a major post-
Soviet nostalgic mechanism. Finally, golubchiki, the common folk, constitute the 
majority of the population, and the narrator is one of them. They have no conscious 
memory of the life before the Blast.24 
The diversity of the population in the world of The Slynx ensures the parallel 
existence of the two discourses, one knowledgeable of the inversion of the linearity and 
another oblivious to it. While Byvshiie, the Oldeners, are the carriers of the former, the 
narratorial power (to the extent that the third person narration allows for it) is given to the 
carrier of the latter. Benedikt measures time through a subjective distinction between 
childhood and adulthood, and up to a certain point his own life’s milestones are the death 
of his mother, his “nervous breakdowns” and his marriage. While the Byvshiie struggle 
with the past and the future having exchanged places, which is quite possible to conceive 
of on the conceptual level, but creates only aporias being put into words (“It will come, 
everything will come [Budet, vsio budet]! The most important thing is to preserve our 
                                                
24 Interestingly enough, nobody seems to have an actual memory of the Blast itself, which proves our initial 
assumption of the Blast being the moment of trauma. 
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spiritual heritage!”25, Benedikt is in some ways luckier, as his subjective time is folkloric 
in a sense that it is not organized into historical temporal categories. 
The reader, then, is forced to look at the dystopian Russia through the eyes of 
Benedikt the narrator, whose ahistoric and atemporal position shapes the perception of 
the post-historic temporality of the novel. The reader is invited to experience this 
temporality on a very intimate emotional level through identification with the narrator. 
On the other hand the identification on the intellectual level happens not with Benedikt, 
but with the Oldeners, who are easily recognizable as Russian intellectuals because of the 
discursive patterns they employ and because of the constant attention they pay to the 
issues of culture. So, together with the Oldeners, the reader feels the effect of a “temporal 
loop” that history has made in the world of The Slynx. 
Benedikt’s narratorial power, however, ensures that the temporality that he 
unquestionably inhabits diminishes the effect of the “temporal loop” of which the 
Oldeners are aware. The reader, therefore, is nearly lured on the emotional level into 
sharing the timeless temporality with the protagonist/narrator. Thus, instead of being 
presented with the conceptual, highly abstract and intellectualized “after-history” (as it 
emerges in post-Soviet theorizations of Epstein and Dragan Kujundzič26), Tolstaia’s 
Russian reader gets the “after-history” in the raw, with little to no intellectualization. The 
narrator does not knowingly or consciously contribute to the readers’ discovery of the 
fact that “history” used to exist in Tolstaia’s dystopian milieu. 
                                                
25 Tolstaya 111. “Будет, все будет! Главное же - сберечь духовное наследие!” 
26 Consider the level of abstraction in Kujundzič’s musing in his "After": Russian Post-Colonial Identity: 
“Russia is after history in a sense that it is "outside history, before history occurred, in the realm where the 
temporality of the World History has not even happened: in the realm of Messianic promise that will alone 
hurl Russia towards the historical, its full teleological fulfillment, 'after' it and beyond”. (See Dragan 
Kujundzič, Dragan. “After: Russian Post-Colonial Identity”. MLN, Vol. 115, # 5, Comparative Literature 
Issue. (Dec., 2000), 892-908, 892). 
154 
 
The genuine “after” that Benedikt’s perspective provides turns out to have limited 
and distorted connections to the “before” with which the Oldeners are preoccupied. 
While the two have to be connected on some level (the existence of one is determined by 
the presence of another), the “after” that Benedikt represents is simultaneously dependent 
on the “before” and voiding it, denying its significance, having never known the 
“before.” Paradoxically, given the amount of attention the text pays to the views of the 
Oldeners, and thus to the “before,” the “after” seems to be the temporality in which the 
text is really interested: by making the character who has no memory of the pre-
Apocalypse narrate the text, it is as if the novel wants to make sure that the reader forgets 
the “before.” And to facilitate forgetting, it employs the mind-numbing narrative 
techniques of retardation and parallel constructions, not uncommon in the folkloric large 
form: 
Aye, aye, aye, but we poor small folk have to stand on our porches at night, 
inhaling the freezing darkness, exhaling a slightly warmer darkness. We stomp 
our feet, turn our faces to the distant heavenly Spindle, listen to tears tinkling like 
frozen peas, rolling into the thickets of our beards, we listen to the silence of the 
black izbas [peasant huts. – DK] on black foothills, the creak of high trees, to the 
whine of the blizzard, which brings in gusts – barely audible, but still clear – of a 
distant, pitiful, hungry northern wail.27 
                                                
27 Tolstaya 60.“Ох-ти, охтеньки, а нам, малым да сирым, в ночи на крыльце стоять, вдыхать 
морозную тьму, выдыхать тьму чуть теплую, переступать с ноги на ногу, задирать личико к 
далекому небесному Веретену, слушать, как слезы мороженым горошком шуршат, скатываются в 
заросли бороды, слушать, как молчат черные избы на черных пригорках, как поскрипывают 
высокие деревья, как ноет метельный ветер, как доносит порывами, - чуть слышно, но явственно, - 
далекий, жалобный, северный голодный вой”. 
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What goes on in this paragraph is hardly distinguishable behind the 
conglomerations of parallel constructions, a traumatic repetition where the meaning is 
lost in the fissures between the words and the text fails to be identified as anything but a 
repetition of constructed “Russianness” by the virtue of its recognizable folkloric roots. 
So, in The Slynx, too, we see “pseudo-Slavonic” aesthetics and ritualistic 
repetition put to use for creating the dystopian milieu. To see how these fit into the 
novel’s reconceptualization of historical temporality, we will need to look at the role that 
language plays in Tolstaia’s dystopian milieu and what transformations the very notion of 
language undergoes therein. 
Nearly every scholar of Tolstaia has noted The Slynx’s focus on logocentrism as 
one of the essential features of the Russian culture.28 The ways the novel approaches 
Russian logocentrism (and deconstructs it) elucidates why “pseudo-Slavonic aesthetics” 
and genres associated with it become such a productive cultural repository for the post-
Soviet dystopia; they provide conceptual mechanisms that reflect on the shift in 
conceiving historical temporality in the post-Soviet context. 
Tolstaia’s Russia of the future is surprisingly logocentric, but the dystopian 
premise of the novel ensures that this logocentrism is a pastiche of itself. Mikhail Epstein 
argues that postmodernism in Russia is about “a parodic unmasking of centuries of 
logocentrism in Russian culture, of captivity to the word and the ideological principle.”29 
“The captivity to the word” that the world of The Slynx manifests speaks to Epstein’s 
                                                
28 A succinct characteristic of Tolstaia’s love-hate relationship with logocentrism in The Slynx is given in 
Mark Lipovetskii, “PMS (Post-Modernism Segodnia)”, in Znamya, 2002, No. 5. Online version at 
<http://magazines.russ.ru/znamia/2002/5/lipov.html>, accessed February 12, 2009. 
29 Epstein 1995, 328. 
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observation very well. Nearly every golubchik is an avid reader, even if Brandis’ (sic) 
trigonometric charts are among their favorites.30 
However compromised logocentrism thus might be in The Slynx, it is not denied 
its power either over the characters or over the text itself. The Slynx is structured around 
the Old Russian alphabet, as reflected in the chapter titles, which makes it possible to 
read it as a Bildungsroman that narrates the story of the acquisition of knowledge.31 
Yet, Russian logocentrism in the novel is not without its dangers: on the level of 
the plot, persecution awaits those who possess the “old-print” (i.e., pre-Blast) books. 
Furthermore, Benedikt’s developing passion for reading does not bring him much besides 
moral anguish, as he ends up killing for reading, as if reading were a narcotic. The book 
in the world of The Slynx is indeed comparable to a mind-altering substance, as it 
acquires magical qualities and is personified: 
You, Book! You are the only one who won’t deceive, won’t attack, won’t 
abandon! You’re quiet – but you laugh, shout and sing; you’re obedient – but you 
amaze, tease and entice; … Nothing but a handful of letters, that’s all, but if you 
feel like it, you can turn heads, confuse, spin, cloud, make tears spring to the eyes, 
take away the breath… Sometimes a kind of wordless feeling tosses and turns in 
the chest, pounds its fists on the wall… I’m suffocating! Let me out!... What 
words can you dress it in? We don’t have any words, we don’t know! Just like 
wild animals, or a blindlie bird, or a mermaid – no words, just a bellowing. 
                                                
30 Interestingly, the reading preferences of the Russians of the future have an unmistakable postmodern 
quality, as the texts of all sorts have equal value (and, by the same token, no value at all). 
31 This reading is reinforced by the name of the main character, alluding to Spinosa, and by his heritage (his 
mother is an antelegent, a bastardized spelling of intelligent, an intellectual). 
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[italics mine. – DK] But you open a book – and there they are, fabulous, flying 
words.32 
The novel’s problematic treatment of logocentrism, however, is best seen in the 
way it constructs post-apocalyptic reality. As per genre convention, the fantasies that the 
dystopian fiction creates require new language to describe the new social and cultural 
notions. In the world of The Slynx, a range of neologisms is introduced to name the 
mutated flora and fauna (chervyr’ the maggot, vertizubka the fish, slepovran the blind 
raven, bliadunitsa the pigeon, etc.). Yet, due to the fact that part of the population has 
access to the memories of life before the Blast, they possess the pre-Blast vocabulary that 
denotes both abstract notions and items of everyday material culture, which contributes to 
the effect of the “temporal loop” in the novel. Thus, a “regular” word like ‘miasorubka’ 
(meat grinder) is a complete neologism for Benedikt and the rest of the golubchiks, yet 
for the Oldeners it is a nostalgic notion. 
However, the system of designation in the novel is somewhat dysfunctional, 
which is an unexpected move for dystopian fiction that should theoretically strive to 
make its constructed world as “believable” (and thus as coherent) as possible. This, too, 
is the result of the diversity in Tolstaia’s universe. At least for the Oldeners (and thus for 
the reader, whose intellectual and/or conceptual allegiance to this group was discussed 
above), the language in the novel is seriously discredited in its ability to account for 
changed reality. 
                                                
32Tolstaya 189.“Ты, Книга! Ты одна не обманешь, не ударишь, не обидишь, не покинешь! Тихая,— а 
смеешься, кричишь, поешь; покорная,— изумляешь, дразнишь, заманиваешь; малая — а в тебе 
народы без числа; пригоршня буковок, только-то, а захочешь — вскружишь голову … дыхание 
захолонет, вся-то душа как полотно на ветру взволнуется…! А то чувство какое бессловесное в 
груди ворочается, стучит кулаками в двери…: задыхаюся! выпусти!— а как его, голое-то, 
шершавое, выпустишь? какими словами оденешь? Нет у нас слов, не знаем! Как все равно у зверя 
дикого, али у слеповрана, али русалки,— нет слов, мык один (italics mine. - DK)! А книгу раскроешь, 
— и там они, слова, дивные, летучие”.  
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To illustrate the point, consider the following exchange between the two Oldeners 
who are unable to find a proper designation for one of the Degenerators, the mutants: 
But he’s not human! Humans don’t have felt boots on their hands! – You have to 
look at it more broadly! ... We won’t argue about definitions… Who are you and 
I…? Bipeds without feathers, with articulate speech… Let me out, I’ll go and 
invite him… What is his name?33 
The problem with the definitions that the Oldeners encounter and are too eager to 
dismiss is at the core of the text's concerns about what happens to language in the 
aftermath of the destruction of culture. As the conventional dichotomy of human/non-
human fails in a world inhabited by a wide range of mutants, so do conventional 
linguistic designations. The Oldeners then have to turn to the performative aspects of the 
identities of the subjects they seek to classify: they have to consider whether the 
Degenerators wear felt boots on their hands, and, beyond the quotation above, whether 
they are fine with their fate to serve in the place of the extinct horse to transport those 
who are considered “people”). The problem here is that the linguistic milieu in which the 
characters of The Slynx function allows for a coexistence of two irreconcilable 
discourses: one subscribing to the old, conventional dichotomy between human and 
animal, and another, attempting to account for the reality that is already non-dichotomic 
(hence the terms, the Oldeners, the Degenerators and the golubchiks). The Slynx, then, 
occupies an ambivalent position towards logocentrism: on the level of the plot, it exposes 
the mutation of the (supposedly) devalued and misinterpreted concept, while on the level 
of the text’s own structure it supports the value of logocentrism. 
                                                
33Tolstaya 199. “Дак он и не человек! У человека валенок на руках нету! - Шире надо смотреть! И 
без него народ неполный! — назидал Лев Львович. - Не будем спорить о дефинициях…— Мы-то с 
вами кто… Двуногое без перьев, речь членораздельная…” 
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There seems to be two temporalities simultaneously operating within the world of 
The Slynx. The first is the subjective time of the characters, with a seemingly 
conventional position of past, present and future, which ensures the functioning of the 
novel’s subset genre, that of Bildungsroman. The second temporality is the time of 
national history, paradoxically inverted as the Russia of the future becomes the Russia of 
the past. In Epstein’s words, historical temporality is thus “turned inside out.”34 One of 
the characters, as if illustrating Epstein’s theory, laments: “Why, … why is it that 
everything keeps mutating, everything? People, well, all right, but the language, concept, 
meaning! Huh? Russia! Everything gets twisted up in knots [vsyo vyvernuto].”35  
Moreover, the individual time of the characters is not nearly as “normal” as it 
might initially seem. Though the reader is able to identify what happens to the characters 
first and what happens next, the category of historic time is not operational in the 
folkloric realm, and thus the modern distinctions of past, present and future do not hold; 
the protagonist is therefore stuck outside of historic time as known to the readers. This 
problematizes the reader’s own temporal position, and thus, along with adding to the 
dystopian feel of the novel by making the text’s temporality exceptionally alien, 
simultaneously compromises the genre convention by failing to define the reader’s 
position in relation to the temporal location of the dystopian society. 
Epstein suggests that “culture is an anti-time machine built into history.”36 Indeed, 
the end of history in The Slynx is what compromises the perceived historical linearity of 
culture by inverting it: 
                                                
34 Epstein 1995: xi. 
35Tolstaya 196.“Отчего бы это, — says Nikita Ivanich, the protagonist’s mentor, — отчего это у нас все 
мутирует, ну все! Ладно люди, но язык, понятия, смысл! А? Россия! Все вывернуто!”). 
36 Epstein 1995: xiii. 
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Moreover, friends, material culture is being restored hour by hour. The wheel has 
been reinvented, the yoke is returning to use, and the solar clock as well! We will 
soon learn to fire pottery! Isn’t that correct, friends? The time of the meat grinder 
will come. Though at present it may seem as mysterious as the secrets of the 
pyramids… as incomprehensible… as the canals of the planet Mars – the hour 
will come, friends, when it will start working!37 
Marina Balina’s “absolute pause… and the void (i.e., anti-time)”38 discussed in 
the Introduction, the halt to which the late-Soviet texts brought the time of Socialism, is 
the pause to which historical time has come in The Slynx: both Benedikt and his pre-
modern, folkloric space are suspended in time. As a traumatic and nostalgic text, The 
Slynx creates a pre-modern, ahistorical temporality which provides yet another (and 
elegant) way to manipulate the “absolute time” of the Soviet symbolic order, by attaching 
the absolute quality lost by the Soviet narrative to the timeless, folkloric time of the text. 
By moving her characters out of historical time, then, Tolstaia suggests a way out 
of the paradox of inverted historical linearity by establishing a pause in the flow of 
history, even as this pause is relegated into the future and is otherwise problematic on 
many levels. The folkloric timeless temporality of The Slynx compulsively recreates the 
Soviet temporality of never-ending present in the textual space of the novel. 
This textual space is constructed as a dystopia, and thus is “of course… about the 
present.” Being such, it becomes a textual site where the confusing vectors of post-Soviet 
                                                
37 Tolstaya 121.“Материальная культура, друзья, ежечасно восстанавливается. Вновь изобретено 
колесо, возвращается коромысло, солнечные часы! Скоро научимся обжигать горшки! Верно, 
друзья? Придет черед и мясорубки. И пусть сейчас она так же загадочна, как тайна пирамид, - стоят 
ли они еще, мы не знаем, - так же непостижна уму, как каналы Марса, - но пробьет час, друзья, и 
она заработает!” 
38 As discussed in Balina, 2000, 60. 
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historical temporality come together, by providing a distinctly utopian possibility for the 
post-Soviet subject. To deal with the post-Soviet collapse of the organizing categories of 
history, the novel puts history on hold, allowing the unmoving time of the narrative to be 
spent reflecting on the lessons from the past, and on the methods to be used to navigate 
the post-collapse cultural milieu. 
In The Slynx, such timeless, post-historic temporality is largely a “result” of the 
title “character,” the slynx,39, as its existence, on the level of the plot, ensures the 
impossibility of ‘progress’ in a conventional sense: the slynx is the primary villain in the 
folk mythology that guides the post-apocalyptic society. It is the fear of the slynx that 
makes the golubchiks extremely cautious, close-minded and therefore insusceptible to the 
beauty of the symbol of progress, the meat grinder so celebrated by the Oldeners. 
Simultaneously, the integral role of the slynx for the formation of the protagonist’s 
subjectivity, as we will see, attests to the anxieties of identification (and a certain 
enjoyment derived from them) that the inhabitants of such temporality have to face. 
Interestingly, the slynx not a “species” in the way all other mutant creatures of the 
text are, with the exception of Ptitsa Paulin, the slynx’s chief antagonist in Benedikt’s 
fantasies. Presumably, there exists only one slynx, which right away makes it possible to 
read it, through Derrida, as human, because the slynx cannot be reduced to a multitude.40 
At the initial encounter with the slynx, however, it is “obvious” that it is an animal, as the 
                                                
39 Kys’ (translated as ‘slynx’ from the Russian) is ostensibly a phonetic clipping of koshka (cat) and rys’ 
(lynx). The interpretation that builds a chain of phonetic associations between kys’ and Rus’ (Old Russian 
word for “Russia”) has been proposed in an ideological reading of the text. See Boris Paramonov, 
“Russkaia Istoriia Nakonets Opravdala Sebya v Literature”, Vremya MN, October 14, 2000 (online version 
at <http://www.guelman.ru/slava/kis/paramonov.htm>, accessed Jun 12, 2009). 
40 Derrida observes that humanity prefers its animals in the plural, as the single animal (the other) can be 
fixed as the Other, Other-as-Human, which threatens the constructed dichotomy. For Derrida’s discussion 
of the human/non-human dichotomy, see Jacques Derrida, “‘Eating Well’, or The Calculation of the 
Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, E. Cadava et.al., eds., in Who Comes After the Subject? (New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 96-119. 
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reader’s perception by that point is conditioned, in the exposition, by a variety of flying 
hares and figs that glow in the dark. The slynx, against this dystopian background, seems 
to be just another item in the monster gallery. 
Interestingly, kys’ is both the creature’s name and the only ‘discourse’ available to 
it, in the form of a sound it makes. The phonetic connotations of the word kys’ may be 
interpreted as introducing the motive of temptation, deceit and obstruction.41  
Notwithstanding the possibilities of interpreting the slynx’s “name,” the range of 
interpretations is too wide,42 which is why it can be argued that in the text slynx stands for 
that which cannot be named. This reading is supported by another “property” of the 
slynx: it is invisible. In the conceptual mapping of the folkloric space of the text, the 
slynx belongs to the North, to the night, to the lack of “civilization,” to absence 
(invisibility). 
As the narrative progresses, the slynx gets more and more detailed descriptions, as 
if acquiring a body while moving from the periphery of the narrative to its center. The 
image develops along the lines of primal fear, existential anguish, and anxiety of 
identification: 
[You’ll] start thinking… listening to …the wail just outside the window, begging 
to be let in; something white, heavy, cold, unseen. You suddenly imagine your 
izba far off and tiny, like you’re looking down at it from a treetop [italics mine. – 
DK] … The branches rock in the northern trees, and on the branches, swaying up 
                                                
41 Russian kis-kis as a call for a cat; also, the lynx that blocks Dante’s way in the beginning of The Divine 
Comedy comes to mind. 
42 As the slynx ostensibly “stands” for the “message” of the novel, the critics tend to try unpacking the 
range of meanings its name contains: for an ideological reading, see, e.g., Paramonov 2000; for a more 
existential take on the novel, see V. Kuritsyn’s review of Kys’ in Vremya MN (2000): V. Kuritsyn, 
“Retsenziia na Kys’ T. Tolstoi”, Vremya MN, 2000, online version available at 
http://www.guelman.ru/slava/kis/kur.htm, accessed March 10, 2009. 
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and down, is the invisible Slynx… [it] presses its invisible ears against its flat 
invisible head, and it cries in a hungry cry, and reaches, reaches … for the warm 
blood pounding in the people’s necks: SSSLYYYNXXX! Fear touches your heart 
like a cold draft or a small paw, and you shudder… as if you don’t know who or 
where you are (slovno ty sam sebe tschuzhoi). Who am I?43 
The slynx here functions as a nearly perfect gaze of the Other, as Benedikt for a 
split second is able to see through the slynx’s eyes. This initial effect wanes and is 
forgotten in Benedikt’s subsequent “spiritual encounters” with the slynx, as his anxieties 
are up to a certain point manifested by the feeling that “one has the slynx on one’s back,” 
literally “the slynx looks at you from behind”, kys’ v spinu smotrit). This paranoid 
sensation, for the time being at least, contains and conceals Benedikt’s split subjectivity: 
Benedikt seems to have happily forgotten that he was already transformed into the object 
of the slynx’s gaze and saw himself through its eyes just pages before. 
The paradox of the slynx is that, as its body acquires more and more detailed 
description, it nevertheless remains invisible. This invisibility is not a physical property 
of the slynx’s body; Benedikt’s concession, “One can’t see it [the slynx], one can’t see it” 
(182) (a videt’-to ee nel’zia, nel’zia videt’-to) seems to be as much about the physical 
invisibility as it is about the prohibition to see. Moreover, it turns out that its body is at 
least partly anthropomorphic: it has a face instead of a muzzle and is able to grimace. 
                                                
43 Tolstaya 45.“[З]адумаешься, … слушая, как шуршит под полом, как трещит в печи, как воет, 
подступает, жалуется за окном, просится в дом что-то белое, тяжелое, холодное, незримое; и 
представится тебе вдруг твоя изба далекой и малой, словно с дерева смотришь [italics mine. – DK], 
… и качаются ветки северных деревьев, и качается на ветках,— вверх-вниз,— незримая кысь,— … 
прижимает невидимые уши к плоской невидимой голове, и плачет, голодная, и тянется … к теплой 
крови, постукивающей в человечьей шее: кы-ысь! кы-ысь! И тревога холодком, маленькой лапкой 
тронет сердце, и вздрогнешь …словно ты сам себе чужой: что это? Кто я?” 
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By moving closer to Benedikt, the slynx becomes more and more “human,” not 
only on the level of physical body, but also on the level of the “language” that it 
possesses. This is not surprising, having in mind that the oppositions of human/non-
human do not work properly in Tolstaia’s text. The closest the reader comes to 
understanding what the slynx “wants to say” is the following passage: “its invisible face 
grimaces, its claws quiver. It’s hungry, famished. It’s tormented, tormented! 
Slyyyynnnxxx!” 44 
To see what the slynx may “mean” we have to examine, essentially, Benedikt’s 
interpretations of what he gets from the communication. While in the beginning of the 
novel Benedikt’s fear of the slynx does not differ very much from his fear of other post-
apocalyptic mutant monsters, as the slynx searches for Benedikt and comes closer, he 
becomes attracted to it. This attraction is masochistic and voyeuristic in nature: the 
passages where the slynx is described become longer, more frightening, and more 
detailed, as if Benedikt savors the ominous presence of the slynx.45 Moreover, Benedikt 
acquires a claw (kogot’) when he becomes his father-in-law’s subordinate in the secret 
police: the police’s weapon is a hook used to pick up the “old-print” books. 
Finally, Benedikt commits a murder, which is described in the words that the text 
up to this point reserved for the slynx: 
…His arm could still feel the crunch up to the elbow, the way you squash a 
beetle: instead of just grabbing the book, jerking it, tearing it away, he caught the 
Golubchik right on the neck, on the vein [italics mine. - DK], and since he whirled 
                                                
44Tolstaya 90. “и кривится невидимое лицо ее, и дрожат когти,— голодно ей, голодно! Мука ей, 
мука! Кы-ы-ысь! Кы-ы-ысь!” 
45 Benedikt’s desire for the slynx is sublimated in his love for his colleague Olen’ka and in connection to 
Olen’ka’s family; the only creatures who have claws in the text are the slynx and Olen’ka’s family. 
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the hook with unpracticed fingers, the vein snapped and something streamed 
out… 46 
In the same scene, a sudden shift of perspective, similar to the one in the 
beginning of the novel, takes place: 
…it (the robe) blinded Benedikt for a moment, but the slits settled right over his 
eyes. He could see everything through this crevice, all human affairs, trivial, 
cowardly, fussy… but the wind howls, the snowstorm shrieks, and the Slynx is in 
flight; it soars, triumphant, over the city [italics mine. – DK].47 
Here the border between Benedikt and the slynx, again, collapses for a moment 
and is later reinstated as Benedikt childishly blames the slynx for compelling him to kill. 
However, the internalization has already taken place, because Benedikt has committed an 
act as the slynx and consistent with the “cultural expectations” of the slynx. 
Finally, Benedikt “becomes” the slynx when he is labeled as such within 
language, by his father-in-law. Though in this scene Benedikt does not see himself as the 
slynx in the mirror, he is both assigned a linguistic label and commits an act as the slynx. 
Therefore, rather than overcoming the cultural and moral constraints of his dystopian 
milieu, Benedikt is instead subsumed by it: he is tempted by, and falls prey to, something 
that does not belong to language or humanity and, moreover, effectively voids these. The 
dystopian milieu of the novel can become so ahistorical, so reliant on superstition and 
irrationality because it is, in a way, predicated on the existence of the slynx, at least for 
                                                
46 Tolstaya 184.“…рука до локтя чувствовала хруст, вот как жука давишь: вместо того чтоб захватить 
книгу, да дернуть, да вырвать, — попал голубчику прямо по шее, по шейной жиле [italics mine. – 
DK], а как крюк-то повернул неловкими пальцами, — жила и выдернись, и потекло…” 
47 Tolstaya 183.“…оболокло Бенедикта, ослепило на мгновение, но прорези сами пали на глаза, все 
видать как через щель, все дела людские, мелкие, трусливые, копошливые; им бы супу да на 
лежанку, а ветер воет, вьюга свищет, и кысь — в полете; летит, торжествуя, над городом [italics 
mine. - DK]”.  
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the protagonist whose perspective the reader is given. The slynx becomes the (empty) 
master signifier that structures the symbolic order of Tolstaia’s universe. 
Language’s ability to account for reality—material, socio-cultural, or political— 
comes to the forefront of intellectual discussions whenever the reality in question rapidly 
changes, which makes this ability especially relevant in the post-Soviet context. It seems 
that The Slynx denies this ability by facing the non-linguistic, non-cultural void that the 
slynx represents. At first glance, The Slynx is an über-pessimistic, Orwellian, dystopian 
narrative as it lets its protagonist be subsumed by the reality he inhabits. The novel 
provides Benedikt with the means of escape (symbolized by his access to culture), yet 
does not let him make full use of these means as he confronts the “essence” of his 
dystopian milieu, the slynx. 
Yet, the frightening void that Benedikt faces contains a powerful temptation. The 
eternal present, the ahistorical temporality that the existence of the slynx in the world of 
the novel produces, undoubtedly creates an anxiety of estrangement for the reader: such 
temporality is something that modernity has firmly forgotten about. Nevertheless, this 
temporality contains a potential that becomes an exciting prospect in the post-Soviet 
context: the possibility to put the historical (and reliant on the notion of history) 
framework of modernity on hold to reflect on the possibilities of signification as the 
former system of signification demonstrates the extent of its dysfunctionality. As The 
Slynx demonstrates, these “other” ways of meaning-production are hardly language-
oriented, because of how little language is able to describe the post-apocalyptic reality. 
However, unable to shed the constraints of textuality,48 The Slynx launches a search for 
                                                
48 For a discussion of this impossibility, see Chapter 1. 
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another language, a language that produces meanings in a way that is radically different 
from the analytic models of modernity. 
Thus we find the reliance of Tolstaia’s dystopian milieu on the traumatic 
repetitiveness of incantation. As tempted as one might be to read the floating temporality 
of the novel (structured by the folkloric, seemingly senseless, linguistic repetition) as only 
traumatic, staging the rupture in the time of national history, another argument can be 
made. The eternal folkloric present in which the Russia of the future exists in The Slynx 
may well be the post-Blast mutation of the eternal Soviet present. The novel, therefore, 
does not simply put history on hold to examine the lessons of the past, but simultaneously 
covers the temporal gap that the collapse of the Soviet narrative produced by recreating, 
in its own textual space, the illusion of continuity that the Soviet eternal present used to 
sustain. 
Vladimir Sorokin’s The Day of the Oprichnik: A “Book about the Present”? 
Vladimir Sorokin’s iconic status in contemporary Russian literature is a sum of 
his strikingly phantasmatic (and often exceptionally graphic) conceptualist prose and of 
its remote social effects. Though Sorokin explicitly denies to literature any value except 
an aesthetic one, he is nonetheless best known in the West as a post-Soviet writer 
persecuted for his writings, most significantly, for his 1999 novel, Blue Lard.49 Despite 
proclamations of art-for-art’s-sake, however, Sorokin’s texts that followed Blue Lard are 
progressively more engaged with issues of Russian national history as they search for the 
                                                
49The pro-Putin youth organization, “Marching Together” (Iduschiie Vmeste) brought charges of 
pornography on Sorokin in conjunction with one of his novels, Blue Lard (Goluboie Salo, 1999). Sorokin’s 




hidden meanings of historical events by creating metafictional and/or alternative accounts 
of Soviet history (in his Ice trilogy, 2004-2005). 
In 2006, Sorokin comes back to the subject of Russian national past, approaching 
it from a different perspective. Instead of creating another historiographic metafiction,50 
Sorokin offers his take on the dystopian genre with a short novel, The Day of the 
Oprichnik. Russia’s future, just as it was the case with The Slynx, is modeled in the novel 
on the intellectual construct of national past. If we recall Sorokin’s comment about the 
novel being "of course a book about the present"51 quoted in the beginning of this 
chapter, his understanding of Russian national history becomes all the more surprising: 
the “country’s present,” which is supposed to bear the seeds of a warning (which a 
conventional dystopian text communicates) is suspiciously absent from another of 
Sorokin’s musings in the same interview. The view of Russian history that Sorokin 
conjures ignores the present altogether: “There is much talk about Russia being a fortress. 
Orthodox churches, autocracy and national traditions are supposed to form a new national 
ideology. This would mean that Russia would be overtaken by its past, and our past will 
be our future.”52 The fact that Sorokin so desperately wants his book to be about the 
Russian “present” of the 2000s (in which autocracy and national(ist) traditionalism are 
prominently featured in the context of Putin’s presidency) is counteracted by his 
discursive inability to fit the present as a historical category into his schema of Russian 
history. Nevertheless, the novel itself becomes a site for this present, as it constructs that 
                                                
50 See Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (New York, 1988), esp. 289, 
294. 
51“’Russia Is Slipping Back into an Authoritarian Empire’: Spiegel Interview with Author Vladimir 
Sorokin, Spiegel”, trans. Christopher Sultan, in Spiegel, Feb 2, 2007. 
< http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,463860,00.html>, accessed Jun 10, 2009. 
52 “’Russia Is Slipping Back into an Authoritarian Empire’: Spiegel Interview with Author Vladimir 
Sorokin, Spiegel”, trans. Christopher Sultan, in Spiegel, Feb 2, 2007. 
< http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,463860,00.html>, accessed Jun 10, 2009. 
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which Sorokin’s words in the interview lack: a kind of “present tense temporality” that 
defines the dystopian milieu of the novel. 
At first glance, The Day of the Oprichnik indeed suggests that history is bound to 
repeat itself. The short novel is set in 2028, and portrays the dystopian future of Russia 
where the premise for radical social change is a set of the mysterious “Red, White and 
Grey Turmoils.”53 The last Turmoil is followed by the restoration of absolute monarchy 
in Russia. A wall is then erected around Russia, whose only international partner 
remaining is China. 
It is this extreme isolation that makes the national past the only accessible cultural 
repository from which to borrow in order to create a new totalitarian society. Indeed, the 
new Tsar of Russia reinstalls the oprichnina, the paramilitary 16th century organization 
created by Tsar Ivan the Terrible,54 as the all-controlling state institution. Furthermore, 
the new regime is based on the ideology of “self-determination, Orthodoxy and tradition” 
(based on slightly mutated, but still recognizably catchy 19th-century nationalist slogan 
proposed by Minister Uvarov for Tsar Nicholas I55). Sticking to the slogan, however, 
                                                
53 Ostensibly standing for the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, for the collapse of 1991 and for the 
subsequent move towards autocracy. 
54 A comprehensive account of the history of oprichnina is given in S. B. Veselovskii, Issledovaniia po 
istorii oprichniny (Moscow, 1963). Throughout the twentieth century, historians’ assessment of the 
phenomenon varied from condemnation to, importantly, praise for the role of oprichnina in Russia’s 
unification under Ivan the Terrible, which was the official historical assessment during Stalin’s era. For a 
post-Soviet historiographic assessment, see A. Karavashkin and A. Yurganov, “Oprichnina i Strashnyi 
Sud”, in their Opyt istoricheskoi fenomenologii: Trudnyi put’ k ochevidnosti (Moscow, 2003), 68-115. 
55 The original slogan is “Absolute monarchy, Orthodoxy, orientedness towards the people” 
(samoderzhaviie, pravoslaviie, narodnost’). The role of Count Uvarov’s report in Russia’s search for the 
“national idea” in the late nineteenth century is assessed in Richard Worthman, “Ofitsial’naia narodnost’ i 
natsional’nyi mif rossiiskoi monarkhii XIX veka”, trans. O. Maiorova, in Rossiia/Russia: Vyp. 3(11): 




proves to be impossible in Sorokin’s dystopian future, as Russian language turns out to 
be peppered both with archaisms and Chinese words.56 
On the other hand, many of the unmistakably futuristic elements of the dystopian 
milieu, like various spins on communication technologies, remain highly visible (all 
traditionalist ideology notwithstanding) and are used by the regime to exert various forms 
of control over the population. To reconcile traditionalism with the futuristic aspect of the 
dystopia, the names for the technologies are archaized and/or Russianized, so that the 
oprichniki are constantly seen chatting on their “mobilo”57 or watching “puzyr’” 
(“bubble”), supposedly a cross between a 3D-television and an Orwellian telescreen. 
The protagonist is a middle-ranking member of the secret police, whose day at 
work the reader follows. Andrei Komiaga goes about his usual day, executing those who 
are not loyal to the regime and raping their wives (not because he is in any way “evil,” 
but because it is a custom); taking on a delivery task on the orders of the Tsarina; sorting 
out the money issues that the oprichnina has with Customs; ensuring that the new show 
performed for the Kremlin’s aristocratic elite is ideologically sound; taking a steam bath 
with other members of oprichnina; taking part in another execution; and finally getting 
home, exhausted. He then falls asleep to face another day just like the one the reader 
witnessed. 
We can assume the extreme predictability of Komiaga’s existence for two 
reasons. Firstly, the title of The Day of the Oprichnik is a pun on the actual content of the 
                                                
56 For more on Sorokin’s imagining of the future of the Russian language, see Chapter 1. 
57 The archaization/Russianization occurs here by adding a neuter gender ending to the transliteration of an 
English word, with the resulting neologism morphologically resembling pattern of forming nouns to denote 
instruments from past participles of the verbs, characteristic of Old Russian. 
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novel;58 while the novel depicts one day in the life of an oprichnik, the title can be read in 
two ways – either referring to a particular day in the life of a particular oprichnik, or to 
the fact that the “day,” the era depicted in the novel belongs to the oprichniki, as the 
Russian possessive construction allows for both interpretations. The sense of an era of 
doom, conveyed by the second interpretation, contributes to the effect of post-
apocalyptic, and, in a way, post-historic temporality.59 
Secondly, the novel opens with a dream sequence, the same dream sequence that 
it will fade into in the end. This dream sequence establishes the mode of narration which 
the rest of the novel is to follow, overloaded with folk motifs, repetitions and parallel 
constructions. In the dream, the first-person narrator, yet unknown to the reader, follows 
a magical white horse that for the narrator comes to symbolize “everything, all of my life, 
all of my destiny, all my luck.”60 The dream, the narrator says, is “the same again”: he 
goes after the horse, but it does not notice the narrator, or anyone else for that matter, and 
“goes away, leaves me, goes away forever, goes away, for all eternity it goes away, goes 
away, goes, goes away.”61 
When the narrator awakens and the dystopian milieu is painstakingly established 
in great detail in the next several pages, the meaning of the dream becomes suspiciously 
                                                
58 It is also an evident pun on the title of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s famous One Day in Life of Ivan 
Denisovich (1962): Sorokin’s protagonist can be read as a satire of Ivan Denisovich (they both possess a 
kind of uncanny honesty, which in the case of Sorokin’s protagonist is perverse as he is committing 
monstrous acts and still remains honest and even likeable). 
59 In opposition to this striving towards genre conformity stands Komiaga’s constant analysis of the 
sociopolitical situation in the year 2028, which suggests that historical time does not come to a complete 
halt in this dystopian milieu (as was the case with Tolstaia’s The Slynx).  This supports Tchantsev’s 
argument about Sorokin’s dystopia being a more immediate reaction to the current political situation, as the 
political dynamics of Sorokin’s dystopian society ostensibly mirror  (and/or extrapolate on) those observed 
in Russia in the 2000s. 
60 The Russian text is cited from Vladimir Sorokin, Den’ Oprichnika, online version at 
<http://lib.aldebaran.ru/author/sorokin_vladimir/sorokin_vladimir_den_oprichnika/>, accessed March 10, 
2009. “вся жизнь, вся судьба моя, вся удача”. 
61 Ibid. “а он все так же неспешно удаляется, ничего и никого не замечая, навсегда уходит, уходит от 
меня, уходит навеки, уходит бесповоротно, уходит, уходит, уходит…” 
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obvious: the narrator experiences, unconsciously, some loss of great significance 
(“everything”), but in his conscious state he is sure that everything is perfectly well as he 
goes about his day with very little hesitation. Thus, the dystopian milieu is established not 
only on the level of detailed descriptions of distorted everyday practices that blend 
futuristic motives with old Russian cultural customs, but also on the level of the “moral” 
attitude that the reader is supposed to adopt, as we come to know on a very intimate level 
that something is wrong with the world (and the psyche) that repeatedly produces such 
dreams. In any case, on the purely stylistic level, there seems to be very little difference 
between the way Komiaga frames his conscious and unconscious content, as his musings 
about the fate of Russia, just as his thoughts about the everyday issues, are organized 
along the same stylistic lines of repetition, parallelism, and excessive synonymizing. 
The obsessive attention to detail in the exposition reveals a tension between the 
method of creating an alternative reality, which is supposed to be dystopian, and the effect 
the first-person narration produces. This narration produces an interesting twist on the 
cautionary tale: the reader is to an extent caught in between the dystopian premise of the 
novel and the inescapable identification with the protagonist’s non-critical, even positive, 
attitude to his dystopian society. Thus, the following description in the exposition, slow-
paced, filled with stylistic inversions in the original, hardly contributes to creating a 
dystopian milieu: 
They bow from the waist to me. I nod to them, passing. The floorboards crack. 
They open the door for me, the door coated with iron. To the yard I go. Sunny day 
it is, with a bit of frost. More snow fell during the night – on the firs, on the fence, 
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on the little guard tower it lays. Snow is good! The earthly shame it covers. And 
the soul is cleansed by it.62 
For the protagonist, then, his milieu is definitely not dystopian. His attitude 
towards the winter landscape is structured by classic tropes of Russian Romantic 
nationalism.63 Such idealized descriptions suggest that for the protagonist his milieu is 
utopian; this is a drastic departure from classic dystopian narrative dynamics, where the 
protagonist is either already or about to be disenchanted with his environment. The 
reader, then, is put into an impossible position, identifying with something with which 
they should not be identifying. 
Read from the premise that the novel is dystopian and socially critical towards the 
reality it creates, Komiaga’s obsessive mode of narration is supposed to cover over the 
ugly truths about the society portrayed in the novel. However, if we assume that the 
subjective narration opens up a utopian space in the middle of dystopia, the structure of 
the novel predicated on repetition may mean something entirely different: the repetitive 
elements’ main function then is to blur the line between the protagonist’s personal utopia 
and the reader’s dystopia. Komiaga’s discursive repetitiveness accomplishes two things 
simultaneously: for him, it structures and legitimizes reality (which he is unaware is 
dystopian). For the reader, it serves as retardation as it conceals the monstrous social and 
cultural practices of the Russia of the future. Because of the excessive repetition (and 
                                                
62 In the translation, I made an attempt to preserve the stylistic inversion. “Кланяются в пояс. Киваю им, 
проходя. Скрипят половицы. Отворяют дверь кованую. Выхожу на двор. День солнечный выдался, с 
морозцем. Снега за ночь подсыпало — на елях, на заборе, на башенке сторожевой. Хорошо, когда 
снег! Он срам земной прикрывает. И душа чище от него делается”. 
63Russian Romantic nationalism favored the inversion of word order to add folk flavor to sentence 
structures, and eagerly found philosophical and emotional meanings in the elements of nature. A discussion 
of Russian Romantic nationalism and its political and ideological implications is given in Susanna Rabow-
Edling, Slavophile Thought and the Politics of Cultural Nationalism (New York, State University of New 
York Press, 2006). 
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because of the almost inevitable identification with the protagonist), it becomes 
exceptionally hard to perceive the hangings, dismemberments and political oppression in 
the novel at their conventional moral value. 
This is one of the main reasons why The Day of the Oprichnik, which is supposed 
to be a cautionary tale, is, paradoxically, nostalgic. The proclaimed warning about the 
authoritarian future of Russia is simultaneously constructed and concealed by the first-
person narration, through which the text revels in an idealized (national) past. The 
identification with the protagonist indeed proved to be powerful enough: Sorokin’s 
“sequel” to, or rather an expansion of, The Day of the Oprichnik, Sugar Kremlin (2008), 
is vaguely apologetic. Sorokin’s comments upon publishing Sugar Kremlin (a collection 
of dystopian short stories set in the same universe as The Day) suggest that the collection 
was, in a way, written to prove that The Day was indeed a dystopian novel: 
The Day of the Oprichnik still was monological, not enough for me, I was lacking 
polyphony from the other inhabitants [of this universe]. Sugar Kremlin is a frame 
of sorts. Perhaps, for me this frame was even more valuable than The Day of the 
Oprichnik: I just enjoyed the details of the picture.64 
The cautious formulas, “was not enough for me” and “perhaps…” frame the 
notion that the enjoyment that Sorokin derives from creating the dystopian milieu turns 
out to be based on the text’s polyphonic quality. This is significant, because the choice of 
a compliant insider as protagonist and narrator of a cautionary tale undoubtedly 
                                                
64 Vladimir Sorokin, “V Mavzoleie dolzhen lezhat’ Ivan Groznyi”: Vladimir Sorokin o svoiei novoi knige”, 
in Kommersant, 2008, No. 149 (3966), <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-rss.aspx?DocsID=1014309>, 
accessed March 12, 2009. “День опричника” все же был монологичен, мне не хватало многоголосья 
других ее [этой вселенной] обитателей. “Сахарный Кремль” — некая рама. Может, она была для 
меня даже ценнее “Дня опричника”: я просто наслаждался подробностями”. 
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diminishes the impact of the social critique that the novel performs. Sorokin cautiously 
admits as much, and he theorizes this “unintended effect” in another interview: 
When I was writing The Day of the Oprichnik, this was largely a search for a 
metaphor for contemporary Russia. On the other hand, this was a cartoon, a 
grotesque. And I managed to create a warning, too – a friend of mine told me 
about it. He said, “you wrote an incantation of a kind, an incantation against all of 
this happening.” But by the time of writing Sugar Kremlin, I got a feeling that 
everything [that I was writing about] can really happen, that the path Russia 
chooses may well end [the way I imagined]. And the first readers of Sugar 
Kremlin, apparently, felt that: nearly everyone said that this is a much scarier 
book than The Day of the Oprichnik.”65 
Sorokin’s “friend,” real or imagined, pinpoints the most striking feature of the 
text: the novel is an incantation against this [future] happening (“zagovor, chtoby etogo 
ne sluchilos”). That the novel becomes an incantation, in a way, denies Sorokin’s 
assurance that it is a political satire of the present. Instead, the present that the text is 
“about” emerges not only as a current sociopolitical reality containing a warning about 
the future, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a textual site where incantations 
hold the power to change the world. It is a temporality Komiaga already inhabits and 
Sorokin would desperately want to have in his own present: if the Russian sociopolitical 
                                                
65 “Vsem lizat’ Sakharnyi Kreml: Interv’ju s Vladimirom Sorokinym o novoi knige”, in Stringer Portal, 
August 2008. <http://www.stringer.ru/publication.mhtml?Part=49&PubID=9852>, accessed March 12, 
2009. “Когда я писал ‘День опричника’, это во многом было поиском метафоры для современной 
России. С другой стороны, это был и шарж, и гротеск. И предостережение из этого получилось - об 
этом мне сказал один мой друг. Ты, говорит, написал такой как бы заговор, чтобы этого не 
случилось. Но к моменту написания ‘Сахарного Кремля’ у меня появилось ощущение, что все это и 
вправду может быть, что путь, который выбирает Россия, может именно этим и кончиться. И 
первые читатели ‘Сахарного Кремля’, видимо, это почувствовали: почти все они сказали, что это 
более страшная книга, чем ‘День опричника’”. 
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reality of the 2000s bears the seeds of authoritarianism, in Sorokin’s interpretation it also 
bears seeds of utopia, predicated on the power of the spoken word. This is also a literary 
utopia, where the literary text has the power to influence history.66 
The pre-modern belief in the powers of interpellation, in the magic language, 
paradoxically, finds a parallel in logocentrism that is traditionally associated with modern 
Russian culture.67 The cautionary nature of the tale that The Day of the Oprichnik tells, 
then, is predicated not just on the relatively recent Russian notion that literature is meant 
to be a guiding force for social change (as formulated by the preeminent 19th -century 
Russian scholar Vissarion Belinskii68 and later reinforced by Stalin’s characteristic of 
writers as “engineers of human souls”69 that will come to define the ideology of Socialist 
Realism). The early 19th-century Romantic notion of “poet as a prophet”70 is resurrected 
here in its original meaning, stripped of any metaphoricity.71 
The scholars of Sorokin note his texts’ exceptional preoccupation with ritualistic 
practices.72 While The Day of the Oprichnik is less concerned with formal 
                                                
66 For more on the changing role of literature and the writers’ struggle with the change in the post-Soviet 
context, see Chapter 1. 
67 Logocentrism is conventionally posited as a characteristic of cultural production that is “endemic” to 
Russia. In the post-Soviet context, logocentrism often becomes a subject of both fascination and critique: as 
evidenced by an opinion expressed by Mikhail Epstein in a conference presentation cited below: “Russian 
logocentrism [is] the love for verbal expression which remains strikingly indifferent to the world of 
objects” (for a discussion of philosophical implications of logocentrism, see Mikhail Epstein, "The 
Philosophical Implications of Russian Conceptualism," paper delivered at AAASS Annual Meeting 
(Washington, D.C.), 29 October 1995). For more discussion of logocentrism, see the section above on The 
Slynx. 
68 See esp. Belinskii’s Vzgliad na Russkuiu Literaturu 1846 (Vissarion Belinskii, Vzgliad na Russkuiu 
Literaturu 1846 goda (Moskva, Goslitizdat, 1955)). The mythologizes status of Russian literature is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
69 Stalin borrows a formula from writer Yuri Olesha and first uses it at a 1932 meeting with Soviet writers 
at Maksim Gor’kii’s residence. 
70 Prominently featured in the poetry of major Russian Romantic writers, most importantly, Aleksandr 
Pushkin and, to an extent, Mikhail Lermontov. 
71 This is in line with constant dismantling of metaphors that is a prominent feature of Sorokin’s literary 
style. 
72 Galina Nefagina, Russkaia proza kontsa XX veka (Moscow, Flinta-Nauka, 2003), 268. Also see Svetlana 
Beliaieva-Konegen, “Khorosho zabytoie, ili Rasstreliat’ bez suda (o prose V. Sorokina)”, in Strelets, 1992, 
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experimentation with stylistic and narrative conventions than earlier Sorokin texts, its 
“universe” is nevertheless exceptionally dependent on ritualistic repetition, and not only 
on the conceptual level. Beside the text being an “incantation” against history repeating 
itself, the dystopian society is also structured by repetitive, highly mysticized everyday 
practices. On the stylistic level, the text is not only obsessed with details of the dystopian 
milieu, which is an anticipated effect of the genre, but also structures the dystopian 
psyche as completely dependent on the belief in the power of repetition. 
Sorokin’s oprichnina must be one of the most obsessive “secret brotherhoods” 
ever depicted in literature. The work of oprichnina acquires mystic qualities very early 
on, as every action of oprichnina is accompanied with elaborate rituals. If the novel is to 
be read as an unproblematic cautionary tale, these rituals are supposed to legitimize the 
violence that the oprichnina commits. The oprichniki behave like model illustrations of 
Vladimir Propp’s folk-tale lack that can be only covered by compulsive adherence to a 
magical structure manifested in magic numbers.73 Thus, they are required (and, 
seemingly, feel compelled) to cry out three times before entering the compound of a 
disloyal boyarin, walk around it three times clockwise and proclaim “woe to this home,” 
also three times, before they are “allowed” to enter. 
Being, of course, a satire of police procedure, this elaborate ritual is, nonetheless, 
much more than mere satire; the sheer amount of rituals that govern the work of 
oprichnina suggests an excess of performativity that, in the dystopian reading, masks the 
morally compromised meaning of the acts that the oprichnina commits. However, this 
excess is perhaps a little too “excessive”. The excess reveals itself not only on the level of 
                                                                                                                                            
No. 2, (Paris, New York, Moscow), 150-153. Also, see Svetlana Beliaieva-Konegen, “Khorosho Zabytoie, 
ili rasstreliat’ bez suda (o proze V. Sorokina)” (Paris-New York, Strelets, 1992, #2), 150-153. 
73 See esp. Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folk Tale (University of Texas Press, 1968), 25. 
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content (the immense violence and depravity that nearly all the deeds of oprichnina 
exhibit), but also on the level of linguistic organization of this content. Thus, a 
boyarin’s74 compound is surrounded “so that not even an evil mouse can sneak through, 
so that not an insidious mosquito can fly through.”75 This extension on a trite Russian 
metaphor (“chtoby mysh’ ne probezhala”, “so that a mouse can’t sneak through”) is not 
only excessive because the metaphor takes more space in the text. Through reactivating 
the actual metaphoricity of the expression by juxtaposing the trite metaphor with a made-
up one, the scene acquires a surprisingly paranoid quality, so that mice and mosquitoes 
that are not supposed to get through become very real enemies. This fits very well, 
however, into the undercurrent of the pagan, folkloric mindset by which the oprichnina is 
guided.76 
The reliance on ritual that Sorokin’s dystopian milieu exhibits plays into the 
predictability of existence in Sorokin’s Russia of the future, the predictability that, as we 
have seen, operates on many levels of the text. The predictability of the future, in the 
Russian context, is an especially relevant social concern, a concern that complicates the 
dystopian premise of the novel. No matter how “bad” the future of Russia turns out to be 
in Sorokin’s text, the very fact that it is allowed to appear there is significant. The 
“explosion” of dystopian texts in Russian literature of the mid-2000s, mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter, may signify the end of the pause where Russian culture found 
itself in the 1990s. Sorokin’s dystopia, among other dystopian texts of the period, makes 
                                                
74 In the Middle Ages, the term boyarin denoted a Russian noble; the term is used in the novel to indicate a 
member of new Russian aristocracy. 
75 “Обложена усадьба со всех сторон еще с ночи... Чтобы мышь зловредная не пробежала, чтобы 
комар злокозненный не пролетел”. 
76 The oprichnina is also fervently religious (Orthodox Christian), which reiterates the perennial tension 
between Christianity and paganism in the conventional Russian belief system. 
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predictions about the relatively immediate future of the country; by satirizing current 
sociopolitical reality, it not only begins to feel comfortable about making sociopolitical 
and cultural predictions, but also, implicitly, resurrects the future as a functional category 
of history. Sorokin’s own Ice Trilogy, an arc of novels from the 1990s that are arguably 
dystopian, is set in a “parallel reality” of sorts, without explicit references to any temporal 
category of history. The Day of the Oprichnik, on the other hand, by formally and 
explicitly being set in the future, signifies the reemergence of the future as a conceptual 
category of historical temporality in Russian culture, no matter how perverse this 
resurrection comes to be in its reliance on the national past. 
Still, the future of Russia in The Day of the Oprichnik is imagined to possess the 
temporality that is, in essence, devoid of the flow of time, and structured by magical 
beliefs, which we have observed in two incarnations in the earlier post-Soviet dystopias. 
Sorokin’s text, while undoubtedly reacting to sociopolitical changes and therefore 
establishing a certain immediacy of its vision of the future, nevertheless borrows the 
system of signification that is supposed to describe this future from the legacy of the 
1990s. In the 2000s, the new set of fantasies about what the future should (not) be still 
relies on the eternal, never-ending present, the time of the Soviet epic (to borrow from 
Bakhtin via Clark again), and on the system of signification associated with this time. 
This sort of cultural “inertia”, as it seems, lies in the perverse (and, in the Russian 
context, nostalgic) appeal of a utopian “no-place” that, at least from within, for the texts’ 
protagonists, is devoid of a characteristically post-Soviet anxiety about the nature of 
historical process. Disillusioned with the compromised teleologically Marxist model of 
history in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the texts nonetheless cling to the 
180 
 
memory of functional teleology, and, paradoxically, do so by crafting their versions of 
the future as places possessing a radically different temporality. This temporality ignores 
the conventional framework of past, present and future because it denies the flow of time 
itself. As post-Soviet culture maps the semiotic and temporal similarities between the 
folkloric imagination and Soviet mythology, both the eternal present of magic fairy tale 
and the Great Time of Socialist Realist text quell the post-Soviet uncertainties about the 





The Dead Cosmonauts: Soviet Hero in Post-Soviet Space. 
News from the Russian Mission Control Center: Today, the Russian Space Agency 
de-orbited The Mir Space Station. Large fragments were scuttled in the Pacific. Smaller 
fragments burned upon entering the Earth’s atmosphere. Tomorrow, our cosmonauts are 
planning… Fuck! Our cosmonauts! (A Russian anekdot)2 
Soviet Science Fiction’s Dead Cosmonauts: the Foundations of the Myth 
On March 23, 1961, less than a month before Yuri Gagarin successfully orbited 
the Earth, a Soviet cosmonaut-in-training, Valentin Bondarenko, died in a training 
accident in a pressure chamber at the Institute for Biomedical Studies in Moscow. In the 
incident that will in 2008 become one of the plot lines for Aleksei Gherman’s film about 
the Soviet space program, Paper Soldier, Bondarenko burned alive in the oxygen-rich 
atmosphere of the chamber. No mention of this incident appeared in press before 1986, 
when Yaroslav Golovanov’s article in the “Izvestiia” newspaper was published to give 
what he called a “truthful” account of the events3. Golovanov’s struggle for truthfulness 
pertains, perhaps, less to the actual circumstances of the incident than to the fact that he 
takes a stand against the corpus of conspiratorial publications that can be called “the tales 
of the lost cosmonauts,” launched by a Readers Digest article, published in April 1965 in 
the US. The article claimed that several cosmonauts were lost in space during secret 
                                                
1 A version of a part of this chapter appeared in: Daria Kabanova, “Mourning the Mimesis: Aleksei 
Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon and the post-Soviet Practice of Writing History”, Studies in Slavic 
Cultures X, “Postmodernism” (2011). 
2 “Репортаж из ЦУПа, ведущий берет интервью у руководителя ЦУПа: "Сегодня Российское 
Космическое Агенство затопило станцию "Мир". Большие осколки станции были сведены с орбиты 
и затоплены в Тихом Океане. Малые осколки сгорели при входе в плотные слои атмосферы. Завтра 
наши космонавты планируют...б*ять!!!.... Наши космонавты!!!” 




training flights; “strange” radio signals received by Italian amateur space watchers were 
cited in the article as proof of the fact that Soviet Union had several space missions 
stranded in orbit, intentionally or unintentionally. This story of “lost cosmonauts” 
undermined one of the Soviet myths upon which the state’s symbolic validation was 
built. 
The Space Race gave birth to tens of songs, hundreds of books and thousands of 
monuments to Yuri Gagarin (a process that, significantly, intensified after his accidental 
death in 1967), as well as metaphorization of national pride through the images 
associated with the Soviet space program.4 The Space Race, a crucial site for the 
competition of ideologies during the Cold War, created an important part of Soviet 
mythological framework: the story of the Soviet space program and its successes, just as 
its American counterpart during the Cold War, goes beyond any military applications and 
comes to be a source of national pride, as it literally translates technological achievement 
into an ideological one. The Space Race exemplifies the uneasy relationship the Soviet 
state had with the legacy of Leon Trotsky’s dreams of world revolution.  
Even after Stalin effectively put an end to these dreams, the dream of space 
exploration is a function of an unmistakably revolutionary (and Trotskyite) desire to 
ideologically appropriate outer space itself. An example of the romantic revolutionary 
sentiment at work in mythologizing the dream of space exploration is the 1936 film, 
Kosmicheskii Reis (Cosmic Journey or Space Voyage), a silent feature directed by 
Vassilii Zhuravlev. In the film, outer space becomes an important site for Socialist 
“colonization.” Kosmicheskii Reis’s (critically acclaimed) special effects are mostly 
                                                
4 Thus, a 1960s song sums up the Soviet cultural and technological achievement as “We build rockets, and 
also in the sphere of ballet we’re ahead of all the planet.” 
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focused on creating the illusion of weightlessness and freedom of movement that the first 
space travelers experience on the Moon. The film thus can be read as the romantic 
interpretation of Communism as freedom, in line with the ideas of early Russian 
revolutionary discourse.5 
The invalidation of the significant Soviet myth that the conspiracy theory of lost 
cosmonauts performs will make the corpus of cultural fantasies that deal with lost or dead 
cosmonauts particularly pertinent in the post-Soviet cultural context, when the Soviet 
mythology becomes a subject of deconstruction.  The Reader’s Digest article introduced 
the image of the dead body in orbit that must remain there for all eternity: “There is an 
eerie possibility that a long-dead Russian astronaut is today hurtling silently through 
space at thousands of miles an hour - the victim of a Soviet space shot that went wrong. 
His body perfectly preserved by intense cold, he may be a lonely wanderer in space for 
centuries to come.”6 Readily observable in this paragraph are the motifs of the peculiar 
temporality of outer space, devoid of measurable time, and of the immutable nature of the 
objects that are forever suspended in that space. All of this creates a set of images that 
contribute to a fantasy that is powerful because of the “natural” metonymic connection 
between the images of the body, the eternal questions of life and death, and the 
ideological notions upon which the myth of the “conquest” of the Cosmos is predicated. 
                                                
5 In a post-Soviet film, First on the Moon (2004, dir. Aleksei Fedorchenko), outer space becomes a critical 
site for Socialist expansion in the 1930s, with the offscreen narrator informing the spectators that “it was a 
time where people lived by the idea of planetary revolution, dreamed of the Cosmic Soviet Republic” 
(mechtali o kosmicheskoi respublike Sovetov). 
6 J.T. Ratcliff, “Italy’s Amazing Amateur Space Watchers”, in Reader’s Digest, April 1965, 115-117. 
Online version available at 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20031002125716/lostcosmonauts.com/readers.htm>, accessed April 1, 2009. 




This conspiracy theory and its paranoid structure provide a surprisingly accurate 
insight into the mechanisms of the myth’s functioning, exposing the structures that the 
ideology behind the myth would technically want to conceal but cannot help making 
visible. While the Soviet media and official discourse were, of course, extremely hesitant 
to acknowledge any kind of accident involving cosmonauts, in space or on Earth, 
socialist science fiction,7 on the other hand, produced a substantial number of texts that 
feature images and motifs of dead, dying, or mutilated cosmonauts. Following Katerina 
Clark’s suggestion to treat Socialist Realist texts primarily in their mythological 
function,8 I will now look at the ways in which the fantasy of the cosmonauts dead and 
forever lost in space elucidates the ideological content of the myth of the conquest of the 
Cosmos. 
Already in the “proto-Socialist Realist” novel, Aleksei Tolstoi’s Aelita (1923), 
outer space becomes the place to long for, an object of desire for the protagonist Mikhail 
Los’. Los’ goes to Mars because outer space holds a promise for him: he hopes that there, 
“beyond the threshold of Earth and the threshold of death,”9 he will be able to forget the 
                                                
7 A note is in order about the place of science fiction within Soviet cultural production. While some 
scholars, like Matthias Schwarz, argue that Socialist science fiction goes against Socialist realist method by 
depicting the remote future when Socialist Realism’s main focus is the immediate future, I rather side with 
others like Elana Gomel. Following her, I treat science fiction as a paradoxically logical development of the 
Socialist Realist method. Science fiction produces an “excess” of realism by creating an entirely new 
reality, thus taking the Socialist Realist utopian and futuristic modality to its ultimate point. Science fiction 
takes the call of the Congress of Socialist Writers made in 1934 to depict reality not as it is, but as it should 
be, literally, by creating this reality.  Escapist as science fiction is, it nevertheless uses the Socialist Realist 
method while seemingly distancing itself from its conventional subject matter. See Matthias Schwarz, Die 
Erfindung des Kosmos: Zur sowjetischen Science Fiction und popularwissenschaftlichen Publizistik vom 
Sputnikflug bis zum Ende der Tauwetterzeit (Berliner Slawistische Arbeiten, no. 22. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
2004). A similar opinion is held by John Glad (John P. Glad, Extrapolations from Dystopia: A Critical 
Study of Soviet Science Fiction ( Princeton: Kingston Press, 1982); and Elana Gomel, “Gods like Men: 
Soviet Science Fiction and the Utopian Self”, in Science Fiction Studies, 2004, Vol. 31, No. 3, Soviet 
Science Fiction: The Thaw and After, 358-377. 
8 Clark 1981, 252. 
9 Aelita is cited from Aleksei Tolstoi, Aelita. <http://az.lib.ru/t/tolstoj_a_n/text_0160.shtml>, accessed 
April 1, 2009. 
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loss of his beloved wife. Yet, Los’ is unsure whether outer space will hold true to its 
promise, because he realizes that he, the living being, has no place in outer space: to truly 
belong here he has to become “slumbering ice crystals that fly there, unawakened.”10 
Fear prompts him to ask somebody to accompany him to Mars; he is afraid that if his 
calculations are incorrect, he will remain in space for all eternity. He describes this 
through a striking image of a “chilled corpse in the dark,” thus problematizing his own 
feeling for the “slumbering ice crystals” that have the same fate of flying in space 
forever. Los’’s longing for outer space is, then, ambiguous: tempted by its atemporality 
and the promise of forgetting, Los’ is nonetheless fearful of this temptation. 
In the later examples of Ivan Efremov’s The Andromeda Nebula (“Tumannost’ 
Andromedy”, 1957) and Arkadii and Boris Strugatskii’s The Land of Crimson Clouds 
(“Strana Bagrovykh Tuch”, 1959), ideological meanings are explicitly attached to death 
in space. In an episode of The Andromeda Nebula, the crew discovers a long-lost 
spaceship from Earth with nobody inside. The recorded message in the captain’s log 
forewarns the crew of the dangers that they are about to face. The moment of the crew’s 
death inside the lost spaceship is recorded on tape, too, providing the present crew with 
all the necessary tips to eventually be able to capture the deadly alien life form and 
transport it to Earth for further research. While the crew that perished is, of course, 
mourned by the present crew, their death proves to be actually useful not only for the 
present crew’s research mission, but also in their soul-searching: they leave the planet 
assured that they are able to face any adversity, having refueled their spaceship using the 




other spaceship’s fuel supplies that are conveniently available now that the original crew 
has little use for them.11 
In The Land of Crimson Clouds, the space crew lands on Venus, which in the 
novel’s universe has become a critical site of the human conquest of outer space. The 
(Communist) society of the future is in an energy crisis due to the rapid development of 
technology; the society is ready to mine the radioactive ore reserves Venus is said to 
possess. The crew of the present mission is stunned to intercept a radio signal on Venus; 
upon approaching the source of the signal they discover a mangled spaceship with a lone 
(and dead) space explorer inside: “The transmitter was working, little green and blue 
lights behind the broken dials trembled. And at the transmitter there sat a dead man, his 
shaggy head, bandaged by grey rags, on his chest.”12 
The contrast between the personification in the description of the transmitter and 
the dead body of the space explorer is striking; the functional interchange between the 
lifeless body and the “alive” transmitter turns a dead body into a beacon that establishes 
the presence of humans on Venus by constantly transmitting the radio signal.13 The dead 
body in the spaceship becomes a symbol of a stage in the conquest of Venus, forever 
                                                
11 In another episode of Andromeda Nebula, the spaceship crew discovers a dead planet, the inhabitants of 
which were ostensibly frozen to death because they did not listen to warnings about misusing the planet’s 
natural resources. The crew observes a “glass grave” where, among others, a man is sitting “with insane, 
scary eyes looking into the distance.” The frozen people (“not Earthlings, but definitely human”), though 
they do not fall very neatly in the core narrative of the myth of the cosmonauts lost in space, nonetheless 
introduce a very important feature of the myth: they become eternal symbols, in this case of stupidity and 
carelessness, which the captain of the spaceship confirms. These people are bound to stay in their glass 
grave forever, forever fulfilling their didactic function, cautioning people against misusing natural 
resources. Interestingly, it is precisely through their death that they are able to play such an important role 
in (and for) the Communist society of the future that Efremov’s novel is set in. 
12The Land of Crimson Clouds is cited from Arkadii i Boris Strugatskii, Strana Bagrovykh Tuch. 
Strugatskii, Arkadii, and Boris Strugatskii. Strana Bagrovykh Tuch (The Land of Crimson Clouds) 
(Moskva: Ast, 1999), 239. 
13 This runs parallel to the present crew’s mission to install the radio transmitters so that the future 
spaceships can safely land on the planet’s surface. 
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installed as a perverse and immutable monument to this conquest, transmitting its death 
for every space traveler to reflect upon. 
The crew is deeply moved by this death, pondering the extent of the feat that they 
themselves need to perform. This death is inspirational, but what exactly it inspires 
becomes evident when one crew member gives a little eulogy, saying that the space 
explorer died “like a Real Man” (nastoiaschchii chelovek). Here, the actual content of the 
fantasy of dead bodies in space is revealed: the crew member refers to the space explorer 
using the same metaphor that Boris Polevoi used for Aleksei Meres’iev, a World War II 
pilot who lost his legs but persevered in rejoining the ranks after having learned to pilot 
with artificial limbs. 
Polevoi’s A Story about a Real Man (Povest’ o nastoiaschchem cheloveke, 1946) 
follows the events of Meres’iev’s life, narrating the circumstances of his trauma, his 
despair upon losing his legs and eventual spiritual recovery, followed by a physical one. 
The inspirational example that Meres’iev (Mares’iev in Polevoi’s novel) follows is, of 
course, the iconic hero of Socialist Realist literature, the avant la lettre Real Man, Pavka 
Korchagin from Nikolai Ostrovskii’s How the Steel Was Tempered (Kak zakalialas’ stal’, 
1932). Like Pavka, Mares’iev becomes physically disabled while in the service of the 
Soviet state, and, like Pavka, he is compelled to be again useful to the state. And, as it is 
the case with Pavka, Mares’iev’s ability to overcome all sorts of adversities, surprisingly, 
does not make him a hero: it is his mutilated body that does. 
In her How the Soviet Man Was (Un)Made, Lilya Kaganovsky suggests that 
Pavka Korchagin’s mutilated body, paradoxically, is what makes him into the ideal 
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subject of the state.14 Kaganovsky’s argument is based on Slavoj Žižek’s discussion of 
what the political regime wants from its subjects. The regime, Žižek argues in a Lacanian 
development on the social contract theory, demands that its subjects forego jouissance, 
i.e., the desire for pleasure beyond the limit imposed by the Law,15 in the name of the 
greater good. However, according to Žižek this is not enough. While the Law explicitly 
asks the subject to sacrifice something, it also implicitly asks them to enjoy repressing 
jouissance, i.e., to consent to (and be content to) forego it, which, Žižek suggests, results 
in a perfect ambiguity of pleasure and pain. 
Pavka’s mutilated body represents the ultimate sacrifice that the state requires of 
its subjects. Pavka’s Communist spirit is reinforced as his body becomes progressively 
more disabled. The pure spirit, which is distilled out of the noncompliance of Pavka’s 
body with his mind’s revolutionary aspirations, is what destroys the conventional reliance 
of subjectivity on the physical body. Pavka is able to overcome the challenge that the loss 
of bodily ability presents to him by becoming a symbol of pure spirit, as evidenced by his 
career as a writer, i.e., a figure that in the Russian cultural context has been invested with 
spiritual (and inspirational) meanings since the 19th century. 
The next “Real Man” in the line-up, Mares’iev, does not get as close to becoming 
a pure, disembodied spirit of Communism as does Pavka. Yet, it is his injury that 
transforms him from a common pilot into a truly heroic one. The famous episode from 
Aleksandr Stolper’s 1949 film adaptation of A Story about a Real Man, where Mares’iev 
                                                
14 Lilya Kaganovsky, “How the Soviet Man Was (Un)Made”, in Slavic Review, 2004, Vol. 63, No. 3, 577-
596. For a discussion of Mares’iev, see also: Lilya Kaganovsky, How the Soviet Man Was Unmade: 
Cultural Fantasy and Male Subjectivity Under Stalin (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 
esp. 119-145, 174. 
15 The Lacanian term jouissance refers to the enjoyment that is beyond the pleasure principle. See Jacques 
Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious”, in 
Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, trans. Bruce Fink (NY, W.W. Norton, 2006), 671-703, esp. 696. 
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performs, on his artificial limbs, a Russian folk dance to convince the doctors that he is fit 
to fly again, attests to the excess of what he has set out to accomplish. The dance 
Mares’iev performs is not a physical requirement for flying; however, the joyful display 
of excessive devotion is. Whether Mares’iev is more successful as a fighter pilot after his 
injury than before is immaterial; it is not the degree of actual usefulness to the state that 
matters, but rather Mares’iev’s symbolic value as a person who less respects the needs of 
his body than the interest of the state in having as many pilots as possible, even (and 
more so) if those are “damaged” pilots. 
For the Soviet cosmonauts, it seems, “just” bodily injuries and disabilities are not 
enough to turn them into ideal subjects of the state. They have to die because they are 
supposed to perform the most symbolically important task that the Soviet power can 
require of its subjects: the conquest of a space that transcends the more-or-less 
conventional ideological considerations of revolutionary struggle or of defending the 
country from external and internal enemies. Thus the requirements for the greatness of 
the feat that the cosmonauts are asked to perform are stricter, as are the obligations 
imposed on their bodies and subjectivities to be in full service of the state. This is 
because they enable the power of the state to transcend the limits of space (and, as we 
will see, time); their feat takes place in a space that is nothing but sublime. This (outer) 
space lends a sublime quality to their feats. 
Thus, the eulogy by the crew member from Land of Crimson Clouds pinpoints the 
nature of the problem: the space explorer had to die to perversely validate the quest for 
the planet’s natural resources, and consequently, to become a didactic and inspirational 
symbol of this quest. He had to sacrifice himself for the greater good, be that the demands 
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of the Communist civilization on Earth, or the spirit of scientific exploration that 
characterizes Strugatskii’s Communist universe. His death fixes him forever in his 
function as the symbol of progress and of Communist spirit. 
Unlike other deaths for the cause, however, the dead cosmonaut is probably much 
more suited to the inspirational goals of Communist ideology than the vast range of 
sacrifices of life and body that it commonly utilizes.16 This is because of the peculiar 
property of the body in space that Aleksei Tolstoi already notes and the Readers Digest 
conspiracy theory savors: it is there to remain for eternity. Therefore, the inspirational 
story that the dead body tells always has a very physical referent, even if it floats in the 
dark and is invisible to the people on Earth. The body of the dead cosmonaut is thus 
simultaneously concealed and revealed.17 The ideological meanings attached to the body 
that floats in space are thus exceptionally stable, because the body will be there when the 
need to refer to it arises. The perverse ideological stability of meaning that the body of 
the dead cosmonaut provides makes it into the perfect building block for creating myth. 
Let us go back to Tolstoi’s novel and Mikhail Los’’s ambiguous attitude towards 
outer space. Los’ is torn between the longing for peaceful, atemporal amnesia that he 
thinks outer space will provide, and the fear of the sublime eternity. In other words, he 
longs for and is afraid of one and the same property of outer space, namely, the absence 
of conventional historical temporality that measures and makes time discrete, assigning a 
temporal frame to the events that happen within it. The temptation and fear that the 
                                                
16 Numerous examples can be cited here, from Arkadii Gaidar’s Military Secret (“Voiennaia Taina,” 1935) 
to the explosion of novelized biographies of primarily young (and almost invariably dead) heroes of the 
Great Patriotic War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, like Aleksandr Fadeev’s Young Guard (“Molodaia 
Gvardiia”, 1951), Lev Kassil’s The Younger Son Street (“Ulitsa Mladshego Syna” , 1949), Lyubov’ 
Kosmodem’ianskaia’s A Story of Zoya and Shura (Povest’ o Zoie i Schure, 1953), V. Smirnov’s Zina 
Portnova and many others. 




“atemporal” temporality of outer space evokes can be explained if we consider 
similarities between this temporality and the temporality in which the Communist state 
has to theoretically exist, a temporality “after” the final point of historical process, after 
the history stops, strikingly similar to the epic “Great Time” of the Soviet novel as 
Katerina Clark discusses it.18 It is, in a way, a space of radical alterity, the most 
appropriate “no-place”, u-topia, due to a temporality it is imagined (not) to possess. 
The ideal, immutable, eternal symbol of the dead body in space becomes more 
than a beacon that signals the ideal (even as, or precisely because, it is dead) Soviet 
subjectivity to the rest of the state’s subjects and to the rest of the world. In a space that 
possesses what can be deemed a perversely ideal Communist temporality, the dead body 
serves as a constant reference to the ideal Soviet subject in the ideal Soviet space. 
Post-Soviet Deconstruction of the Myth 
All of the features of the corpus of fantasies about dead cosmonauts, namely: the 
fantasy’s potential of becoming a powerful symbol of the Soviet state’s accomplishment; 
the fantasy’s appeal to the desired ahistorical temporality that both Communism and 
outer space promise; the dead cosmonaut’s status as an ideal subject of the state that has 
to undergo an ultimate ordeal (death) to be installed as such; and the perverse nature of 
all of these that is manifested in the excess of the required sacrifice and the excess of the 
subjectivity that results19 – all of these become subject to deconstruction in post-Soviet 
literature and film. On the one hand, this deconstruction is a result of exposing the 
                                                
18 Clark 40. 
19 Though the dead body is of course devoid of “conventional” subjectivity, it is invested with a symbolic 
subjectivity that maintains an infinite existence. 
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mythological nature of the Communist grand narrative in the aftermath of perestroika and 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its structuring narratives. 
On the other hand, film and fiction’s very turn to this corpus of fantasies signifies 
that they still hold an imaginative potential as post-Soviet culture works with the Soviet 
material to create its own mythological content. Several important post-Soviet texts in the 
1990s and 2000s turn to the fantasies of the dead cosmonauts, as it seems that for post-
Soviet culture outer space holds another promise, predicated on the nostalgia for its 
Soviet value – of being a place where the concerns of the now-post-Soviet subjectivity 
can be examined. 
Viktor Pelevin’s Omon Ra: the Soviet Cosmos and its Discontents  
Viktor Pelevin’s short novel, Omon Ra (1991) reveals the structure of the fantasy 
that is formally similar, but ideologically strikingly different from what we have already 
seen in the Soviet texts; here, the fantasy’s structure is exposed, not concealed,20 which 
radically changes the “message” of the novel. 
Sally Dalton-Brown contends that the text’s main theme is (Soviet) propaganda 
and its exposure/deconstruction.21 This indeed seems to be the case, as the plot would 
suggest: a boy, Omon, dreams of becoming a cosmonaut; is able to join the Space 
Program; is instructed by his superiors that he needs to sacrifice his life for the sake of 
the mission’s success; is getting ready to die because the details of the mission do not 
include the return of the cosmonauts (indeed, officially it is an automatic flight that does 
                                                
20 The novel’s dedication supports the argument that the ideological fantasy in question is the same Soviet 
fantasy. Omon Ra is dedicated to the “heroes of the Soviet Cosmos” (“geroiam sovetskogo kosmosa”). The 
formulation demonstrates the dynamics of symbolic appropriation that structured the Space Race: the outer 
space here becomes a Soviet territory. 
21 Sally Dalton-Brown, “Ludic Nonchalance or Ludicrous Despair? Viktor Pelevin and Russian 




not include any human space travelers at all); and finally goes to the Moon only to 
discover that the whole mission was an elaborate set-up and he had never left Earth. The 
Soviet space program turns out to be a simulation, an attempt to invent itself in order to 
be able to compete with the “enemy,” the USA, in the Space Race, all the while lacking 
financial and technological resources to do so. 
As much as the text’s “message” is indeed the dismantling of the elaborate web of 
Soviet propaganda through a postmodernist deconstruction of ideological simulacra, it is 
nonetheless not its only focus. While the Soviet space program in the novel turns out to 
be a sham, the deaths of its participants, at least as far as the narrator can tell, are not 
being simulated: the cosmonauts have to die “for real,” in an uncanny post-Soviet 
reiteration of the heroic path of becoming “Real Men.” If the phantasmatic content of the 
myth of the Real Man is taken into account in the reading of the text, it becomes a novel 
that deals with “metaphysical and eternal concepts”22 even as it deconstructs the Soviet 
propaganda. 
Omon Ra’s eponymous protagonist and narrator, Omon Krivomazov shares his 
dream of going to space with the flight school admission committee and is asked to join 
the cosmonaut squad in a “space school.” He is then explicitly asked to sacrifice his life 
for his country. He becomes a part of the lunar mission, but in a bizarre capacity: Omon 
is supposed to drive the lunar module that is touted as the achievement of Soviet space 
automatics. In the course of training, Omon learns that the Soviet automatics is 
nonexistent, and all the automatic systems, like intercontinental ballistic missiles and 
spaceships are in fact operated by humans, who are in the novel very appropriately called 
                                                
22As Sergei Kostyrko suggests in his early review of the novel. See Sergei Kostyrko, “Chistoie Pole 
Literatury”, in Novyi Mir, 1992, 12, pp. 250-59. A similar opinion is expressed by S. Chuprinin, 
“Sbyvsheesia Nebyvshee”, Znamia, 1993, 9, p. 181-188. 
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“Real Men,” a designation that penetrates the actual content of the romanticized Soviet 
concept: operating a sustainer rocket engine in the novel invariably results in the death of 
the human who performs this task. Omon is required to die (to shoot himself, as there is 
no means of return to Earth), too, after he installs a transmitter broadcasting Soviet 
slogans on the lunar surface. The actual content of the mission of Strugatskiie’s space 
explorer is thus made explicit in Pelevin’s text, as Omon’s (eventually) dead body is 
precisely what will ensure the proper functioning of the symbol of the Soviet 
appropriation of outer space, the transmitter. 
Omon Ra engages with the myth of “Real Men” by exposing the implications of 
what the hero of How The Steel Was Tempered is transformed into by the requirements 
imposed on his subjectivity by the state. Where Ostrovskii’s character became the ideal 
Soviet subject “despite” (or precisely because of, as Kaganovsky argues) his mutilation, 
in Pelevin’s novel the mutilation becomes an explicit, and officially sanctioned, 
prerequisite to being useful to the state. The text’s constant strategy is the schizophrenic 
literalizing and legitimizing of Soviet mythology’s most emotionally charged metaphors. 
When Omon, taking his first step on the way to space, enters the flight school (named 
after Aleksei Mares’iev), a high-ranking member of the admission committee speaks to 
the incoming class, saying that the class will not train to become just pilots in the school, 
but first and foremost – real men.23 This sounds like just another lofty Soviet formula 
peppering the novel’s parody of the Party-sanctioned discourse– but only until after the 
meeting, when the class goes to the mess hall, where their food is spiked with sedatives; 
they wake up in the morning to find their feet amputated, to repeat Aleksei Mares’iev’s 
                                                
23 Viktor Pelevin, Omon Ra. Trans. Andrew Bromfield (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996).This 
sentence is omitted in the Bromfield translation (31). Further quotations refer to this edition. 
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journey towards being the Soviet hero pilot in shockingly exact detail. Omon and his 
friend escape this fate because the state has another one in mind for them (for which they 
must yet remain able-bodied). Yet, Omon still has a chance to observe a graduate of the 
flight school at his final examination, consisting of performing the folk dance for the 
exam committee. The graduate passes with flying colors, which on the surface attests to 
the effectiveness of his transformation into a Real Man. However, while for Polevoi’s 
Mares’iev, at least, dancing was a way to persuade the medical board to let him fly again, 
in the phantasmatic version of the Soviet Union constructed by Pelevin’s novel, the 
performance is a means to its own end. The novel associates the Soviet State with the 
excess of ritualistic performativity: Omon learns that the graduate has never flown, nor 
would he ever fly, because this Soviet Union possesses only a couple of planes that patrol 
the border. 
Further, on his way to the Moscow secret “cosmonaut school” Omon hears shots 
from afar; his driver explains that the shots come from the Aleksandr Matrosov infantry 
school. No further explanation is given, but, amputated feet still fresh in mind of 
Pelevin’s reader familiar with Soviet heroic narratives, they can imagine that the cadets at 
the Matrosov school are trained to throw themselves on pill-boxes, blocking the machine-
guns with their own bodies to allow their units to escape the fire, repeating the feat of 
historical Aleksandr Matrosov, another martyr in the Soviet war pantheon, during the 
Great Patriotic War. 
Pavka Korchagin, too, appears in the text; attesting to the excess of the heroic feat 
that the state requires of him, he is split in two. Omon’s two political instructors in the 
secret cosmonaut school are named Urchagin and Burchagin: these alliterative copies of 
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the first Real Man graduated, Omon learns, from the Pavel Korchagin School of Higher 
Political Education24 that manufactures Pavkas on a large scale. The mass production of 
heroes, the reader is led to believe, works quite well for the ideological goals of the state 
in the novel’s universe. Omon cannot help being inspired by the mechanically reproduced 
copies of Korchagin, whose everyday life is also a literal reproduction of the inspirational 
setup given in the Ostrovskii’s novel: 
I was amazed at the positive optimism of this man [Urchagin], blind, paralyzed, 
chained to a wheelchair, but nonetheless carrying out his duty and never tiring of 
life. […] [He] would lie silent and motionless, propped up on his elbow on the 
bed in a tiny room on the fifth floor, wearing his uniform jacket and covered up to 
the waist with a blanket that hid the bedpan from probing eyes. The poor 
furnishings of the room – a map case for writing on, with narrow slits in the sheet 
of cardboard laid over it, a glass of strong tea permanently on the table, the white 
curtain and the rubber plant – all touched me so profoundly I almost wept, and at 
those moments I stopped thinking that all Communists were cunning, mean, and 
self-serving.25 
In this parallel universe of literalized metaphors, Omon is, to an extent, an 
outsider: he retains some degree of skepticism towards the symbolic excesses of the 
Soviet state. That he himself is ready to become one of the Real Men is inconsistent with 
                                                
24 This is omitted in the Bromfield translation. 
25 Pelevin (Omon Ra), 56.The Russian text is cited from: Pelevin, Viktor. Omon Ra. < 
http://pelevin.nov.ru/romans/pe-omon/>. Accessed Apr. 2, 2009. “Меня поражал оптимизм этого 
человека, слепого, парализованного, прикованного к инвалидному креслу - но выполняющего свой 
долг и не устающего радоваться жизни. [Он] молча и неподвижно полулежал в кровати в крохотной 
комнате пятого этажа - в кителе, до пояса прикрытый одеялом, скрывавшим от постороннего 
взгляда судно. Бедная обстановка комнаты, планшет для письма с узкими прорезями в 
накладываемой сверху картонке, неизменный стакан крепкого чая на столе, белая занавеска и фикус 
- все это трогало меня почти до слез, и в эти минуты я переставал думать, что все коммунисты - 
хитрые, подловатые и основательные люди”. 
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this skepticism. He manages to be, simultaneously, a dissident and an already-ideal, 
unquestioning Soviet subject. To see how Omon, in a feat of Orwellian doublethink, 
manages to reconcile his admiration for the simulacra of Korchagin with an 
understanding that the Communists are, in general, not very nice people, we need to 
examine the source of his surprising compliance with all and everything that the state 
requires of him. 
Upon seeing the flight school cadets that have undergone the required 
“transformation,” Omon notices “how pale and unhealthy their faces were; they seemed 
to bear the imprint of long days of interminable torment, to have been recast in a fixed 
expression of readiness”26 and recalls the Young Pioneer’s organization traditional 
greeting, “Always Ready!”. Where the Bromfield translation would have him say, “ [I] 
realiz(ed) what frauds we’d been… loudly assuring ourselves… that we were always 
prepared”27, in the Russian text he realizes, literally, “what it was that we were assuring 
ourselves and everybody else of when we shouted out, ‘Always ready!’” Omon does not 
think he was a fraud when he shouted the Young Pioneer’s greeting; on the contrary, he 
seems to have always known the “it” for which he formulaically and not entirely 
consciously claimed he was ready as a boy. 
Omon is surprisingly compliant with all the requirements of his training, as well 
as with the necessity to eventually die. His emotions upon learning about the inner 
workings of the Space Program and the deceit that it is predicated upon are very subdued. 
He experiences very little shock when he is told he will need to die and, though the 
thought of dying does not please him at all, he still proceeds with his training. The key to 
                                                




the text lies in this lack of emotion that is best approached through examining the 
structure of narration. 
The previously discussed Soviet space crews discovered the bodies of other 
cosmonauts to learn their ideological and moral lessons. Omon, on the other hand, is 
supposed to become this body; yet, he cannot become it, because he is also the narrator in 
the text, and his never-slipping first person subjective narration is already a proof that his 
story of being a Soviet cosmonaut and dying to become a hero will not end the way 
Socialist Realist formula would have it. Where the Socialist heroes are retrospectively 
heroic, Omon is only potentially so. To use Aleksandr Fadeev’s The Young Guard as an 
example, Oleg Koshevoi and his friends go towards their ends without knowing them: 
they are ready to die for their Motherland, of course, but they do not know that they will, 
much less how or when. The ideological impact of the story, then, is achieved through the 
constant interplay of the reader’s historical knowledge that the members of the Young 
Guard perished, and the narrative’s own (seeming) unawareness that this will happen. 
The narrative perspective in The Young Guard belongs to the characters, with little to no 
didactic digressions on the part of the subdued omniscient narrator, who chooses to 
withhold his omniscience in respect of the young people’s fate until the very last chapters 
of the novel. 
In the case of Omon Ra, the mechanism is reversed: the Soviet ideology’s 
unwillingness to conceal, in the novel’s universe, its inner workings, ensures that Omon 
firmly believes that he is going to die as a result of his heroic feat (and, as we have seen, 
may actually want to, because of more “personal” reasons), yet he does not. Thus, he is 
hardly a Soviet hero in retrospect; he is able to become a pastiche of a Soviet hero 
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because he performs, in the course of his life, the actions that would eventually make him 
a hero in retrospect. This performance is conscious, or so the narrative logic would have 
it: Omon the narrator, already “omniscient,” selects the episodes in the life of his 
temporal Other, the younger Omon, doing what the narrator of The Young Guard did 
when he selected the episodes of Oleg Koshevoi’s childhood that pointed towards 
dormant heroism. However, because these two Omons pretend to be one and the same for 
the reader, the structural elements of the heroic narrative lack a critical distance from 
which they can be observed (which Fadeev-the-narrator’s position in relation to the 
Young Guard allowed). 
In this way, Omon spends the novel preparing to become a dead cosmonaut, a 
symbol of the Soviet achievement in space, while it is quite obvious that he will live, as 
he is still able to narrate. The tension between what we are led to believe by the formulaic 
nature of the narrative (which in its conceptual structure repeats the Soviet 
Bildungsroman) and Omon’s narratorial position makes proper functioning of such a 
narrative impossible. In other words, Omon cannot be living and telling the story within 
the context of the Soviet formula, though all of the structural elements of the formula are 
present. The narrative perspective, then, lends a sort of retroactive logic to the narration; 
the narrator’s present, his status as a cosmonaut who stayed alive, shapes all the previous 
events of his life. 
The novel starts with outlining the steps through which Omon’s childhood dream 
of going into space crystallizes. At the outset, the account pretends to be just another 
Soviet Bildungsroman: Omon begins by reminiscing about his formative years, and the 
somewhat clichéd style of reflection deceivingly structures the beginning of the novel as 
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a (slightly more lyrical than usual) story about the Soviet boy who wants to become a 
cosmonaut. However, upon closer examination, Omon’s account of his childhood dream 
turns out to be very inconsistent with the standard Soviet model of such accounts. 
Consider, for example, Viktor Dragunskii’s Deniskiny Rasskazy (“Deniska’s 
Stories”) from the early 1960s,28 narrated from the perspective of a little boy, Deniska, 
who describes how his dream to become a cosmonaut came into existence. Deniska hears 
about the Nikolaiev-Popovich first group flight29 on the radio, sees the elation of his 
parents and other adults (who are so happy that they let Deniska’s pranks go unpunished), 
and is especially excited about the cosmonauts’ romantic call signs, Sokol (“Falcon”) and 
Berkut (“Golden Eagle”), which he and his best friend immediately adopt in their play. 
Significantly, it is the heavily theatrical and heroic setup, together with validation 
from adults and “such pretty call signs!” that prompt Deniska and his friend to start 
dreaming of becoming cosmonauts (they even build a “rocket ship” in the playground 
and “launch” it). Even more significantly, to prepare for their careers they decide, before 
they are accepted to the “cosmonaut school” (which is not going to happen for quite some 
time - they are eight years old), to “condition themselves like steel”, a pun on the title of 
Ostrovskii’s novel introduced in the song from the Stalinist film Vratar’(The Goalkeeper, 
1937). The song, Sportivnyi Marsh (“Sports March”), encourages to “temper yourself like 
steel” in order for body and soul to remain “young.” Deniska and his friend, inspired “not 
to be afraid of heat or cold,” take the song’s recommendation at face value: they begin 
taking cold showers and fall ill, promptly taking the first step on the sacrificial way of the 
Soviet Real Man. 
                                                
28 See Viktor Dragunskii, The Adventures of Dennis. Trans. Fainna Glagoleva (Moscow, Progress 
Publishers, 1981). 
29 On August 11, 1962. 
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While Deniska and his friend acquire their dream through paternal validation and 
acutely, if not totally consciously, feel the need to transform themselves, symbolically as 
well as physically, into “Real Men” to become cosmonauts, Omon Ra subverts not only 
the content, but also the structure of the Soviet Bildungsroman by laying bare the death 
drive that underlies the Soviet heroic narrative. 
Peter Brooks, in his application of Sigmund Freud’s theory of death drive to 
narrative dynamics, argues that the narrative desire, the desire of reading is a desire for 
the end, reached through the detour of the plot of narrative.30 Brooks argues that this 
consideration ensures the sort of anticipatory logic that the narratives must follow: 
The sense of a beginning, then, must in some important way be determined by the 
sense of an ending. We might say that we are able to read present moments—in 
literature and, by extension, in life—as endowed with narrative meaning only 
because we read them in anticipation of the structuring power of those endings 
that will retrospectively give them the order and significance of plot.31 
Brooks mentions the “retrospective knowledge”32 that the narrative seeks, which 
is precisely the knowledge with which the older, wiser Omon the narrator invests the 
events of his previous life. The narrative’s desire for its own death, then, is too realized in 
retrospect; in the case of Omon Ra, it is the retrospection that makes apparent the content 
of Omon’s dream to go to space. As a boy, even as Omon thinks about space, he never 
imagines any detail of his own experience in the space beyond liftoff, and this moment of 
                                                
30 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Vintage, 1984), 52 
and 104. 
31 Brooks 1984, 94. 
32 Brooks 1984,  95. 
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symbolic crossing of a threshold marks the death of the dream’s narrative, the actual end 
of the dream. 
Luckily, for the time being the state’s desire to make a Real Man out of Omon 
coincides with Omon’s own desire to belong in space by radically changing his plane of 
existence: both acts require a death, if not physical, then at least symbolic. Katerina Clark 
suggests that all Stalinist novels involve  
some kind of death [as a formal] element in the traditional rite of passage […] 
because death is involved not only in the preparatory or liminal phase of the rite 
[of passage] but also in the moment of passage itself. […] When the hero sheds his 
individualistic self at the moment of passage, he dies as an individual and is reborn 
as a function of the collective33 
Though Omon Ra is not an outright pastiche of a Stalinist novel, it nevertheless 
makes visible the inner structures of Socialist Realist heroic narrative which more often 
than not does “kill” its heroes to fix them forever in their heroic capacity. 
Furthermore, laying bare the requirements for the Soviet brand of heroism, Omon 
Ra tackles the source of the subject’s compliance with the demands of the State, finding it 
in the State’s eagerness to utilize its subjects’ death drive to its own ends. In the ideal 
Soviet heroic narrative, the State would “read” Omon’s desire and single him out as a 
potential (dead) hero; Omon would comply with the requirement because that would be 
exactly what he would have wanted all along. Indeed, this is what the admission 
committee does when they accept Omon into flight school: the committee member listens 
to the story about a spaceship model with no door inside (so that cosmonauts cannot 
escape) and, precisely because Omon chooses to tell this story to explain why he wants to 
                                                
33 Clark 178. 
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be a cosmonaut, interprets it as an early indication of his capability of becoming a Real 
Man, i.e., an already-dead hero. 
According to Peter Brooks, though narratives long for their ends, the circuitous 
path towards that end, a function of the Freudian pleasure principle, is nevertheless 
imperative for the proper functioning of a narrative. There is no possibility for such a 
circuitous path in Omon’s case because this path is made hyper-linear by the will of the 
state. Yet the balance between the death drive and the pleasure principle tips towards the 
latter when Omon discovers that his desire to be a “heavenly body,” i.e., to belong in 
space, is betrayed by the space itself. 
The (outer) space where Omon’s death drive and the state’s desire for dead 
subjects were supposed to be perfectly aligned turns out to be structurally inappropriate 
to make the Real Man myth happen. The “outer space” where Omon (supposedly) goes, 
in short, fails to live up to his expectations. The vast sublime void of outer space that 
Omon dreamed about earlier in the novel turns out to be a very ordinary, mundane place: 
“I was on the moon. But I had no feelings about the fact at all; I was wondering how to 
put back the chain that had slipped off the cog wheel”34. The metaphors that he is able to 
find for his experience are, again, far from lofty: he says that the Earth seen from space 
resembles is a large school globe. Where Socialist Realist narrative would over-utilize 
pathetic fallacy for properly structuring the space where the feat is to be performed 
(thunderstorms, severe frost and wind all abound in the episodes of heroic deaths in the 
                                                
34 Pelevin 121. 
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stories of Pioneer heroes, for example),35 in Omon Ra the heroic feat is supposed to 
happen in a “narrow, black, stuffy space”36 of the lunar module. 
The state, in other words, in its already-much-exhibited carelessness, fails to make 
the heroic space happen, as Omon comes to realize in the very end of the novel when it 
becomes apparent that he in fact never left Earth. The sublime vastness of the cosmos 
turns out to be an ideological construction put in place to become the object of desire for 
the eager potential hero, Omon. The state, then, preys on Omon’s fantasy, but, in 
accordance with the general logic of the parallel universe where the events of the novel 
take place, the state never conceals that the space for heroism is far from sublime. 
The phantasmatic Soviet state of the novel promptly puts every ideologically 
relevant signified in place: it sets up the training school, it kills off the operators of 
sustainer rocket engine; in a perverse nod to the didacticism of the figure of a dead 
cosmonaut in the Socialist science fiction, it even conveniently provides the bodies of the 
former “space crews” on the “Moon” for Omon to discover in the course of his mission. 
Yet, the state fails to provide the signified that would justify the core of ideological 
meanings that it expects to produce out of Omon’s death: it fails to provide outer space 
itself. In other words, the sublime void of outer space that technically should “be there” 
for the proper Soviet hero to uncover the ideological meanings associated with this 
                                                
35 There seem to be two main modes of using pathetic fallacy in the stories of young Soviet martyrs: in 
Povest o Zoie i Schure by Luybov Kosmodem’ianskaia, the morning of the young woman’s hanging by the 
Nazis is accompanied by a severe frost the likes of which the villagers cannot recall; lightning flashes 
consecutively on the faces of each member of the Young Guard in the scene of their execution in the 
cinematic adaptation of the Fadeev novel; on the other hand, in Lev Kassil’s Younger Son’s Street, the 
morning of the boy’s death is the most beautiful morning, peaceful and bright, which contradicts the 
tragedy, yet signifies that this death is not in vain because the boy’s heroism in the Crimean resistance 
enables the defeat of the Nazis and thus restores the much-longed-for peace in his hometown. 
36 Pelevin 123. 
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sublimity (those of ideological appropriation and the sublime post-historicity of 
Communism), is not there. 
In the end of the novel, Omon exits the module only to discover that he is in the 
Moscow Underground. Instead of the “above” of outer space, he is literally “below.” The 
novel leaves him as he tries to figure out where he needs to go from there. By making the 
“heroic” narrative open-ended, the text performs the final stage of this narrative’s 
deconstruction, denying it its limit. Furthermore, that outer space itself turns out to be not 
just unreachable, but also, for all practical purposes, non-existent, signifies the failure of 
the ideological fantasy of the cosmos to sustain its impact on the Soviet subject as the 
subject learns that the cosmos is just that – the fantasy, with no physical referent. Omon’s 
heroic feat, then, is not properly structured not just because the heroic narrative’s 
conventionally linear structure fails due to his ambivalent position as an undead hero-
narrator. Also, the space where the finiteness (death) of the narrative has to happen with 
maximum ideological impact is, in the novel’s universe, non-existent. The fantasy has 
gone too far in ripping the signifiers from their signifieds, and it seems that even in 
Omon’s unmistakably postmodern subjectivity the connection should be maintained. 
Does this mean that the Soviet myth of space exploration is dead? It certainly 
seems to be the case as the novel exposes the sacrificial nature of Soviet heroism and the 
carelessness of the state in sustaining the fantasy. Yet, Omon is no victim: his status as a 
cosmonaut who survived makes him “own” his death drive. In one episode, Omon recalls 
the slogan on the wall of his training hall, which says “Life always has room for 
heroism.” He theorizes that  
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It was not just romantic nonsense but a precise and sober statement of the fact that 
our Soviet life is not the ultimate instance of reality but only, as it were, its 
anteroom. I imagined it this way: there is no space anywhere in America, between 
the glaring shop window and the parked Cadillac, for heroism, and there can be 
no space for it – apart, of course, from that rare moment when a Soviet spy passes 
by37. 
Omon theorizes space’s potential for acquiring ideologically relevant meanings in 
a way that is surprisingly similar to the conventional Soviet heroic narrative. The 
presence of a hero is supposed to transform the space in which he performs his feat; this 
is why in the formulaic heroic narrative, nature eagerly provides extreme weather to echo 
the executions of Soviet heroes. In the mock-Socialist-Realist universe of Omon Ra any 
and every one of the mass-produced and nameless heroes is expected to have the “special 
powers” to transform the world around them. 
While rejecting the notion of the dead hero, the novel does not deny the notion of 
Romantic heroism altogether, as Omon possesses these “special powers” even as he 
realizes that he is creating an illusion. As Omon’s younger self cannot help but admire his 
political instructor, as this younger Omon convinces himself that he is in space during the 
“flight,” we recall an early episode from Omon’s childhood, carefully placed by the older 
Omon-the-narrator in the beginning of the narrative. In this episode, the boy Omon was 
able to imagine that he flew a plane, surprised at how convincing the illusion was. The 
mock-Soviet state did not provide Omon with the object of his desire, outer space, yet 
Omon did not need it because he had it all along. In his childhood, he was able see outer 
                                                
37 Pelevin (Omon Ra), 61. 
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space amidst the bleak Soviet landscape, even if (and even as) he realized it was an 
illusion. 
The fetishist’s simultaneous “knowing” and “not knowing” underlies the novel’s 
reflection on the Soviet symbolic legacy: Omon Ra borrows the framework of the 
Communist sublime ideological fantasy, and on this framework builds another one. 
While the Soviet fantasy of space ceased to function properly for Omon, Omon’s ability 
to transform the space around him recovers some measure of authenticity to the notion of 
[Soviet] heroism. In a nostalgic move, the novel borrows the sublimity of the Soviet 
subject’s experience in space to redeem the notion of heroism that is stripped of its 
ideological underpinnings, leaving only its Romantic core. Omon did not go to space, but 
he did not need to: he was there all along, as the unmoving, atemporal, tempting and 
frightening outer space comes to metaphorize the post-Soviet nostalgic object, the Soviet 
Union. As Omon sees himself in space while surrounded by the garbage cans of a Soviet 
courtyard, the swarm of deconstructionist and satirical moves in the novel conceals its 
return to traditional Russian cultural concerns in an attempt to find a metaphor for the 
Soviet experience that does not rely on ideology. 
Aleksei Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon: Resurrecting the Dead 
Cosmonauts. 
Aleksei Fedorchenko’s 2004 film, First on the Moon, follows Omon Ra in carving 
out a post-Soviet niche for the Soviet myth of the conquest of space. The film introduces 
208 
 
Russia to the first full-fledged incarnation of the mockumentary genre38 by narrating the 
“secret history” of the Soviet space program in the late 1930s. 
Exploring the post-Soviet tension between the nostalgic and the critical 
representation of Soviet history, the film inverts a familiar negative mechanism of 
conspiracy theories associated with Space Race. Where the “flapping” flag in the Apollo 
11 moon landing footage has become “proof” that the mission never landed on Moon,39 
First on the Moon demonstrates, with the same degree of conspiratorial conviction, 
filmed evidence of the fact that Russians were on the Moon as early as 1938, in a playful 
nod to the Cold War cultural dynamics. The film explicitly does what the American 
conspiracy theorists claim was done in respect of the Apollo landing: it fakes 
documentary footage to create a historical event, and the explicitness of deconstruction 
becomes for the film a source of reclaiming and reconstructing history. 
                                                
38 Aleksander Prokhorov, in his review of the film, traces the experiments of the nascent mockumentary 
genre in post-Soviet cinema, but posits First on the Moon to be the first production that consistently fits 
into the genre scheme. Prokhorov argues that mockumentary is an exceptionally productive genre to close 
the “gap between Soviet reality and its representation in Soviet culture”. See Aleksander Prokhorov, “The 
Redemption of Lunar Reality: Aleksei Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon (Pervye na lune)”, 2005. Kino-
Kultura 2006: 11.<http://www.kinokultura.com/2006/11r-firstmoon2.shtml>, accessed May 29, 2009. To 
extrapolate from Prokhorov’s argument, mockumentary uses the representational techniques conventionally 
associated with “telling the truth” for dealing with fictional subjects. Thus, the gap between “fact” and 
“fiction” is formally exposed because the fictional subject matter of the film is presented as objectively 
verifiable. In the post-Soviet cultural context, permeated with the remnants of Soviet signifiers that have 
proved to be empty, such representational mode, paradoxically, can potentially become a functional model 
of working through the past, because it ironically, yet compulsively uses the same techniques of 
fictionalizing social reality that were used (with little irony in mind) in creating Soviet master narrative. As 
a result, the constant awareness of the fictional nature of the object of representation (i.e., historical event) 
ensures that the mockumentary functions just like this narrative, with limited connection to social reality. In 
other words, the mockumentary’s mode of treating the event is very similar to the mode in which the Soviet 
official discourse is perceived, in the post-Soviet context, to have treated Soviet social reality. That is, by 
using representational politics of the mockumentary genre, the film, on one level, examines the creation of 
the Soviet myth, but, by the very fact of this examination, it conceptually solidifies it, by consciously 
narrating it as a myth, which enables the film to find a “proper place” for the important part of the Soviet 
grand narrative (i.e., Space Race) in the post-Soviet context. That it does so by ironically deconstructing the 
past is in fact a nostalgic move; the nostalgia here is not for the lost culture, but for the lost modality of 
representation. 
39 Several reviews explicitly compare and contrast First on the Moon with Capricorn One. 
209 
 
Further, First on the Moon blends nostalgia for the time when the Space Program 
was a source of national pride and the hardly nostalgic representation of the grotesque 
atmosphere of the Soviet cultural milieu that brought the myth into existence. This 
ambivalence of assessment of Soviet history prompted early domestic reviews of film to 
be obviously confused as to what exactly it “says.” An anonymous online reviewer 
muses, “Unfortunately, just the post-Soviet viewer and a handful of Western intellectuals 
can get wild about the film.”40 Indeed, the representation of the Soviet space program in 
the film is conceptually strikingly similar to that of Omon Ra, just as the program itself is 
equally phantasmatic.41 
Fedorchenko happily shares in his interviews the great lengths to which his crew 
went locating and obtaining the unused caches of older film to give the footage an 
“authentic” feel. Pretending to be a journalistic investigation (a documentary genre that 
swelled on Russian television in the 1990s), the film “locates” and “interviews” the 
surviving “witnesses.” 
                                                
40 Anonymous review of First on the Moon, 2004: 
<http://project.insysltd.ru/pls/ivan/movies.htm?action=1&value=5&p_value2=3782>, accessed May 29, 
2009: “К сожалению, реально протащиться от фильма может только постсоветский зритель и 
горстка западных интеллектуалов”. 
41 The motives of appropriation of space, simulation, and death (readily observed in Omon Ra) re-emerge in 
First on the Moon’s treatment of Space Program. Thus, the repetitive clips literally show simulation of the 
cosmonauts’ training in flight simulators. Just as we have seen in Omon Ra, this simulation dangerously 
borders reality: in an episode where the cosmonauts are shown to train in rarefied atmosphere, the 
technician acts as flight controller and his commands follow liftoff and landing routines; meanwhile, the 
cosmonauts, progressively less and less conscious, are shown sitting in a crude simulator that looks like a 
shed. What the film seemingly shows is just that space training does require some amount of physical 
discomfort, which the offscreen commentary cheerfully asserts. However, in a move that the film would 
repeatedly use, that of mismatched soundtrack and visuals, the cheerfulness of the commentary that 
immediately follows the clip is undermined by the camera’s lingering on the faces of visibly suffering 
cosmonauts and later on their unconscious bodies. The footage being shown comes, we are lead to believe, 
from several surveillance cameras in the training module, all looking at the crew from different angles and 
differently zoomed, yet footage from these different cameras is edited into one sequence, which nearly 
eliminates the “documentary” feel of the sequence. Instead, it strikes the viewer as camerawork 




The mission of the first Soviet cosmonauts, according to the investigation, is in 
line with the rest of unmistakably utopian aspirations of Stalinist Russia: the program 
shoots right for the Moon, skipping the human orbit flight and much of the animal 
testing. The launch is scheduled for March 16, 1938. Upon failure of the mission several 
minutes into launch, the program is quickly wrapped up, the chief engineer disappears, 
the substitute members of the crew are assassinated, and the cosmonaut Ivan Kharlamov 
is presumed lost. However, he resurfaces, badly injured, with brain damage that allegedly 
prevents him from “telling the story.” Ivan, then, the logic of the investigation suggests, 
manages to return from space under undisclosed circumstances and travel back to Russia. 
However, due to the mission’s failure, the state does not appear to need Ivan 
alive, and, repressive psychiatry always in the background of the film, he is 
institutionalized so that the possible tales of his space journey can be officially construed 
as a delusion of a madman. Ivan’s cosmonaut training was allegedly rigorously 
documented on video by the NKVD (the KGB’s predecessor); the constant surveillance, 
to which nearly every aspect of the cosmonaut’s life is subjected, installs Ivan as, 
literally, the subject of the state(‘s total observation). In the end, Ivan, like Pelevin’s 
protagonist, Omon, is able to escape the Soviet panopticon: his later life, we are told, is 
officially a mystery.42 Even as he “dies” officially, on the visual level, Kharlamov is 
“dead” even earlier, before the launch, as his immobile body, eyes closed, is loaded into 
the spacecraft. This is very appropriate: after all, he is about to become a Soviet hero. 
                                                
42 Though we manage to get a glimpse of Kharlamov’s later years and find out that he, in a way, did 
become a hero, and very “Russian” at that. He performs in the circus under the stage name, Aleksandr 
Nevskii, historical Prince Aleksandr Nevskii (13th century) being perhaps one of the least disputably heroic 
figures in early Russian history. Thus Kharlamov metonymically partakes in the glory of the “Russia’s 
Sun”, “solntse zemli russkoi”, as the chronicle calls Aleksandr. 
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This brings us to the reemergence of the motif of “Real Men” in the film. The 
film already treats the production of the ideal Soviet subject as a distinct part of the 
Soviet mythology (together with associated symbolic structures and images). 
Furthermore, the impression that the Real Men for this 2004 film are already something 
firmly associated with the imaginary Soviet cultural landscape arises from the film’s 
surprisingly analytical (and ambivalent) treatment of the topic. While First on the Moon’s 
whole representational premise is predicated on the ambivalence of historical 
interpretation, the film seems to be especially uneasy with the issue of producing the 
Soviet subject, simultaneously fascinated and repulsed by it, thus translating the 
“pleasure-pain” that is at the core of the myth of the Real Man into its own 
representational politics, which the surviving member of the cosmonaut squad sums up, 
reminiscing: “All this training, all these G-forces, twelve hours a day… Hard… Nice.”43 
However, while the film has been called “a thoughtful look at the casual brutality 
of Stalinist Russia,”44 the subjects of this brutality, in an already familiar move that the 
“documentary” format easily allows, many years after the events claim to have enjoyed 
this brutality quite a bit, while the look on their faces in the “documentary footage” 
attests to the contrary. When Fedorchenko says in an interview that he made a film about 
“the titans of spirit,” he is pinpointing the nature of the problem: the Communist heroes, 
though beautified by the temporal distance and nostalgia, are disembodied, to remain 
forever as a cinematic illusion. 
                                                
43 Thus, many playful jabs at the symbology associated with the ideological descendants of Pavka 
Korchagin are readily observed in the film. The Soviet cultural milieu of the film is peppered with 
blacksmiths who can still work, injured, even after the machinery they operate gives up. In a satirical 
extrapolation from the popular song of the Stalin era, the Aviators’ March, where the aviators acquire arms 
of steel to be used as wings and a “fiery engine” for a heart, the film introduces in the exposition a footage 
of a fascinating (and fantastic) project of replacing the bony skeleton of humans by a metallic one 
44 IIFF 2007: First on the Moon review, Jun 1, 2007: <http://twitchfilm.net/archives/010243.htm>, accessed 
May 29, 2009. 
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The opening shot of the film establishes the modality of representation that the 
rest of the film would follow. After the title, the long shot of what appears to be a lunar 
landscape, together with craters and mysterious geologic formations, turns out to be a 
close-up of the ground that is being dug by a spade as the camera zooms out. What is 
being shown is not what it seems but rather is what the camera made it look like, the 
opening shot suggests. A legitimate question then remains: why does the fantasy of outer 
space become so conceptually productive for mourning (and recreating) the Soviet utopia 
in the post-Soviet culture even as it is explicitly posited to be fake? Fedorchenko himself 
believes that “the Moon is not a goal, but just a motive, just a pretext [to show] that the 
film really is about real heroes, titans, strong, smart, honest people, who, for their 
Motherland, are expendable.”45 As much as this reading is perfectly valid, it still has to be 
said that the Moon (and outer space in general) for post-Soviet culture is not just the 
pretext to nostalgically muse about the past Soviet glory, but an outright starting premise 
of such musings; the cosmos as a conceptual space is a premise that holds enormous 
signification potential. 
As mentioned earlier, outer space in Soviet mythology is associated with utopian 
meanings, both experiential and ideological; yet, this utopia tends to turn into a dystopia, 
because of the inherent ambivalence of conceptualizing the cosmos as the sublime. Outer 
space thus holds a potential for exploring the tension between the positive and negative 
readings of Soviet (utopian) mythology, allowing to mythologize and demythologize, 
“utopianize” and “dystopianize” the Soviet culture. 
                                                
45 “Pravda” review, <http://www.pravda.ru/world/europe/52114-luna-0. 28.09.2005>: “На самом деле, 
этот фильм о том, как настоящие герои, титаны, сильные, умные, честные люди, оказываются 




Where in Omon Ra the protagonist never left Earth, thus being denied the “real” 
signified of the sublime Soviet heroic narrative, in First on the Moon the situation is 
problematized further. The final sequence of the film is footage that, we are led to 
believe, comes from a camera mounted on the visor of Ivan Kharlamov’s spacesuit 
helmet, having magically survived the catastrophe. Notwithstanding the fact that we have 
already seen a lunar landscape that proved to be fake in the opening shots of the film, in 
this sequence the viewer is sutured with Kharlamov. Kharlamov, battered by his flight 
experience, muted by his head trauma and by Soviet forced psychiatry, we are told 
earlier, was desperately trying to get healthy, to be able to “tell the story.” However, we 
are left wondering about the circumstances of his incident until the final sequence, which 
does what Kharlamov could not: it does tell, in the first and only instance of suture with 
the character occurring in the film, that Russians were on the Moon in the year 1938. This 
formal suture uses the power of cinematic identification even as it has exposed the inner 
workings of the cinematic apparatus many times in course of the film, not to cathartically 
return to the “belief in make-believe,” but to create an interpretative moment that Tsvetan 
Todorov describes in his theory of the fantastic: 
In a world [that] we know....there occurs an event which cannot be explained by 
the laws of this same familiar world.  The person who experiences the event must 
opt for one of two possible solutions:  either he is the victim of an illusion of the 
senses, of a product of the imagination - and the laws of the world then remain 
what they are; or else the event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of 
reality--but then this reality is controlled by laws unknown to us… The fantastic 
occupies the duration of this uncertainty....[it] is that hesitation experienced by a 
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person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural 
event [italics mine. – DK].46 
The film holds the viewer within this uncertainty for its whole duration, 
constantly contradicting itself both in respect to its “historicity” and the ability of cinema 
to represent history. In a way, this allows the film to keep the interpretative field open, 
without the necessity to assign one single reading to Soviet history. It is possible to argue 
that, no matter how aware the film is of the Soviet grand narrative being a myth, the 
film’s nostalgia for Soviet mythology prompts it to create its own. At the first glance, it is 
evident that verifiability of every event in the film is consistently, though not always 
explicitly, questioned if not outright denied. Thus, the film stresses the unavailability of 
many “witnesses” who mysteriously “vanish” in another euphemism describing Stalinist 
purges; those “witnesses” who are available insist that they do not remember a thing. The 
phrase, “there was nothing” (nichego ne bylo) repeats as a compulsive refrain in the part 
of the film narrating the aftermath of the launch. Yet, after proclaiming that, in the 
absence of witnesses, it might even seem that “there was no such era” (literally, “no such 
time,” kazhetsia, chto i vremeni togo ne bylo), the narrator pauses and dreamily says, 
“But the rocket – it was there” (a raketa - byla), squeezing the whole narrative of the 
Soviet achievement into one exceptionally appropriate symbol (earlier in the film the 
rocket was described being “higher than Kremlin towers,” thus, in an allegorical reading, 
something above and beyond the symbol of the state and ideology). 
In an interview, Fedorchenko shares an emotional experience he had at one of the 
film’s screenings: he tells about being approached by “one man” and being told that “it 
                                                
46Tzvetan Todorov, Trans. Richard Howard, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre 
(Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973), 25. 
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(the events in the film) was really so, and everything very closely resembles the truth. 
Not factually, but we managed to portray the spirit. This was the man who operated the 
lunar rover [this likely refers to the Lunokhod 1 mission of 1970. – DK] from Earth… 
This was the greatest praise I could have received.”47 The readily observable 
inconsistency between “it being really so” and “closely resembling the truth” in fact 
mimics the problematic relationship to mimesis that is built into the mockumentary 
genre. The film sums up its supposed relationship to the issue of historical representation 
through the voice of an archive worker, who says, guiding the “journalists” through the 
dusty labyrinth of secret KGB archives: “Everything that happened must be filmed. And 
if it was filmed, then it happened,”48 which cannot help but sound like a perverse 
conclusion the film makes out of the Barthian "on the one hand, it [the object in a 
photograph] is not there, on the other, it has indeed been."49 
First on the Moon self-consciously does not do a good job pretending to be a 
documentary feature. The title sequence has opening credits that clearly show that the 
film has a cast; yet, none of the actors engaged in the film are on the Russian A-list, 
which ensures that the face recognition effect does not interfere with the suspension of 
disbelief that the film attempts to create. The narration varies between non-diegetic 
voiceover (most of the film) and diegetic voiceover, in some scenes where the narrator 
acts as the journalist interviewing the witnesses. The authority of the non-diegetic 
voiceover ensures proper framing of the illusion of mimesis, as, before any “action” starts 
                                                
47 The “Pravda” review,<http://www.pravda.ru/world/europe/52114-luna-0. 28.09.2005>: “На меня 
большое впечатление произвел один человек, который подошел ко мне и сказал, что действительно 
всё так и было и все очень похоже на правду. Не фактически, но мы передали тот дух. Это был 
человек, который управлял с Земли Луноходом. Вся грудь в орденах, пожилой. Для меня это была 
высшая похвала”. 
48 In Russian: “Все, что было, должно быть снято. А если снято, значит, было”. 




in the film, it already apologizes for the quality of the archival footage used in the film 
that is “not up to the standard” but is still used because of its “uniqueness.” There will be 
many more such apologetic revelations in the film that in fact does, albeit ironically, the 
same thing as Pelevin’s protagonist, Omon, saw the Soviet Space Program’s staff 
cinematographers do when making fake footage of the space walk, with similar 
revealingly apologetic remarks. 
The argument of many cinema theorists who examine what happens to the issue 
of representing history in the postmodern cinema is that in postmodernity, history gets 
reinterpreted as an “experience” rather than as a chain of events. To that end, Vivian 
Sobchack discusses the representational immediacy of twentieth century technologies 
that, in terms of history, creates a possibility of attaching another dimension to the 
historical events that are traditionally presented in the form of linear (and, importantly, 
verbal) narratives. This representational immediacy, beside enabling one to think of 
history in terms of experience, has a very interesting implication for the whole structure 
of historical process as conceived by the film viewer: “By virtue of their increasing 
representational immediacy, these new twentieth century technologies of representation 
and narration (most significantly television) have increasingly collapsed the temporal 
distance between present, past, and future that structured out previously conceived 
notions of what we call history.”50 The visual experience of history in First on the Moon 
is created out of the uncannily Eisensteinian montage through metonymic associations, 
where the footage of cosmonauts’ training is complemented by the equally fake footage 
of Young Pioneers’ outings and of everyday life in the Russia of 1937, where people 
                                                
50 Vivian Sobchack, ed., The Persistence of History: Cinema, Television and the Modern Event. 
(Routledge, 1995), 4-5. 
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stroll in the parks, buy newspapers, eat ice cream and so forth. Another reviewer tackles 
precisely that, saying that 
[i]t is not the plot that makes his film stunning, but the subtlety with which each 
fragment of the action conveys not just the historical time, but also its refined 
gradations, all of which are totally clear to [Fedorchenko’s] contemporaries and to 
every Soviet person. Every decade has its own colors, odors, nuances, and 
between its beginning and its end there is an historical abyss.51 
The “purposelessness” of the archival footage then becomes not just the function 
of the film’s critique of national history, realized through showing the obsessive desire on 
the part of the Soviet state to put itself in control of the events by filming and thus 
appropriating them. It also becomes a work of memorialization, an attempt to capture the 
experience of history, to bridge the “historical abyss”, for which documentary footage 
seemingly has great potential. 
Surveillance footage, by definition, is presumed to represent the event as 
objectively as possible, because the camera in such footage is, literally and figuratively, 
disembodied, often immobile, capturing the events that happen to cross its scope. The 
arguably most famous piece of documentary footage in the XX-century, the Zapruder 
film showing Kennedy’s assassination, for the theorists of the documentary has become a 
perfect example of the documentary’s ability to simultaneously show and not show what 
“really” happened52 (it does show the moment of assassination yet fails to provide any 
                                                
51 The Kovalyov review, <http://www.kinokultura.com/2006/11r-firstmoon1.shtml>. 
52 For a discussion of the Zapruder film, see Marita Sturken, “Reenactment, Fantasy, and the Paranoia of 
History: Oliver Stone's Docudramas”, in History and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 4, Theme Issue 36: Producing 
the Past: Making Histories Inside and Outside the Academy (Dec., 1997), 64-79. Also, Robert Kolker pays 
attention to the issue in his chapter on Oliver Stone’s cinema, in Robert Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness: 
Penn, Stone, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
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answers as far as to who might have done it). The Zapruder film compromises the belief 
in the possibility of “objective” historical representation, yet it continues to be viewed 
because the belief that documentary footage is the representation of historical events is 
too temptingly ensured by the workings of the cinematic apparatus to be completely 
abandoned. 
Such is the nostalgic desire on the part of First on the Moon for the camera to be 
able to be the objective, dispassionate recorder of the truth, that the film fakes the 
surveillance footage of the cosmonauts’ road to the Moon because it wants such footage 
to really have existed. The film creates a fetish out of the surveillance footage, knowing 
perfectly well that it is not “it,” not the objective representation of events, and yet so 
temptingly close. 
First on the Moon, then, crafts a peculiar place from which it can look at the 
Soviet mythology from a distance, temporal as well as interpretative. As First on the 
Moon painstakingly recreates and mythologizes its perfect nostalgic object – the past that 
never existed, it uncovers the Soviet utopia that allowed the myth of the conquest of 
Cosmos to appear, and uses the model verbatim to salvage the remnants of Soviet 
mythology. 
Aleksei Gherman’s Paper Soldier, the Last Cosmonaut 
Post-Soviet culture’s fascination with all things cosmic is evident in that it does 
not seem to leave alone the corpus of myths surrounding the Soviet Space Program. In 
2008, Aleksei German’s Paper Soldier presented a fictionalized account of the 
Bondarenko accident. This account serves in the film as the background to the story of a 
physician who monitors the cosmonaut squad’s training. The physician, Daniil, once 
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wanted to become a cosmonaut himself, but due to medical issues is left to participate 
only in ground operations. Daniil spends time worrying about “young boys who we send 
towards sure death,” and is still dreaming about “us going to the place where there was 
only God before.” 
Daniil witnesses the oxygen chamber incident, fails to save the burned young man 
and plunges into the depths of depression, together with hallucinations of his dead parents 
who are calling him to join them in heaven. Daniil’s ambivalence about the space 
program is mirrored by his love life as he is torn between his wife and his lover, and his 
health becomes progressively worse. In the film’s climax, the two women watch Daniil 
fall off his bicycle and die of a heart attack as the launch of the rocket (which, we are lead 
to believe, carries Yuri Gagarin) is visible over the rural landscape, followed to the 
heavens by the camera’s languid movement. Daniil is reunited with his parents in heaven 
(which looks very much like a nostalgic recreation of the iconic messy coziness of a 
Soviet apartment of the 1960s-70s) where the rocket “carried” him. 
Daniil’s failure and simultaneous triumph is summed up in the iconic voice of the 
1960s Soviet generation, Bulat Okudzhava: “He wanted to change the world/So that 
everyone could be happy,/But he himself was hanging by a thread,/For he was a paper 
soldier.”53 Even as the ‘thread’ of ideology seems to hold the cosmonauts-in-training 
firmly in place as they prepare for the first human spaceflight, Daniil is able to sever this 
thread as the film metaphorically takes him where he wanted to be. 
In the film, the familiar motifs of ‘iron men,’ who created the Soviet state and 
desire to appropriate outer space (‘our men will go to the stars, and we’re going to build a 
huge base on Mars’, goes the staunch prognosis) run along the equally familiar themes of 
                                                
53Okudzhava 1989, 45. 
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outer space as a source of transcendent, utopian meanings yet also of fear and uncertainty 
(‘all sorrows will be gone when we get there,’ promises one of the characters, but the 
Space program is called ‘a difficult and poignant step’). Yet, these themes only serve as a 
frame to the faithfully nostalgic recreation of the Soviet cultural landscape. The 
notoriously slow-moving camera lingers on objects of everyday life, leaving the 
‘likeable, but pointless’ characters (Daniil’s self-designation) to converse off-screen. The 
events of the film unfold against landscapes that lack color and seem to consist of 
puddles, broken tree branches and patches of mud, which is reminiscent of the ways the 
late 1980s Russian chernukha films set up their narrative space, contributing to the 
impression that the film does not truly belong in the year 2008 when it was made. 
The opening sequence, with soldiers walking through the Kazakh steppe and the 
rocket being transported to the launch site, looks like a dream because of the camera’s 
slow, slightly wobbly movement constantly changing elevation. Indeed, when we 
encounter the protagonist, he wakes up, yet the dream continues on the visual level 
because the technique does not change. Furthermore, Daniil is shown waking up so often 
in the film that the viewer is left wondering whether the preceding sequence was not also 
a dream sequence. 
Thus, in the film, the faithfully recreated Soviet urban milieu and landscapes are 
formally and authoritatively posited as dreams. The film’s vision offers the fleeting and 
“unreal” dream that the Soviet Union of the 1960s must indeed look like from the 
nostalgic post-Soviet vantage point. This vision taps into the nature of nostalgia as a 
longing for the place and time that never existed. However, the same cinematic technique 
allows for a different reading: the camerawork creates the disembodied, nearly 
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disinterested point of view that is, in a way, akin to the “objectiveness” of the 
“documentary” footage of First on the Moon. The gaze of the camera in the film is 
largely depersonalized as the camera looks at the space from unusual angles, its motions 
fluidly slow, not allowing itself to adopt the perspective of any of the characters. The 
viewer, then, is not invited to look at the history of the Soviet space launch through the 
perspective of the events’ participant. Instead, the camera is interested in the visual 
structure of the historical era it attempts to record, wherein the history of the space launch 
is inscribed as a structuring narrative. This pinpoints the place of the complex of the 
“dead cosmonauts” myths within post-Soviet culture’s attempts to come to terms with the 
Soviet past. 
Lyubov’ Arkus observes that the film is “not about the era, but instead about its 
unconscious”54. As Paper Soldier continues the post-Soviet examination of the Soviet 
‘space mythologies’, the rocket carries Daniil not to the vast expanse of Cosmos but 
instead to a kind of nostalgically peaceful Soviet heaven. Daniil, too, becomes a dead 
cosmonaut, radically changing his plane of existence not in order to conquer outer space 
for the Communist State, but instead to stay forever in the Soviet past, signaling it to 
anyone watching. At one point in the film, Daniil reads from Aleksandr Blok’s 1910 
poem, “The Demon”: ‘Yes, I will take you with me/And raise you up where/The earth 
seems like a star/And the star seems like earth’ (Blok 2001: 197). As the film displaces 
the Soviet past into this eerie space structured by ambivalence, it is possible to locate 
Arkus’s ‘unconscious of the era’ in outer space that is staged as a reverse side of the 
Soviet dreamscape. For post-Soviet film and fiction that engage the Soviet ‘space 
                                                
54 Lyubov’ Arkus, “Besplodnye usiliia liubvi k Otechestvu” (interview with Aleksei German). Seans 35-36 
(2008) <http://seance.ru/n/35-36/sborka-3536/bumsoldat/> Accessed October 12, 2010. 
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mythologies,’ outer space becomes a kind of experiential metaphor for the Soviet past 
that encompasses the sublime and the mundane, pleasure and pain, pride and shame 





“То есть я просто-напросто хочу сказать, что Ленин был грибом. Грибом, более 
того, он был не только грибом, он был еще помимо всего радиоволной”. 
Сергей Курёхин, «Ленин-гриб» 
 
“That is, I just simply want to say that Lenin was a mushroom. A mushroom, yes; 
moreover, not only was he a mushroom; he was also a radiowave.” 
Sergei Kurekhin, “Lenin Was a Mushroom” 
 
On May 18, 1991, according to the TV host Sergei Sholokhov, a group of “old 
Bolsheviks” came to the [Leningrad] Regional [Party] Committee. Their only question was, “is 
this true?”1 The “old Bolsheviks” reacted to the segment in the “Fifth Wheel” (Piatoie koleso), a 
Leningrad TV program, which aired the previous day. In the segment, Sholokhov interviewed 
Sergei Kurekhin, an avant-garde musician who, in a series of brilliant lapses of logic, 
convincingly argued at length that Lenin was a mushroom, and that his mushroom-ness directly 
led to the October Revolution of 1917. Though by the end of the broadcast neither the host nor 
his guest could contain their giggling, Sholokhov later noted that the theory Kurekhin and he had 
put forward “was an answer to many questions.” 
Kurekhin’s way of theorizing the Soviet era is in line with the absurdist aesthetics of the 
time. Yet, behind the formally sacrilegious hypothesis that Lenin abused hallucinogenic 
mushrooms to the extent that he himself finally became one, there is explanatory pathos: by May 
1991, the October Revolution looked exactly like an outcome of a hallucinatory delusion. 
                                                
1Dima Mishenin, “Tsennyie Bumagi: Sholokhov – klassik russkogo televideniia” (Mikhail Sholokhov’s interview to 
Krestyanka), in Peremeny (online, 2008), http://www.peremeny.ru/column/view/873/, accessed September 20, 2010. 
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Kurekhin’s project does deconstruct Soviet history; yet, the aesthetics of the absurd, in a way, are 
an honest answer to a genuine question late-Soviet culture had about its beginnings. Even though 
the “old Bolsheviks” did not think Kurekhin’s answer was a good one, they nonetheless took the 
trouble to double-check, and probably not only because of the blind belief in the infallibility of 
Soviet TV broadcasts. Kurekhin’s answer was truthful, if not true: his theory rationalized and 
explained the irrational in the late-Soviet culture through staging this culture’s irrational 
beginnings. 
The absurdist, de(con)structive tactics that Russian cultural texts of the 1990s too-often 
employed to represent both the Soviet past and the post-Soviet present are the reason why, in the 
words of Eliot Borenstein, “in the first five years of the twenty-first century… the 1990s 
[became] the despised decade… [characterized by] persistent negativity and hostility….”2 
Contemporary Russian culture seemed to be relieved when the 1990s were over; studies of recent 
Russian culture like Borenstein’s “point to a growing emphasis on order, structure and domestic 
harmony”3 in the cultural production. 
This shift in the tactics of representation points not just to the stabilization of both 
sociopolitical discourses and everyday life in post-Soviet Russia in the 2000s. The cultural desire 
for order, structure and comfort that recent Russian culture comes to articulate is not only a 
reaction to the cynical aesthetic of the absurd and the bleak – such an aesthetic had always 
concealed this desire. We can then read the trends described by Borenstein as an eventuality of 
the semantic uncertainties of the 1990s, as an articulation of the ordering, structuring pathos that 
underlied post-Soviet de(con)structive cultural production of the 1990s. This articulation 
becomes possible because the search for a metaphor that would legitimize post-Soviet culture 
                                                
2 Borenstein 2008, 226. 
3 Ibid., 238. 
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finally achieves a modicum of success in the context of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. 
For Borenstein, the 1990s condense into the figure of Russia’s first President, Boris 
Yeltsin, the “flabby and weak…absent father.”4 Against this absent father is juxtaposed the 
“manly man,” Putin, who, Borenstein convincingly shows, comes to define the landscape of 
“recent [Russian popular] culture [that] is attempting to move beyond male insecurity (Yeltsin) 
to a manly grip on power (Putin) while… rejecting the violent excess and bleak cynicism of the 
previous decade in favor of domesticity, comfort, and the continuity of family ties.”5 Putin, then, 
replaces Yeltsin the absent father, to legitimize and support the articulation of the desire for 
continuity in the cultural texts from the 2000s. 
The post-Soviet is over, as Kevin Platt proclaims, arguing that 
whereas authoritative visions of [Russian] history and identity during the 1990s were 
predicated on the notion that 1991 marked a moment of radical social transformation… 
the “end of the post-Soviet” is the culmination of a gradual reemergence over the last 
decade or so [2000s] of a vision of political history and social identity based in 
continuities, at various historical depths, linking the Russian present with the Soviet and 
pre-Soviet eras.6 
As the metaphor of historical rupture comes to be replaced by the metaphor of continuity, 
the “despised decade” of the 1990s thus might look like a gap in Russian cultural mythologies, 
marked by the absent father and an absent teleology, much like the 1920s must have looked like 
to the founding fathers of Socialist Realism who attempted to cover a gap of their own created by 
the semantic uncertainty of the Russian revolutionary art. Yet, Borenstein makes a revealing 
remark when he discusses Putin’s rise to power and its symbolic implications. In a cheesy pop 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Borenstein 228. 
6 Platt 2009 
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song, the girl singer, weary of her unreliable, drinking boyfriend (who in Borenstein’s reading 
stands for Yeltsin) wants a new one, “someone like Putin,” an ideal boyfriend. Borenstein points 
to the song’s “unintended” wisdom: “the new president filled a perceived need not necessarily 
for Putin himself, but for someone like Putin.”7 Post-Soviet Russian culture’s desire for the 
stability of myth is thus satisfied: the father returns to cover over the metaphoric lack, but this 
father only does so because he hears the call coming from the historical gap of the 1990s. In a 
perverse reading, Putin is an exceptionally suitable national symbol, alliteratively very close 
Pushkin: “not Pushkin, but still,” Putin was, in a way, the culmination of the fetishistic desire for 
the continuities of Russia’s paternal mythologies outlined in this study. I consciously make this 
metaphor dangerously supple, as its malleability alludes to the multitude of implausible 
extrapolations and analogies in the texts I have discussed, in the texts that stretch and bend the 
continuum of Russian/Soviet mythologies, making it “work” for post-Soviet culture. 
The very “Project Putin,” as Borenstein calls it, is a culmination of the post-Soviet 
attempt to articulate the continuity of Russian cultural mythologies. The “cult of Putin” emerges 
not as a response to the 1990s’ void of state ideology and cultural mythologies; rather, it emerges 
as a response to the attempts of the culture of the 1990s to assess, restructure and relaunch the 
Soviet myths about culture, identity and textuality. 
In this way, though the metaphors that come to stand for the 1990s and 2000s in the 
historiography of Russia are opposites, the cultural desires that define these two decades are not. 
When, with the end of the Soviet era, Lenin ceases to be the grandfather of every Soviet child, he 
becomes a mushroom. This transformation certainly stages a break between the Soviet myth and 
its post-Soviet interpretation. Yet, Lenin cannot remain just a mushroom: he has to be a 
radiowave, too. As the 1990s appropriate the existing rhetorical and mythological structures that 
                                                
7 Borenstein 227. 
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the Soviet Union left behind,8 the excess of meaning with which the figure of Lenin continues to 
be invested provides a structural link between the hyperboles of Soviet mythology and the post-
Soviet mode(s) of organizing meaning. 
To draw on Platt again, “revolution, transition, or transformation … can only be 
metaphors that mask inevitable continuities of social organization, practical life, and everyday 
experience - basal linkages that persist through even the most radical moments of social 
change.”9 Russia’s most persistent continuity is the role of its culture in shaping public and 
political life; in Nancy Condee’s words, “Russia’s culture… has historically served… as 
historian and augur, cartulary and politician [in the] narration of public conscience.”10 Yet, 
linguistic and visual signs, bread and butter for the scholars of culture, are but a symptom of 
these linkages, which exist on the level of repeating patterns of culture, on the level of practices, 
habits and rites of everyday life. Condee has precisely these continuities in mind when she 
discusses the structures of representation and practices of production in post-Soviet cinema: 
Russia will not resolve its imperial legacy, she argues, because it is its imperial legacy.11 In this 
argument, the “imperial trace” in recent Russian cinema (which Condee cautiously avoids calling 
post-Soviet) has to do not only, and not primarily, with the themes, images, and ideologies that 
the filmmakers construct and draw upon; it also has to do with the representational modes and 
tactics through which these themes, images, and ideologies are approached. 
Russia’s [imperial] past, then, is not the lost object for the culture to ponder, mourn, and 
to be eventually reconciled with; instead, it is that part of the pondering subject which organizes 
and structures the very mode of exploration of Russia’s [imperial] past. It is, in a sense, 
                                                
8 Condee 2009, 5. 
9 Platt 2009. 
10 Condee 2009, 20. 
11 Condee 2009, 47. 
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contemporary Russia’s unconscious, a concealed structure that underlies the production and 
articulation of culture. 
The unconscious is structured like language, Lacan reminds us, and the linguistic 
conception of time in the modern Russian language is prohibitive of attempts to place an event in 
time. The beginnings of the modern Russian state lie temptingly close to the historical moment 
when the linguistic conception of time changed imperceptibly in Russia, with the loss of Old 
Russian tenses which blurred the distinctions between the different “pasts” to emphasize the 
“how” of the event rather than the “when,” the modality rather than the moment on the 
conceptual timeline. This is not to say that the Russian language is prohibitive of the writing of 
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